Editing N1 (rocket) (section)

===Early Soviet lunar concepts===
[[File:N1.stl|thumb|260x260px|Static [[3D model]] of the rocket]]
In May 1961, the US announced the goal of landing a man on the Moon by 1970. During the same month, the report ''On Reconsideration of the Plans for Space Vehicles in the Direction of Defense Purposes'' set the first test launch of the N1 rocket for 1965. In June, Korolev was given a small amount of funding to start N1 development between 1961 and 1963. At the same time, Korolev proposed a lunar mission based on the new [[Soyuz spacecraft]] using an [[Earth orbit rendezvous]] profile. Several [[Soyuz (rocket)|Soyuz]] rocket launches would be used to build up a complete Moon mission package, including one for the Soyuz spacecraft, another for the lunar lander, and a few with cislunar engines and fuel. This approach, driven by the limited capacity of the Soyuz rocket, meant that a rapid launch rate would be required to assemble the complex before any of the components ran out of consumables on-orbit. Korolev subsequently proposed that the N1 be enlarged to allow a single-launch lunar mission. In November–December 1961, Korolev and others tried to further argue that a super heavy lift rocket could deliver ultra heavy nuclear weapons, such as the just tested [[Tsar Bomba]], or many warheads (up to 17) as further justification for the N1 design.<ref name="rsw-n1icm">{{Cite web |last=Zak |first=Anatoly |date=3 November 2018 |title=Soviets mulled a colossal nuke on future Moon rocket |url=https://www.russianspaceweb.com/n1_icbm.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240215022857/https://www.russianspaceweb.com/n1_icbm.html |archive-date=15 February 2024 |access-date=2 March 2021 |website=Russian Space Web }}</ref><ref name="utkin1999">{{Cite book |last=Utkin |first=V. F. |title=Otechestvennue Strategicheskie Raketnue Kompleksu |publisher=Nevskiy Bastion |year=1999 |location=St. Petersburg |language=ru |trans-title=National Strategic Missile Systems }}</ref> Korolev was not inclined to use the rocket for military uses, but wanted to fulfill his space ambitions and saw military support as vital. The military response was lukewarm – they thought the N1 had little military usefulness and was worried it would divert funds away from pure military programs. Korolev's correspondence with military leaders continued until February 1962 with little progress.

Meanwhile, [[Vladimir Chelomey|Chelomey]]'s [[OKB-52]] proposed an alternate mission with much lower risk. Instead of a crewed landing, Chelomei proposed a series of circumlunar missions to beat the US to the vicinity of the Moon. He also proposed a new booster for the mission, clustering four of his existing UR-200s (known as the [[SS-10]] in the west) to produce a single larger booster, the UR-500.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.astronautix.com/p/proton.html | title=Proton }}</ref> These plans were dropped when Glushko offered Chelomei the RD-270, which allowed the construction of the [[UR-500]] in a much simpler "monoblock" design. He also proposed adapting an existing spacecraft design for the circumlunar mission, the single-cosmonaut [[LK-1]]. Chelomei felt that improvements in early UR-500/LK-1 missions would allow the spacecraft to be adapted for two cosmonauts.

The Strategic Missile Forces of the Soviet military were reluctant to support a politically motivated project with little military utility, but both Korolev and Chelomei pushed for a lunar mission. Between 1961 and 1964, Chelomei's less aggressive proposal was accepted, and development of his UR-500 and the LK-1 were given a relatively high priority.