Editing Multiple drafts model (section)

==Critical responses==
Psychobiologist John Staddon contrasts a simple "new behaviorism" interpretation of color phi with Dennett and Kinsbourne's account. The basic idea is that because of well-known processes such as lateral inhibition, the internal states created by the two stimuli are identical, hence are so reported.<ref>John Staddon ''The New Behaviorism:'' ''Foundation of behavioral science'' (3rd edition)| 2021|</ref> {{harvtxt|Bogen|1992}} points out that the brain is bilaterally symmetrical. That being the case, if Cartesian materialism is true, there might be ''two'' Cartesian theatres, so arguments against only one are flawed.<ref name="bogen">{{cite journal |last=Bogen |first=J. E. |title=Descartes' fundamental mistake: Introspective singularity |year=1992 |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |issue=15 |pages=184–247 | doi = 10.1017/s0140525x00033914 |volume=17}} Commentary on {{harvnb|Dennett|Kinsbourne|1992}}</ref> {{harvtxt|Velmans|1992}} argues that the phi effect and the [[cutaneous rabbit illusion]] demonstrate that there is a delay whilst modelling occurs and that this delay was discovered by [[Benjamin Libet]].<ref name="vel">{{cite journal |last=Velmans |first=M. |title=Is Consciousness Integrated? |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |volume=15 |issue=2 |pages=229–230 |doi=10.1017/s0140525x00068473|year=1992 |s2cid=145232451 }}(commentary on {{cite journal |last1=Dennett |first1=Daniel C. |last2=Kinsbourne |first2=Marcel |title=Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |date=1992 |volume=15 |number=2 |pages=183–201 |publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/S0140525X00068229 }}</ref>

It has also been claimed that the argument in the multiple drafts model does not support its conclusion.<ref name="bring">{{cite web |last=Bringsjord |first=Selmer |date=6 December 1996 |url=https://homepages.rpi.edu/~brings/SELPAP/phi/phi.html |title=Explaining phi without Dennett's exotica: Good ol' computation suffices |access-date=26 September 2023}}</ref>

==="Straw man"===
Much of the criticism asserts that Dennett's theory attacks the wrong target, failing to explain what it claims to. Chalmers (1996) maintains that Dennett has produced no more than a theory of how subjects report events.<ref name="chalmers">{{cite book |author=Chalmers, David |title=The Conscious Mind |year=1992 |publisher=Oxford University Press.}}</ref> Some even parody the title of the book as "Consciousness Explained Away", accusing him of [[greedy reductionism]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia | author=DrMatt | date=7 December 2004 | chapter-url=https://h2g2.com/edited_entry/A3005001 |chapter=Some Modern Theories of Consciousness | title=[[h2g2]]}}</ref> Another line of criticism disputes the accuracy of Dennett's characterisations of existing theories:
{{quote|The now standard response to Dennett's project is that he has picked a fight with a [[straw man]]. Cartesian materialism, it is alleged, is an impossibly naive account of phenomenal consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Consequently, whatever the effectiveness of Dennett's demolition job, it is fundamentally misdirected (see, e.g., Block, 1993, 1995; Shoemaker, 1993; and Tye, 1993).<ref name="bando">{{cite journal |author1=O'Brien, G.  |author2=Opie, J.  |name-list-style=amp |title=A defense of Cartesian Materialism |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=59 |issue=4  |pages= 939–63 |doi=10.2307/2653563|jstor=2653563  |year=1999  }}</ref>}}

===Unoriginality===
Multiple drafts is also attacked for making a claim to novelty. It may be the case, however, that such attacks mistake which features Dennett is claiming as novel. Korb states that, "I believe that the central thesis will be relatively uncontentious for most cognitive scientists, but that its use as a cleaning solvent for messy puzzles will be viewed less happily in most quarters." {{harv|Korb|1993}} In this way, Dennett uses uncontroversial ideas towards more controversial ends, leaving him open to claims of unoriginality when uncontroversial parts are focused upon.

Even the notion of consciousness as drafts is not unique to Dennett. According to Hankins, Dieter Teichert suggests that [[Paul Ricoeur]]'s theories agree with Dennett's on the notion that "the self is basically a narrative entity, and that any attempt to give it a free-floating independent status is misguided." [Hankins] Others see [[Derrida]]'s (1982) representationalism as consistent with the notion of a mind that has perceptually changing content without a definitive present instant.<ref name="derrida">{{cite book | last=Derrida | first=J. | year=1982 |orig-year=1972 | title=Margins of Philosophy | publisher=University of Chicago Press | isbn=978-0-226-14326-2 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sHYoqEcbgs4C}}</ref>

To those who believe that consciousness entails something more than behaving in all ways conscious, Dennett's view is seen as [[eliminativism|eliminativist]], since it denies the existence of [[qualia]] and the possibility of [[philosophical zombie]]s. However, Dennett is not denying the existence of the mind or of consciousness, only what he considers a naive view of them. The point of contention is whether Dennett's own definitions are indeed more accurate: whether what we think of when we speak of perceptions and consciousness can be understood in terms of nothing more than their effect on behaviour.

===Information processing and consciousness===
The role of information processing in consciousness has been criticised by [[John Searle]] who, in his [[Chinese room]] argument,<ref name="searle">{{cite journal |last=Searle |first=John |date=1980 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070611104618/http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html |title=Minds, Brains and Programs |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=417–424 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/S0140525X00005756 |url=http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html |archive-date=2007-06-11|url-access=subscription }}</ref> states that he cannot find anything that could be recognised as conscious experience in a system that relies solely on motions of things from place to place. Dennett sees this argument as misleading, arguing that consciousness is not to be found in a specific part of the system, but in the actions of the whole. In essence, he denies that consciousness requires something in addition to capacity for behaviour, saying that philosophers such as Searle, "just can't imagine how understanding could be a property that emerges from lots of distributed quasi-understanding in a large system".<ref>Dennett (p.&nbsp;439).{{full citation needed|{{subst:DATE}}|date=September 2023}}</ref>