Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Performative utterance
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
==John Searle== Building on Austin's thought, language philosopher [[John Searle]] tried to develop his own account of speech acts, suggesting that these acts are a form of rule-governed behaviour.<ref name="Searle 1974">{{cite book|last=Searle|first=John R.|title=Speech Acts, an essay in the philosophy of language|publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge |year=1974}}</ref>{{rp|16}} On the one hand, Searle discerns rules that merely regulate language, such as referring and predicating.<ref name="Searle 1974"/>{{rp|24}} These rules account for the "propositional content" of sentences. On the other hand, he discerns rules that are constitutive in character and define behaviour (e.g. when making a promise).<ref name="Searle 1974"/>{{rp|33}} These rules are the conventions underlying performative utterances and they enable not only representation and expression, but also communication.<ref name="Searle 1983">{{cite book|last=Searle|first=John R.|title=Intentionality, an essay in the philosophy of mind |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge |year=1983}}</ref>{{rp|165}} This focus on effect implies a conscious actor and Searle assumes that language stems from an intrinsic intentionality of the mind.<ref name="Searle 1983"/>{{rp|vii}} These intentions set the prerequisites for the performance of speech acts and Searle sets out to map their necessary and sufficient conditions.<ref name="Searle 1983"/>{{rp|163}} Searle argued in his 1989 article ''How Performatives Work'' that performatives are true or false just like constatives. Searle further claimed that performatives are what he calls ''declarations''; this is a technical notion of Searle's account: according to his conception, an utterance is a ''declaration'', if "the successful performance of the speech act is sufficient to bring about the fit between words and world, to make the propositional content true." Searle believes that this double direction of fit contrasts the simple word-to-world fit of {{interlanguage link|assertives|de|Illokution%C3%A4rer Akt#Illokution bei Searle}}.
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)