Editing Mind (section)

== Forms ==
The mind encompasses many phenomena, including perception, memory, [[thought]], [[imagination]], motivation, [[emotion]], [[attention]], [[learning]], and consciousness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sharov|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oQ5HAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA343 343–344]}} | {{harvnb|Pashler|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=lu3aMe6kRowC&pg=PR29 xxix–xxx]}} | {{harvnb|Paivio|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FaGYAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR6 vi–vii]}} | {{harvnb|Vanderwolf|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=78m9BwAAQBAJ&pg=PA155 155]}} }}</ref> Perception is the process of interpreting and organizing [[Sense data|sensory information]] to become acquainted with the environment. This information is acquired through [[sense organs]] receptive to various types of [[Physical stimulation|physical stimuli]], which correspond to different forms of perception, such as [[Visual perception|vision]], [[Auditory perception|hearing]], [[touch]], [[Olfactory perception|smell]], and [[taste]]. The sensory information received serves as raw data that is filtered and processed to actively constitute the experience of the world and the objects within it. This complex process underlying perceptual experience is shaped by many factors, including the individual's past [[experience]]s, cultural background, beliefs, knowledge, and expectations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=85–86, 123–125}} | {{harvnb|Martin|1998|loc=[https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/perception/v-1 Lead section]}} | {{harvnb|Gross|2020|pp=74–76}} }}</ref>

Memory is the mechanism of storing and retrieving information.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=208–209, 241}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018|loc=[https://dictionary.apa.org/memory § Memory]}} }}</ref> [[Episodic memory]] handles information about specific past events in one's life and makes this information available in the present. When a person remembers what they had for dinner yesterday, they employ episodic memory. [[Semantic memory]] handles general knowledge about the world that is not tied to any specific episodes. When a person recalls that the capital of Japan is Tokyo, they usually employ semantic memory to access this general information without remembering the specific instance when they learned it. [[Procedural memory]] is memory of how to do things, such as riding a bicycle or playing a musical instrument.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=210, 241}} | {{harvnb|Tulving|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-wt1aZrGXLYC&pg=PA278 278]}} | {{harvnb|Tsien|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Af0IyHtGCMUC&pg=PA861 861]}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|Barohn|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=x4vvDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA94 94]}} }}</ref> Another distinction is between [[short-term memory]], which holds information for brief periods, usually with the purpose of completing specific cognitive tasks, and [[long-term memory]], which can store information for extended periods, potentially lasting a lifetime.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=214–217, 241}} | {{harvnb|Tsien|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Af0IyHtGCMUC&pg=PA861 861]}} | {{harvnb|Khurana|Khurana|2018|page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tpxYDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA462 462]}} }}</ref>

Thinking involves the processing of information and the manipulation of [[concept]]s and [[idea]]s. It is goal-oriented and often happens in response to experiences by aiming at making sense of them, organizing their information, and deciding how to respond.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=249, 290}} | {{harvnb|Ball|2013|pp=739–740}} }}</ref> Logical reasoning is a form of thinking that starts from a set of premises and aims to arrive at a conclusion supported by these premises. This is the case when deducing that "Socrates is mortal" from the premises "Socrates is a man" and "all men are mortal".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nunes|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xZuSxo4JxoAC&pg=PA2066 2066]}} | {{harvnb|Groarke|loc=§ 9. The Syllogism}} | {{harvnb|Ball|2013|pp=739–740}} | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|p=254}} | {{harvnb|Chowdhary|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8SfbDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA27 27]}} }}</ref> [[Problem-solving]] is a closely related process that consists of several steps, such as identifying a problem, developing a plan to address it, implementing the plan, and assessing whether it worked.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ball|2013|pp=739–740}} | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=257–258, 290–291}} }}</ref> Thinking in the form of [[decision-making]] involves considering possible courses of action to assess which one is the most beneficial.<ref>{{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=265–266, 291}}</ref> As a symbolic process, thinking is deeply intertwined with language, and some theorists hold that [[Language of thought hypothesis|all thought happens through the medium of language]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|p=269}} | {{harvnb|Rescorla|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Aydede|2017}} }}</ref>

Imagination is a creative process of internally generating mental images, ideas, experiences, and related phenomena. Unlike perception, it does not directly depend on the stimulation of sensory organs. Similar to [[dream]]ing, these mental constructs are often derived from previous experiences but can include novel combinations and elements. Imagination happens during [[daydreaming]] and plays a key role in art and literature. Additionally, it can also be used to come up with novel solutions to real-world problems.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Singer|2000|pp=227–228}} | {{harvnb|Kind|2017|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018|loc=[https://dictionary.apa.org/imagination § Imagination]}} | {{harvnb|Hoff|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=7zm6DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA617 617–618]}} }}</ref>

Motivation is an internal state that propels individuals to initiate, continue, or terminate goal-directed behavior. It is responsible for the formation of [[intentions]] to perform [[Action (philosophy)|actions]] and affects what goals someone pursues, how much effort they invest in the activity, and how long they engage in it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weiner|2000|pp=314–315}} | {{harvnb|Helms|2000|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/management/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/motivation-and-motivation-theory lead section]}} | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=298, 336–337}} | {{harvnb|Müller|1996|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=kcEOhEWYDCgC&pg=PA14 14]}} }}</ref> Motivation is affected by emotions, which are temporary experiences of positive or negative feelings like joy or anger. They are directed at and evaluate specific events, persons, or situations. They usually come together with certain physiological and behavioral responses.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=322–323, 337}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018|loc=[https://dictionary.apa.org/emotion § Emotion]}} }}</ref>

Attention is an aspect of other mental processes in which mental resources like awareness are directed towards certain features of experience and away from others. This happens when a driver focuses on traffic while ignoring billboards on the side of the road. Attention can be controlled voluntarily in the pursuit of specific goals but can also be diverted involuntarily when a strong [[Stimulus (psychology)|stimulus]] captures a person's attention.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=126–127, 131}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018|loc=[https://dictionary.apa.org/attention § Attention]}} | {{harvnb|McPeek|2009|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LlN2AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA98 Attention: Physiological]}} }}</ref> Attention is relevant to learning, which is the ability of the mind to acquire new information and permanently modify its understanding and behavioral patterns. Individuals learn by undergoing experiences, which helps them [[Adaptation|adapt]] to the environment.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=171, 202}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018|loc=[https://dictionary.apa.org/learning § Learning]}} }}</ref>

=== Conscious and unconscious ===
{{main|Consciousness|Unconscious mind}}

An influential distinction is between conscious and unconscious mental processes. Consciousness is the awareness of external and internal circumstances. It encompasses a wide variety of states, such as perception, thinking, [[Fantasy (psychology)|fantasizing]], dreaming, and [[altered states of consciousness]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=137–138}} | {{harvnb|Davies|2001|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-wt1aZrGXLYC&pg=PA190 190–192]}} | {{harvnb|Gennaro|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Terminological Matters: Various Concepts of Consciousness}} }}</ref> In the case of phenomenal consciousness, the awareness involves a direct and qualitative experience of mental phenomena, like the auditory experience of attending a concert. Access consciousness, by contrast, refers to an awareness of information that is accessible to other mental processes but not necessarily part of current experience. For example, the information stored in a memory may be accessible when drawing conclusions or guiding actions even when the person is not explicitly thinking about it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Davies|2001|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-wt1aZrGXLYC&pg=PA191 191–192]}} | {{harvnb|Smithies|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=s7emDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA83 83–84]}} | {{harvnb|Gennaro|loc=§ 1. Terminological Matters: Various Concepts of Consciousness}} }}</ref>

Unconscious or nonconscious mental processes operate without the individual's awareness but can still influence mental phenomena on the level of thought, feeling, and action. Some theorists distinguish between [[preconscious]], [[subconscious]], and unconscious states depending on their accessibility to conscious awareness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=137–138}} | {{harvnb|Kihlstrom|Tobias|1991|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GwxnDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA212 212]}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018|loc=[https://dictionary.apa.org/unconscious § Unconscious]}} }}</ref>{{efn|The precise differences between these concepts are disputed. In Freud's psychoanalysis, the preconscious mind lies outside current awareness but can easily be accessed, whereas the unconscious mind is further removed from deliberate access. The word ''subconscious'' is sometimes used as a synonym of ''preconscious''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Birch|Malim|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=dzRIEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA205 204–205]}} | {{harvnb|Sayers|2020|p=100}} }}</ref>}} When applied to the overall state of a person rather than specific processes, the term ''[[Unconsciousness|unconscious]]'' implies that the person lacks any awareness of their environment and themselves, like during a [[coma]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gennaro|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Terminological Matters: Various Concepts of Consciousness}} | {{harvnb|Kind|2023|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_VC_EAAAQBAJ&pg=PT25 § 2.1 Phenomenal Consciousness]}} }}</ref> The unconscious mind plays a central role in [[psychoanalysis]] as the part of the mind that contains thoughts, memories, and desires not accessible to conscious introspection. According to [[Sigmund Freud]], the [[psychological mechanism]] of [[Repression (psychoanalysis)|repression]] keeps disturbing phenomena, like unacceptable sexual and aggressive impulses, from entering consciousness to protect the individual. Psychoanalytic theory studies symptoms caused by this process and therapeutic methods to avoid them by making the repressed thoughts accessible to conscious awareness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mijoia|2005|pp=1818–1819}} | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=137–138}} | {{harvnb|Steinberg Gould|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yAT1DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA151 151]}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018|loc=[https://dictionary.apa.org/unconscious § Unconscious]}} | {{harvnb|Carel|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3iUMevXETJ8C&pg=PA176 176]}} }}</ref>

=== Other distinctions ===
[[Mental states]] are often divided into qualitative and propositional states. Qualitative states are experiences of sensory qualities, typically referred to as [[qualia]], like colors, sounds, smells, pains, itches, and hunger. Propositional states involve an [[Propositional attitude|attitude]] towards a content that can be expressed by a [[declarative sentence]]. When a person believes that it is raining, they have the propositional attitude of belief towards the content "it is raining". Different types of propositional states are characterized by different attitudes towards their content. For instance, it is also possible to hope, fear, desire, or doubt that it is raining.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2005|pp=607–608}} | {{harvnb|Swinburne|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FfDpm-roQwYC&pg=PA72 72–73]}} | {{harvnb|Lindeman|loc=§ 1. General Characterization of the Propositional Attitudes}} }}</ref>{{efn|Some mental states, like perceptions and emotions, may have both qualitative and propositional aspects.<ref>{{harvnb|Kim|2005|p=607}}</ref>}}

A mental state or process is [[Rationality|rational]] if it is based on good reasons or follows the norms of rationality. For example, a belief is rational if it relies on strong supporting [[evidence]] and a decision is rational if it follows careful deliberation of all the relevant factors and outcomes. Mental states are irrational if they fail to adhere to these standards, such as beliefs caused by faulty reasoning, [[superstition]], or [[cognitive bias]]es, and decisions that give into [[temptation]]s against one's best judgment.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Harman|2013|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Broome|2021|loc=§ 1. Normativity and Reasons, §2. The Meaning of "Rationality"}} | {{harvnb|Siegel|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6WEwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA157 157]}} | {{harvnb|Maruyama|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=YlvwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA172 172–173]}} }}</ref> Mental states that fall outside the domain of rational evaluation are arational rather than irrational. There is controversy regarding which mental phenomena lie outside this domain; suggested examples include sensory impressions, feelings, desires, and involuntary responses.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nolfi|2015|pp=41–42}} | {{harvnb|Tappolet|2023|pp=137–138}} | {{harvnb|Knauff|Spohn|2021|loc=§ 2.2 Basic Concepts of Rationality Assessment, § 4.2 Descriptive Theories}} | {{harvnb|Vogler|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zNIeDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA30 30–31]}} }}</ref>

Another contrast is between [[disposition]]al and occurrent mental states. A dispositional state is a power that is not exercised. If a person believes that cats have whiskers but does not think about this fact, it is a dispositional belief. By activating the belief to consciously think about it or use it in other cognitive processes, it becomes occurrent until it is no longer actively considered or used. The great majority of a person's beliefs are dispositional most of the time.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bartlett|2018|pp=1, 4–5 }} | {{harvnb|Schwitzgebel|2024|loc=§ 2.1 Occurrent Versus Dispositional Belief}} | {{harvnb|Wilkes|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jtArBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA412 412]}} }}</ref>

=== Faculties and modules ===
Traditionally, the mind was subdivided into [[Faculty psychology|mental faculties]] understood as capacities to perform certain functions or bring about certain processes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kenny|1992|pp=71–72}} | {{harvnb|Perler|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=78C6BwAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3–6, 11]}} | {{harvnb|Hufendiek|Wild|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=78C6BwAAQBAJ&pg=PA264 264–265]}} }}</ref> An influential subdivision in the [[history of philosophy]] was between the faculties of intellect and [[Will (philosophy)|will]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kenny|1992|p=75}} | {{harvnb|Perler|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=78C6BwAAQBAJ&pg=PA5 5–6]}} }}</ref> The intellect encompasses mental phenomena aimed at understanding the world and determining what to believe or what is true; the will is concerned with practical matters and what is good, reflected in phenomena like desire, decision-making, and action.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kenny|1992|pp=75–76}} | {{harvnb|Perler|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=78C6BwAAQBAJ&pg=PA5 5–6]}} }}</ref> The exact number and nature of the mental faculties are disputed. More fine-grained distinctions divide the intellect into the faculties of understanding and judgment or add sensibility as an additional faculty responsible for sensory impressions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kenny|1992|pp=78–79}} | {{harvnb|Perler|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=78C6BwAAQBAJ&pg=PA5 5–6]}} | {{harvnb|McLear|loc=§ 1i. Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason}} }}</ref>{{efn|Mental faculties also play a central role in the Indian tradition, such as the contrast between the sense mind (manas) and intellect ([[buddhi]]).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Deutsch|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=WfRXAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA354 354]}} | {{harvnb|Schweizer|1993|p=848}} }}</ref>}}

[[File:Müller-Lyer illusion - simple.svg|thumb|alt=Diagram of two horizontal lines with arrow-like components at their ends|In the [[Müller-Lyer illusion]], the horizontal black lines have the same length but the top line appears longer. The illusion persists even after becoming aware of it because of the automatic functioning of mental modules responsible for low-level visual processing.<ref>{{harvnb|Robbins|2017|loc=§ 1. What Is a Mental Module?}}</ref>]]

In contrast to the traditional view, more recent approaches analyze the mind in terms of [[Modularity of mind|mental modules]] rather than faculties.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Robbins|2017|loc=Lead Section, § 1. What Is a Mental Module?}} | {{harvnb|Perler|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=78C6BwAAQBAJ&pg=PA7 7]}} | {{harvnb|Hufendiek|Wild|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=78C6BwAAQBAJ&pg=PA264 264–265]}} | {{harvnb|Bermúdez|2014|p=277}} }}</ref> A mental module is an inborn system of the brain that automatically performs a particular function within a specific domain without conscious awareness or effort. In contrast to faculties, the concept of mental modules is normally used to provide a more limited explanation. It is typically restricted to certain low-level cognitive processes without trying to explain how they are integrated into higher-level processes such as conscious reasoning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Robbins|2017|loc=§ 1. What Is a Mental Module?}} | {{harvnb|Hufendiek|Wild|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=78C6BwAAQBAJ&pg=PA265 265–268]}} | {{harvnb|Bermúdez|2014|pp=288–290}} }}</ref>{{efn|A different perspective is proposed by the massive modularity hypothesis, which states that the mind is entirely composed of modules with high-level modules establishing the connection between low-level modules.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hufendiek|Wild|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=78C6BwAAQBAJ&pg=PA267 267–268]}} | {{harvnb|Robbins|2017|loc=§ 3.1. The Case for Massive Modularity}} | {{harvnb|Bermúdez|2014|p=277}} }}</ref>}} Many low-level cognitive processes responsible for visual perception have this automatic and unconscious nature. In the case of [[visual illusion]]s like the [[Müller-Lyer illusion]], the underlying processes continue their operation and the illusion persists even after a person has become aware of the illusion, indicating the mechanical and involuntary nature of the process.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Robbins|2017|loc=§ 1. What Is a Mental Module?}} | {{harvnb|Hufendiek|Wild|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=78C6BwAAQBAJ&pg=PA266 266–267]}} }}</ref> Other examples of mental modules concern cognitive processes responsible for [[language processing]] and [[Face perception|facial recognition]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Robbins|2017|loc=§ 1. What Is a Mental Module?}} | {{harvnb|Bermúdez|2014|p=289}} }}</ref>