Editing Non-cognitivism (section)

==Arguments in favour==
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As with other anti-[[moral realism|realist]] meta-ethical theories, non-cognitivism is largely supported by the [[argument from queerness]]: ethical properties, if they existed, would be different from any other thing in the universe, since they have no observable effect on the world. People generally have a negative attitude towards murder, which presumably keeps most of us from murdering. But does the actual ''wrongness'' of murder play an ''independent'' role? Is there any evidence that there is a property of wrongness that some types of acts have? Some people might think that the strong feelings we have when we see or consider a murder provide evidence of murder's wrongness. But it is not difficult to explain these feelings without saying that ''wrongness'' was their cause. Thus there is no way of discerning which, if any, ethical properties exist; by [[Occam's razor]], the simplest assumption is that none do. The non-cognitivist then asserts that, since a proposition about an ethical property would have no referent, ethical statements must be something else.

=== Universal prescriptivism ===
Arguments for prescriptivism focus on the ''function'' of normative statements.

Prescriptivists argue that factual statements and prescriptions are totally different, because of different expectations of change in cases of a clash between [[direction of fit|word and world]].
In a descriptive sentence, if one premises that "red is a number" then according to the rules of English grammar said statement would be false. Since said premise describes the objects "red" and "number", anyone with an adequate understanding of English would notice the falseness of such description and the falseness of said statement. However, if the norm "thou shalt not kill!" is uttered, and this premise is negated (by the fact of a person being murdered), the speaker is not to change his sentence upon observation of this into "kill other people!", but is to reiterate the moral outrage of the act of killing. Adjusting statements based upon objective reality and adjusting reality based upon statements are contrary uses of language; that is to say, descriptive statements are a different kind of sentence to normative statements. If truth is understood according to [[Correspondence theory of truth|correspondence theory]], the question of the truth or falsity of sentences not contingent upon external phenomena cannot be tested (see [[tautology (logic)|tautologies]]).

Some cognitivists argue that some expressions like "courageous" have both a factual as well as a normative component which cannot be distinguished by analysis. Prescriptivists argue that according to context, either the factual or the normative component of the meaning is dominant. The sentence "Hero A behaved courageously" is wrong, if A ran away in the face of danger. But the sentence "Be brave and fight for the glory of your country!" has no truth value and cannot be falsified by someone who does not join the army.

Prescriptivism is also supported by the actual way of speaking. Many moral statements are de facto uttered as recommendations or commands, e.g. when parents or teachers forbid children to do wrong actions. The most famous moral ideas are prescriptions: the [[Ten Commandments]], the command of charity, the [[categorical imperative]], and the [[Golden Rule]] command to do or not to do something rather than state that something is or is not the case.

Prescriptivism can fit the theist idea of morality as obedience towards god. It is however different from the cognitivist supernaturalism which interprets morality as subjective will of god, while prescriptivism claims that moral rules are universal and can be found by reason alone without reference to a god.

According to Hare, prescriptivists cannot argue that [[amoralism|amoralists]] are logically wrong or contradictory. Everyone can choose to follow moral commands or not. This is the human condition according to the Christian reinterpretation of the [[Hercules at the crossroads|Choice of Heracles]]. According to prescriptivism, morality is not about knowledge (of moral facts), but about character (to choose to do the right thing). Actors cannot externalize their responsibility and freedom of will towards some moral truth in the world, virtuous people do not need to wait for some cognition to choose what's right.

Prescriptivism is also supported by [[imperative logic]], in which there are no truth values for imperatives, and by the idea of the [[naturalistic fallacy]]: even if someone could prove the existence of an ethical property and express it in a factual statement, he could never derive any command from this statement, so the search for ethical properties is pointless.

=== Emotivism ===
Arguments for [[emotivism]] focus on what normative statements ''express'' when uttered by a speaker. A person who says that killing is wrong certainly expresses her disapproval of killing. Emotivists claim that this is ''all'' she does, that the statement "killing is wrong" is not a truth-apt declaration, and that the burden of evidence is on the [[Cognitivism (ethics)|cognitivists]] who want to show that in addition to expressing disapproval, the claim "killing is wrong" is also true. Emotivists ask whether there really is evidence that killing is wrong. We have evidence that Jupiter has a [[magnetic field]] and that birds are [[oviparous]], but as yet, we do not seem to have found evidence of moral properties, such as "goodness". Emotivists ask why, without such evidence, we should think there ''is'' such a property. [[Ethical intuitionism|Ethical intuitionists]] think the evidence comes not from science or reason but from our own feelings: good deeds make us feel a certain way and bad deeds make us feel very differently. But is this enough to show that there are genuinely good and bad deeds? Emotivists think not, claiming that we do not need to postulate the existence of moral "badness" or "wrongness" to explain why considering certain deeds makes us feel disapproval; that all we really observe when we introspect are feelings of disapproval. Thus the emotivist asks why not adopt the simple explanation and say that this is all there is, rather than insist that some intrinsic "badness" (of murder, for example) must be causing feelings when a simpler explanation is available.