Editing Operation Linebacker II (section)

==="Peace is at hand"===
{{Further|topic=the North Vietnamese offensive|Easter Offensive}}
{{Further|topic=the U.S. aerial offensive|Operation Linebacker}}
On 8 October 1972, U.S. [[National Security Advisor (United States)|National Security Advisor]] [[Henry Kissinger]] and North Vietnamese [[Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam|Politburo]] member [[Le Duc Tho]] met in Paris to discuss new proposals by both nations, hoping to reach mutually agreeable terms for a peace settlement for the nearly decade-old [[Vietnam War]]. Tho presented a new North Vietnamese plan which included proposals for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American forces, and an exchange of [[prisoners of war]]. All three Vietnamese combatant governments—North Vietnam, the [[Republic of Vietnam]] (South Vietnam), and the [[Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam]] (PRG)—would remain intact, as would their separate armies. [[Hanoi]] no longer demanded that South Vietnamese president [[Nguyen Van Thieu]] be removed from office, the U.S. did not have to cease its aid to the southern government, and both [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] and Hanoi could continue to resupply their allies or forces on a parity basis. No new North Vietnamese forces were to be infiltrated from the north, and the U.S. agreed to extend post-war reconstruction assistance to North Vietnam.{{Citation needed|date=October 2015}}

The new terms on the table also included the establishment of a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, a loosely defined administrative structure which was to work toward general and local elections within South Vietnam. Political power would be shared by three groups: the [[Saigon]] government, the PRG, and a "third force" group to be mutually agreed upon by the other two parties. Since it was to work by consensus, nothing could be accomplished by the new council without the agreement of President Thieu.<ref>Samuel Lipsman, Stephen Weiss, et al., ''The False Peace''. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985, p. 12.</ref><ref>Pierre Asselin, ''A Bitter Peace'', pp. 79–87.</ref>

When the two sides convened again on 17 October, there were two main areas of disagreement: the periodic replacement of South Vietnam's American weaponry and the release of political prisoners held by the Saigon government.<ref>Asselin, ''A Bitter Peace'', p. 88</ref> The North Vietnamese had made significant modifications to their past negotiating position and were hurrying to get the agreement signed before November, believing that President [[Richard Nixon]] would be more willing to make concessions before, rather than after, the [[1972 United States presidential election|upcoming presidential election]].<ref>Lipsman and Weiss, p. 10.</ref> Although there were still some issues to be finalized, Kissinger was generally satisfied with the new terms and so notified Nixon, who gave his approval to the settlement.<ref>Lipsman and Weiss, p. 13.</ref>

Kissinger then flew on to Saigon on the 18th to discuss the terms with Thieu. The South Vietnamese president was not happy with either the new agreement or with Kissinger, who he felt had betrayed him.<ref name=lw14>Lipsman and Weiss, p. 14.</ref> Although Kissinger knew Thieu's negotiating position, he had not informed him of the changes made in Paris nor had his approval been sought. Kissinger "had negotiated on behalf of the South Vietnamese government provisions that he, Thieu, had already rejected".<ref name=lw14/> Thieu completely castigated the agreement and proposed 129 textual changes to the document. He went further, demanding that the [[Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone|Demilitarized Zone]] separating the two Vietnams be recognized as a true international border and not as a "provisional military demarcation line" (as had been stipulated in the [[Geneva Accords, 1954|Geneva Accords]]) and that South Vietnam be recognized as a sovereign state. The supreme irony, in the words of [[Stanley Karnow]], had now arrived: "having fought a war to defend South Vietnam's independence, the United States was now denying its legitimacy."<ref>Stanley Karnow, ''Vietnam'', New York: Viking Press, 1983, p. 650.</ref>

Thieu then went one step further on 26 October, and publicly released an altered version of the text that made the South Vietnamese provisions look even worse than they actually were.<ref>Lipsman and Weiss, p. 17. Thieu alleged, for instance, that the U.S. would cease all aid to South Vietnam and that, according to the clauses of the agreement, all members of the Southern government would have to resign.</ref> The North Vietnamese leadership, believing that they had been hoodwinked by Kissinger, responded by broadcasting portions of the agreement that gave the impression that the agreement conformed to Washington and Saigon's objectives.<ref>Lipsman and Weiss, pp. 17–18.</ref><ref>Asselin, ''A Bitter Peace'', p. 101</ref> Kissinger, hoping to both reassure the Communists of America's sincerity, and convince Thieu of the administration's dedication to a compromise, held a televised press conference at the [[White House]] during which he announced "[w]e believe that peace is at hand."<ref name="Karnow, p. 651">Karnow, p. 651.</ref>

On 20 November, the South Vietnamese revisions, and 44 additional changes demanded by Nixon, were presented to the North Vietnamese delegation by Kissinger.<ref name="Karnow, p. 651"/><ref name = 'lipsman21'>Lipsman and Weiss, p. 21.</ref> These new demands included: that the DMZ be accepted as a true international boundary; that a token withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops take place; that the North Vietnamese guarantee an Indochina-wide cease fire; and that a strong international peace-keeping force (the [[International Commission of Control and Supervision|ICCS]]) be created for supervising and enforcing the cease-fire.<ref name = 'lipsman21'/>

Once the North Vietnamese read the new demands, they began to retract their own concessions and wanted to bargain anew, leading Kissinger to proclaim that they were "stalling".<ref name="Lipsman and Weiss, p. 22">Lipsman and Weiss, p. 22.</ref> The talks, scheduled to last ten days, ended on 13 December, with both parties agreeing to resume negotiations.<ref name="Lipsman and Weiss, p. 22"/> Teams of experts from each side met to discuss technicalities and protocols on 14 December, during which time the North Vietnamese representatives submitted a Vietnamese-language text of the protocol on prisoners containing several important changes that Hanoi had failed to gain in the main negotiating sessions. At a subsequent meeting of experts on 16 December, the North Vietnamese side "stone-walled from beginning to end". The talks broke down that day, and the Hanoi negotiators refused to set a date for the resumption of negotiations.<ref name="Asselin, p. 139">Asselin, ''A Bitter Peace'', p. 139.</ref>