Editing Open Door Policy (section)

==History==
===Formation of policy===
With its defeat in the [[First Sino-Japanese War]] (1894–1895), China faced an imminent threat of being partitioned and colonized by imperial powers with a presence in China (which included France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia). After winning the [[Spanish–American War]] of 1898, with the newly acquired territory of the [[Philippine Islands]], the United States increased its Asian presence and expected to further its commercial and political interests in China. It felt threatened by other powers' much larger spheres of influence in China and worried that it might lose access to the Chinese market if it were to be  partitioned. As a response, [[William Woodville Rockhill]] formulated the Open Door Policy to safeguard American business opportunities and other interests in China.<ref>Shizhang Hu, ''Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Open Door Policy, 1919–1937'' (1977) ch 1–2 {{ISBN?}}</ref> On September 6, 1899, U.S. Secretary of State [[John Hay]] sent notes to the major powers (France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia) to ask them to declare formally that they would uphold Chinese territorial and administrative integrity and they would not interfere with the free use of the [[treaty ports]] in their [[sphere of influence|spheres of influence]] in China.<ref>{{cite web|title=Secretary of State John Hay and the Open Door in China, 1899–1900|url=https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/hay-and-china|work=Milestones: 1899–1913|publisher=Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State|access-date=17 January 2014}}</ref> The Open Door Policy stated that all nations, including the United States, could enjoy equal access to the Chinese market.<ref name="Sugita 2003">Sugita (2003)</ref> Hay's logic was that American economic power would then be able to dominate the Chinese market and fend off other foreign competitors.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Policy |date=2023 |publisher= Haymarket Books|isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |page=149 |oclc=1345216431|last1=Davis |first1=Stuart }}</ref>

In reply, each country tried to evade Hay's request by taking the position that it could not commit itself until the other nations had complied. However, by July 1900, Hay announced that each of the powers had granted its consent in principle. Although treaties after 1900 referred to the Open Door Policy, competition continued abated among the various powers for special concessions within China for railroad rights, mining rights, loans, foreign trade ports, and so forth.<ref name="Sugita 2003"/>

On October 6, 1900, Britain and Germany signed the [[Yangtze Agreement]] to oppose the partition of China into spheres of influence. The agreement, signed by [[Lord Salisbury]] and Ambassador [[Paul von Hatzfeldt]], was an endorsement of the Open Door Policy. The Germans supported it because a partition of China would limit Germany to a small trading market, instead of all of China.<ref>"Yangtze Agreement", ''Historical Dictionary of the British Empire'' (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), pp. 1176 {{ISBN?}}</ref><ref>Paul M. Kennedy, ''The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism: 1860–1914 '' (1980) pp 243, 354.{{ISBN?}}</ref>

===Subsequent development===
[[File:Stepping Stone to China Market JUDGE 1900.jpg|thumb|Stepping stone to trade to huge China Market, from ''Judge'' March 11, 1900]]

The policy built popular sympathy for China and raised hopes for a vast "China market" and American influence in China's development. The effect of the policy was partly diplomatic, but it also reflected what the historian Michael Hunt calls a "paternalistic vision" of "defending and reforming China." This vision defined China in terms of two struggles, first, a Chinese domestic struggle between progressive reform and feudal inertia, and the second an international struggle which pitted the "selfish imperialism" of Britain, Russia, and Japan against the supposedly benevolent policies of the United States.{{sfnb|Hunt|1983|p=ix}} Over the next decades, American diplomats, missionaries, and businessmen took a special interest in China, many of them envisioning that China would follow the American example.{{sfnb|Hayford|1996|pp=139–141}}

However these dreams proved difficult to realize. American investments, while considerable, did not reach major proportions; the Open Door policy could not protect China against Japanese interference, first the [[Manchurian Incident]] of 1931, then the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] (1937–1945), and Chinese leaders, while willing to seek American aid, were not willing to play the passive role that the Open Door implied.<ref>Mark Atwood Lawrence, "Open Door Policy," ''Encyclopedia of the American Foreign Policy'', [https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Open-Door-Policy.html online].</ref>

In 1902, the U.S. government protested that the Russian incursion into [[Manchuria]] after the [[Boxer Rebellion]] was a violation of the Open Door Policy. When Japan replaced Russia in southern Manchuria after the [[Russo-Japanese War]] (1904–1905) the Japanese and American governments pledged to maintain a policy of equality in Manchuria.  In 1905–1907 Japan made overtures to enlarge its sphere of influence to include [[Fujian]]. Japan was trying to obtain French loans and also avoid the Open Door Policy. Paris provided loans on condition that Japan respect the Open Door principles and not violate China's territorial integrity.<ref>Seung-young Kim,  "Open Door or Sphere of Influence?: The Diplomacy of the Japanese–French Entente and Fukien Question, 1905–1907." ''International History Review'' 41#1 (2019): 105–129; see also [https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/5408203/h-diplo-article-review-904-%E2%80%9Copen-door-or-sphere-influence Review by Noriko Kawamura in H-DIPLO.]</ref>

In finance, American efforts to preserve the Open Door Policy led in 1909 to the formation of an international banking consortium through which all Chinese railroad loans agreed in 1917 to another exchange of notes between the United States and Japan. There were renewed assurances that the Open Door Policy would be respected, but the United States would recognize Japan's special interests in China (the [[Lansing–Ishii Agreement]]). The Open Door Policy had been further weakened by a series of secret treaties in 1917 between Japan and the Allied [[Triple Entente]] that promised Japan the German possessions in China after the successful conclusion of World War I.<ref name="Sugita 2003"/> The subsequent realization of the promise in the 1919 [[Versailles Treaty]] angered the Chinese public and sparked the protest known as the [[May Fourth Movement]]. The [[Nine-Power Treaty]], signed in 1922, expressly reaffirmed the Open Door Policy. In 1949, the United States State Department issued the ''[[China White Paper]]'', a selection of official documents on United States-China relations, 1900–1949. The introductory "Letter of Transmittal," signed by Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]], asserted that the United States policy had consistently maintained fundamental principles, "which include the doctrine of the Open Door...."{{sfnb|United States Department of State|1949|p=ix}}

Since the policy effectively hindered Chinese sovereignty, the government of the [[Republic of China (1912–49)|Republic of China]] endeavored to revise the related treaties with foreign powers in the 1920s and 1930s. However, only after the conclusion of World War II would China manage to regain its full sovereignty.

===In modern China===
{{main|Chinese economic reform}}
In China's modern economic history, the Open Door Policy refers to the new policy announced by [[Deng Xiaoping]] in December 1978 to open the door to foreign businesses that wanted to set up in China.<ref name="bbc">{{cite web |url= http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/02/china_party_congress/china_ruling_party/key_people_events/html/open_door_policy.stm |title= Open Door Policy |publisher=BBC}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-ab47HrgioMC&pg=PA1 |title=The China-Hong Kong Connection: The Key to China's Open Door Policy|author=Yun-Wing Sung | publisher=Cambridge University Press |date=1992|isbn= 978-0-521-38245-8}}</ref> [[Special Economic Zones of the People's Republic of China|Special Economic Zones]] (SEZ) were set up in 1980 in his belief that to modernize China's industry and boost its economy, he needed to welcome foreign direct investment. Chinese economic policy then shifted to encouraging and supporting foreign trade and investment. It was the turning point in China's economic fortune, which started its way on the path to becoming 'The World's Factory'.<ref name="Routledge">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PN5CDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT30 |title=From World Factory to Global Investor: Multi-perspective Analysis on China's Outward Direct Investment |date=2017 |editor= Xuedong Ding, Chen Meng |isbn=978-1-315-45579-2 |publisher=Routledge}}</ref>

Four SEZs were initially set up in 1980: [[Shenzhen Special Economic Zone|Shenzhen]], [[Zhuhai]] and [[Shantou]] in [[Guangdong]], and [[Xiamen]] in [[Fujian]]. The SEZs were strategically located near [[Hong Kong]], [[Macau]], and [[Taiwan]] but with a favorable tax regime and low wages to attract capital and business from these Chinese communities.<ref name="bbc"/><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DhIcTvNRt-MC&pg=PA85 |title=Regional Economic Development in China |year=2009 |editor= Swee-Hock Saw, John Wong |publisher=Institute of Southeast Asian Studies |pages=85–86 |isbn=978-981-230-941-9 }}</ref> Shenzhen was the first to be established and showed the most rapid growth, averaging a very high growth rate of 40% per annum between 1981 and 1993, compared to the average GDP growth of 9.8% for the country as a whole.<ref>{{cite book |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WavczgJafA0C&pg=PA67 |title=Special Economic Zones and the Economic Transition in China|author= Wei Ge |chapter=Chapter 4: The Performance of Special Economic Zones |pages=67–108 |publisher=World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd |year= 1999 |isbn=978-981-02-3790-5}}</ref> Other SEZs were set up in other parts of China.

In 1978, [[China]] was ranked 32nd in the world in export volume, but by 1989, it had doubled its world trade and became the 13th exporter. Between 1978 and 1990, the average annual rate of trade expansion was above 15 percent,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5033597|last=Wei|first=Shang-Jin|title=The Open Door Policy and China's Rapid Growth: Evidence from City-Level Data|date=February 1993|access-date=30 October 2018}}</ref> and a high rate of growth continued for the next decade. In 1978, its exports in the world market share was negligible and in 1998, it still had less than 2%, but by 2010, it had a world market share of 10.4% according to the [[World Trade Organization]] (WTO), with merchandise export sales of more than $1.5 trillion, the highest in the world.<ref>{{cite web |title=China's Fare Share? The Growth of Chinese Exports in World Trade|url=http://www.ewi-ssl.pitt.edu/econ/files/faculty/wp/120316_wp_HustedSteven_Chinaexports_March%2015%202012%20final_shu.pdf |author=Steven Husted and Shuichiro Nishioka}}</ref>  In 2013, China overtook the United States and became the world's biggest trading nation in goods, with a total for imports and exports valued at US$4.16 trillion for the year.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/10565166/China-overtakes-US-to-become-worlds-biggest-goods-trading-nation.html  |title=China overtakes US to become world's biggest goods trading nation |work=The Telegraph |author= Katherine Rushton|date=10 Jan 2014}}</ref>

On 21 July 2020, [[Chinese Communist Party]] [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|general secretary]] [[Xi Jinping]] made a speech to a group of public and private business leaders at the entrepreneur forum in Beijing. Xi emphasized that "We must gradually form a new development pattern with the domestic internal circulation as the main body and the domestic and international dual circulations mutually promoting each other."<ref>{{cite web |last1= Xinhua Net |title= (Authorized to publish) Xi Jinping's Speech at the Entrepreneur Forum |url=http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-07/21/c_1126267575.htm|website=Xinhua Net |access-date=10 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200811045300/http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-07/21/c_1126267575.htm | archive-date=11 August 2020}}</ref>
Since then "internal circulation" became a hot word in China.