Editing Marian reforms (section)

== Attributed reforms ==
[[File:Kempten Pilum.jpg|thumb|upright|The head of a {{lang|la|pilum}} bent on impact after throwing]]
[[File:Roman aquila.jpg|thumb|upright|Modern reconstruction of a Roman {{lang|la|aquila}}. Marius, according to Pliny, abolished non-eagle legionary standards.{{ref|name=taylor2019citingPlinNH}} ]]

Some or all of the following reforms have been attributed to Marius in modern historiography. They are, however, variably dated. Many modern sources date them to his first consulship, during the [[Jugurthine War]] against [[Jugurtha of Numidia]], in 107&nbsp;BC. However, it is also possible that other far-reaching actions, especially in opening army recruitment, were undertaken during Marius' repeated consulships from 104 to 100&nbsp;BC during which Rome faced the serious threat of [[Cimbrian War|Germanic invasion]].{{sfn|Evans|1995|pp=99–100}}

=== Ancient attributions ===
Marius was credited with setting the precedent for recruiting the poor by the historian [[Valerius Maximus]] writing in the early 1st century&nbsp;AD.{{sfn|Val. Max.|loc=2.3.1}} Two further reforms (distinguished from mere actions taken by Marius) are attributed, in sources postdating his career by hundreds of years, to Marius directly: a redesign of the {{lang|la|[[pilum]]}} and sole use of the [[Aquila (Roman)|eagle]] as the legionary standard.{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=78}}

==== Army proletarianisation ====

The main putative reform attributed to Marius is a change to recruitment starting, as is generally held, in 107&nbsp;BC. In that year, Marius was consul, had himself assigned by [[Plebeian Council|plebiscite]] to the war against Jugurtha, and recruited additional soldiers to send to war by enlisting volunteers from both those in the five census classes and also the {{lang|la|capite censi}}. The senate had in fact given Marius the right to conscript,{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|p=107}} but he chose to also enrol some three to five thousand volunteers.{{sfn|Evans|1995|p=92}}

Various motives have been ascribed to Marius' decision to accept volunteers. The motive attributed in Sallust, Marius' personal ambition to seize power, may more reflect Sallust's desire to connect the republic's collapse with moral decline and failure to adhere to tradition.{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|pp=81–83}} The second edition ''Cambridge Ancient History'' viewed it as an expedient to evade popular opposition to conscription.{{sfn|Lintott|1994|pp=91–92}} R&nbsp;J Evans,<ref>See {{harvnb|Evans|1995|pp=92–93}}.</ref> with whom François Cadiou agreed, instead proposed that Marius' decision emerged from his promise of a quick victory in Numidia followed by an energetic effort to follow through by raising and bringing an army as quickly as possible to Africa so to maximise his time campaigning as consul.{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|pp=106, 110}} Regardless, after Marius' victorious return from the Jugurthine War, his volunteers were discharged and, in the following [[Cimbrian War|Cimbric War]], he assumed command of consular legions recruited via hitherto normal procedure.{{sfnm|Taylor|2023|1p=160|Taylor|2019|2p=79}}

It was believed that Marius' decision to enlist volunteers from the {{lang|la|capite censi}} changed the socio-economic background of the army by allowing the poor to take it over.{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|p=399}} These poor soldiers then professionalised and lived only as soldiers. These professional soldiers, disconnected from a society in which they had no property stake, over time became clients of their generals who then used them to seize power in Rome and plunge the republic into civil wars that eventually brought about its collapse.{{sfnm|Mackay|2009|1p=97|Scullard|2011|2p=47}} There are, however, no indications that Roman conscription ceased.<ref>{{harvnb|Lintott|1994|p=92|ps=. "The Romans continued to levy regularly by conscription".}} {{harvnb|Gruen|1995|p=367|ps=. "And the Marian reforms... did not abolish the levy. Conscription continued... to the end of the republic".}}</ref> Nor is there much evidence that later Roman armies during the 1st century&nbsp;BC were made up of volunteers; almost all ancient references to army recruitment, outside private armies, involve conscription.{{sfnm|Rafferty|2021|1p=|Gauthier|2020|2p=283, "the sources show that soldiers were usually still recruited according to their census rating even in the late Republic", citing {{harvnb|Cadiou|2018|pp=392–93}} }}

Conscription continued after Marius' time, especially during the Social War, and the wealth and social background of the men who joined before and after the opening of recruitment changed little.{{sfnm|Rich|1983|1p=329|Gruen|1995|2pp=xvii, 367|Evans|1995|3p=91}} Pay remained extremely low – only five [[As (Roman coin)|asses]] per day – and irregular.{{sfn|Gruen|1995|p=369, calling it a "bare subsistence"}} Moreover, although the surviving sources frequently characterise soldiers as "poor", these sources largely reflect the perspectives of the elite, by whom the vast majority of the population were considered "poor" and for whom the notion of poverty was broader than actual landlessness. Many of the soldiers of the 1st century&nbsp;BC possessed modest lands.{{sfn|Rafferty|2021}} Nor did the legions meaningfully professionalise: as, in general, both soldiers and commanders served only for short periods intending, respectively, to secure plunder or political advancement from military victory.{{sfn|Gruen|1995|p=xvii}} There is little evidence that this putative change in army recruitment created anti-republican client armies.<ref>{{harvnb|Gruen|1995|p=xvii|ps=. "Nothing suggests that the soldiery had developed a separatist mentality, let alone that they contemplated toppling the republic. Even those who [[crossed the Rubicon]] responded to appeals on constitutional grounds".}}</ref>

==== Equipment changes ====

Beyond changes to army recruitment, there are two other reforms attributed to Marius specifically in the ancient sources: a redesign for a javelin, and the designation of the {{lang|la|[[Aquila (Roman)|aquila]]}} (eagle) as the universal legionary standard.{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=78}}

Plutarch relates that Marius altered the design of the Roman {{lang|la|pilum}},<ref>{{harvnb|Taylor|2019|pp=78}}, citing {{harvnb|Plut. ''Mar.''|loc=25}}.</ref> a heavy javelin designed to stick into shields, by including a wooden peg which broke when the javelin was thrown.{{sfn|Matthew|2010|p=54}} Many scholars believe this was to prevent the javelin from being thrown back, but it is more likely that the swinging motion of the broken peg was meant to force someone to discard a shield into which the javelin was struck.{{sfn|Matthew|2010|p=57}} Regardless of the efficacy or purpose of the redesign, archaeological evidence from the 80s&nbsp;BC through to the early imperial era show that Marius' redesign was not adopted.<ref>{{harvnb|Taylor|2019|p=78}}; {{harvnb|Matthew|2010|pp=65–66|ps=. Matthew believes the redesign was a one-time expedient and that Marius' rapid departure from active command in the immediate aftermath of victory over the Cimbri prevented the redesign from being fully adopted.}}</ref> Roman {{lang|la|pila}} without Marius' peg often bent or broke on impact, but this was more likely a by-product of their long, narrow shanks than an intentional feature.{{sfn|Bishop|2017|p=42}}

Pliny's ''[[Natural History (Pliny)|Natural History]]'' attributes Marius with adopting the eagle as the universal legionary standard.<ref name=taylor2019citingPlinNH>{{harvnb|Taylor|2019|p=78|ps=, citing Plin., ''NH'', 10.16.}}</ref> This has been interpreted as a rallying symbol for each cohort.{{sfn|Scullard|2011|p=48}} Pliny's claim, however, is incorrect; sources show late republican and early imperial legions with other animal symbols such as bulls and wolves.{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=79 n. 14}}

=== Modern attributions ===

Most of the reforms attributed to Marius in various sources emerged only in modern times. These reforms have little ancient pedigree. They rest largely on the basis of comparison between the army described by [[Polybius]] and the army in the texts of the 1st century&nbsp;BC with an assumed attribution to Marius.{{sfn|Faszcza|2021|pp=18–19}}

==== Equipment at state expense ====
It is also sometimes claimed that Marius – because the poor citizens enrolled could not afford to purchase their own weapons and armour – arranged for the state to supply them with arms, displacing the traditional system of self-purchase.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Matthew |first=Christopher Anthony |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YBYaBwAAQBAJ |title=On the wings of eagles |date=2010 |publisher=Cambridge Scholars Publishing |isbn=978-1-4438-1813-1 |page=25 |ref=none }} Matthew notes "the theory of equipping at state expense has no confirmatory basis in the ancient record".</ref> Such a scheme may have been incipient during [[Gaius Gracchus]]' plebeian tribunate ({{circa|122&nbsp;BC}}); according to Plutarch, Gracchus passed a law to abolish deductions from soldier pay for clothing. The Italian historian Emilio Gabba argued, for example, that Plutarch's text could be emended from merely encompassing clothing to equipment more generally, reflecting Gabba's belief that this policy emerged from the recruitment of poor soldiers unable to pay for their own equipment.{{sfn|Gauthier|2015|pp=82–83}}

Neither a Gracchan abolition of deductions for equipment or a Marian programme to equip soldiers is attested in the evidence. There are no indications that Gracchus' law ever came into effect and literary evidence indicates that deductions for clothing and equipment were common in the imperial army of Augustus into the 1st century&nbsp;AD.<ref>{{harvnb|Gauthier|2015|p=83|ps=, citing Tac. ''Ann.'' 1.17.6.}}</ref> If Marius purchased equipment for his troops in Numidia at his own expense, later generals and the state in general did not do so.{{sfn|Gauthier|2015|p=102}}

==== "Marius' mules" and training ====

Marius is said in ancient sources to have moved much of the baggage off beasts of burden and onto the backs of the common soldiers, giving them the moniker {{lang|la|muli Mariani}} ("Marius' mules").{{sfn|Taylor|2023|p=160}} Some modern historians have read this action as a permanent reduction in the size of Roman baggage trains, increasing the speed of army movement.{{sfn|Scullard|2011|p=48}} However, attempts to force soldiers to carry their own equipment were common among successful generals at the time; Marius' predecessor in Numidia, [[Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus|Quintus Caecilius Metellus]],<ref>{{harvnb|Sall. ''Iug.''|loc=44–45|ps=: "[Metellus] is said to have removed the incentives to indolence by an edict... that no private soldier should have a slave or a pack animal in the camp or on the march". }}</ref> as well as [[Scipio Aemilianus]], was said to have forced their soldiers to carry their own equipment.{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=79 n. 18}}

Some modern historians have also attributed to Marius reforms in the training of Roman soldiers which ostensibly reflected a professionalising service. Such training and drilling, however, had become common before Marius due to the loss of collective experience in the generations after the Second Punic War. [[Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus]] drilled his men for almost a year before deploying them in the [[Lusitanian War]] ({{circa|145&nbsp;BC}}); Scipio Aemilianus, for example, drilled his men before his [[Numantine War|campaigns]] against [[Numantia]] ({{circa|133&nbsp;BC}}); Metellus similarly drilled his men prior to their departure to Africa in 109&nbsp;BC.<ref>{{harvnb|Taylor|2023|p=160}}, citing, App. ''Hisp.'', 65; Front. ''Strat.'', 4.1.1; {{harvnb|Val. Max.|loc=2.7.2}}.</ref> Such attempts to reintroduce discipline reflected the recruits' lack of military training rather than a class of budding professional soldiers.{{sfn|Taylor|2023|p=160}}

==== Unit composition ====

Modern historians have sometimes credited to Marius the abolition of Roman cavalry and light infantry and their replacement with [[auxilia]]. There is no direct evidence for this contention, which is driven largely by literary sources' silence on those branches after the 2nd century; continued inscriptional evidence attests both citizen cavalry and light infantry into the end of the republic.<ref>{{harvnb|Gauthier|2020|p=284}}, citing, among others, {{CIL|1|593}}. See also, especially pages 69–71, {{Cite journal |last=Gauthier |first=François |date=2021 |title=Did ''velites'' really disappear in the late Roman republic? |url=https://biblioscout.net/article/10.25162/historia-2021-0004 |journal=Historia |volume=70 |issue=1 |pages=69–82 |doi=10.25162/historia-2021-0004 |s2cid=230543924 |issn=0018-2311|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The decline of Roman light infantry has been connected not to reform but cost. Because the logistical cost of supporting light infantry and heavy infantry was relatively similar, the Romans chose to deploy heavy infantry in extended and distant campaigns due to their greater combat effectiveness, especially when local levies could substitute for light infantry brought from Rome and Italy.{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=86}}

Marius has also been credited with the introduction of the [[cohort (military unit)|cohort]] (a unit of 480 men) in place of the [[Maniple (military unit)|maniple]] (a unit of only 160 men) as the basic unit of manoeuvre.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Richardson |first=Alan |date=2003 |title=Space and manpower in Roman camps |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0092.00189 |journal=Oxford Journal of Archaeology |volume=22 |issue=3 |pages=303–313 |doi=10.1111/1468-0092.00189 |issn=0262-5253|url-access=subscription }} Contra {{harvnb|Scullard|2011|p=48|ps=, explaining also that three maniples made up a cohort, which was itself 600 men.}}</ref> This attribution is rather dubious and there is no ancient evidence of it;<ref>{{harvnb|Matthew|2010|p=50 n. 3|ps=. "{{lang|la|cohors}}: no ancient text specifically attributes this reform to Marius".}}</ref> cohorts may have been used as far back as the Second Punic War near the end of the third century&nbsp;BC. The cohort itself emerged as an administrative unit conscripted from Rome's Italian allies and is first attested in a description by Polybius, a usually reliable historian,{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2006|pp=20–21}} of a battle which occurred in 206&nbsp;BC.{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=81}} By the 130s&nbsp;BC, through the [[Roman conquest of Spain|Spanish wars]] and operations with Italian allies, the cohort had developed into a tactical unit.{{sfn|Taylor|2019|pp=76, 82}} While, after 109&nbsp;BC, the maniple disappears from the literary evidence, Marius' predecessor in Numidia is documented to have used cohorts in battle:<ref>{{harvnb|Taylor|2019|p=89|ps=, citing {{harvnb|Sall. ''Iug.''|loc=51.3}}, where amid an uncertain battle "Metellus... opposed four legionary cohorts to the enemy's infantry", pushed through, and won the [[Battle of the Muthul|battle]].}}</ref> if cohorts replaced maniples around this time, Marius was likely not responsible.<ref>{{harvnb|Taylor|2019|p=82|ps=, citing {{Cite journal |last=Bell |first=Michael J V |date=1965 |title=Tactical reform in the Roman republican army |journal=Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte |volume=14 |issue=4 |pages=404–422 |jstor=4434897 |issn=0018-2311}} }}</ref>

==== Land and citizenship for veterans ====

Modern historians have also attributed to Marius the development of the client armies, tying the loyalty of the veterans to generals securing land grants on discharge.{{sfnm|Mackay|2009|1p=97|Scullard|2011|2p=47}} This picture, however, is largely an exaggeration stemming from the {{lang|la|[[Lex Appuleia agraria|lex agraria]]}} ({{circa|100&nbsp;BC}}) distributing lands to Marius' veterans and poor Romans.<ref>{{harvnb|Evans|1995|pp=149–50|ps=. Evans largely dismisses Appian's narrative (''BCiv.'' 1.29–30) as "little less than absurd".}}</ref> No such client army can be seen in Marius' own land laws, which required cooperation from civil society – the senate, people, and other magistrates – and was not imposed by military decree.{{sfn|Lintott|1994|p=92}}

Moreover, through the post-Marian period, land distributions were sporadic and volunteers were taken on with no promises or reasonable expectations of land at discharge.{{sfnm|Gauthier|2015|1p=101|Keaveney|2007|2p=62}} Soldiers both in the Marian and post-Marian periods largely went home peacefully when land demands were not immediately met, though land distributions became more common after [[Sulla]]'s example in the aftermath of [[Sulla's civil war|his civil war]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Tweedie |first=Fiona C |date=2011 |title=The case of the missing veterans: Roman colonisation and veteran settlement in the second century BC |journal=Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte |volume=60 |issue=4 |pages=458–473 |doi=10.25162/historia-2011-0019 |jstor=41342861 |s2cid=252451787 |issn=0018-2311}}</ref> Only during the civil wars during the later last century&nbsp;BC did demands for land become more prevalent, though not always explicitly to agrarian ends, due to the soldiers' increased bargaining power. For example, during [[Caesar's civil war]] (49–45&nbsp;BC), mutineers demanded lands as a pretext for larger cash donatives, and only during the [[Second Triumvirate|triumviral period]] (43–31&nbsp;BC) did this pretext fall away.{{sfn|Keaveney|2007|pp=63–64}}

There is also no evidence that Marius created or operated any system to give veterans [[Roman citizenship]] on discharge.<ref>Marius gave citizenship to a few cohorts during the Cimbric War. However, this was done ad hoc and only once. {{harvnb|Lavan|2019|p=28 n. 6}}.</ref> Before the [[Social War (91–87 BC)|Social War]] there is only a single example of a citizenship grant for martial valour.<ref>{{cite book |last=Mouritsen |first=Henrik |title=Italian unification |year=1998 |series=BICS Supplement 70 |publisher=Institute of Classical Studies |location=London |isbn=0-9005-8781-4 |page=90}} Mouritsen notes also that Marius' citizenship grant during the Cimbric War is the only pre-Social War example.</ref> Most scholars believe that grants of citizenship to veterans became common only under the emperor [[Claudius]] in the 1st century&nbsp;AD.{{sfn|Lavan|2019|pp=28–29}}