Editing MBT-70 (section)

=== Background ===

The joint German–US main battle tank program was the brainchild of [[US Secretary of Defense]] [[Robert McNamara]]. After serving in the [[United States Army Air Forces|US Army Air Forces]] during World War II, McNamara became a [[Whiz Kids (Ford)|"Whiz Kid"]] at [[Ford Motor Company]], where he later rose to become president. McNamara's interest in German engineering had been shown during his tenure as head of Ford. He had shepherded development of the abortive [[Ford Taunus P4|Ford Cardinal]] – a cancelled project involving the redevelopment for US and other international markets of a compact family car designed by engineers in both the US and Germany. This, it was hoped, would result in a new, competitive product for international markets, with reduced development costs.<ref name="King"/>{{Page range too broad|date=November 2023}}

As Defense Secretary, McNamara began to apply his methods of industrial management to military production. At the time, [[NATO]] member states fielded many different weapons systems and these generally lacked common ammunition, fuel and parts; few weapons were developed jointly, including tanks. While West Germany used American [[M48 Patton]]s, it had historically excelled in engineering armored fighting vehicles and was known to be proceeding with plans to design, develop and build its own tanks. McNamara regarded Germany as an increasingly important member of NATO and believed that joint development would yield superior weapons that could also be used by other NATO members,<ref name="King"/> as well as allies outside NATO.

In 1961, McNamara approached German Minister of Defence [[Franz Josef Strauss]] about beginning a collaborative main battle tank program. Strauss wrote off McNamara's idea and suggested that the U.S. should buy the [[Leopard 1]]. Germany, which was readying production of its indigenous Leopard 1 tank, had little interest in starting another main battle tank project. Strauss did however agree to a common component program. McNamara continued to press for Germany's cooperation in a common tank program, succeeding the next year in brokering a tentative agreement with the Germans.{{sfn|McNaugher|1981|p=4-5}}

The US [[Armor Branch]] had long been pressing the Pentagon to fast-track new main battle tank designs. Consequently, McNamara's seven-year timeline to production was opposed by senior armor officers, who believed an all-new MBT was more urgently needed. Others questioned McNamara's high regard for German engineering, arguing that Germany's collective abilities in tank design and engineering had dwindled and not kept pace with innovations since the end of World War II. Within US armored circles, it was believed that there would be a net [[technology transfer]] towards Germany and there was a common belief that the UK would make a better partner. However, McNamara's choice of Germany was also due to the country's excellent economic position, following its successful post-war rebuilding: the so-called "[[Wirtschaftswunder|economic miracle]]". Hence Germany was better positioned to financially commit to a project of this scale.<ref name="King"/>

In order to develop a tank that would meet the requirements of both armies, in August 1963, Germany and the United States signed a [[memorandum of understanding]] that specified certain desired characteristics and organized a Joint Engineering Agency and a Joint Design Team with equal representation from both countries. Despite these measures, conflicts between the differing engineering practices of each country would plague the MBT-70 project throughout its development.{{sfn|Hunnicutt|1990|p=117}}