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Obligation
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== Obligation and morality == {{See also|Moral imperative|Obligation-based ethics}} An obligation is contract between an individual and the thing or person to which or whom they are obligated. If the contract is breached the individual can be subject to blame. When entering into an obligation people generally do not think about the guilt that they would experience if the obligation were not fulfilled; instead they think about how they can fulfil the obligation. Rationalists argue people respond in this way because they have a reason to fulfill the obligation.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|url=https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.001.0001/acprof-9780199691500-chapter-4|title=Obligation|last=Owens|first=David|date=20 September 2012|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=9780191744938|language=en-US|doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.001.0001}}</ref> According to the sanction theory, an obligation corresponds to the social pressures one feels, and is not simply derived from a singular relationship with another person or project. In the rationalist argument, this same pressure adds to the reasons people have, thereby strengthening their desire to fulfill the obligation. The sanction theory states there needs to be a sanction in order for a duty to be a moral duty.<ref name=":0" />
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