Editing Permissive action link (section)

=== Background ===
[[File:Sandia-Building800-1951.gif|thumbnail|right|[[Sandia National Laboratories]], 1951. Sandia was instrumental from the beginning in developing PALs.]]

Permissive action links were developed in the United States in a gradual process from the [[Nuclear weapons testing|first use of atomic weapons]] to the early 1960s. In 1953 the [[United States Atomic Energy Commission]] and the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] signed the ''Missiles and Rockets Agreement'', which paved the way for the development and implementation of PALs. Certain national laboratories, under the auspices of the AEC, would develop and produce nuclear weapons, while the responsibility for the use and deployment remained with the military. The laboratories were also free to conduct their own research in the field of arms control and security. The thinking behind this was that if the government would ever be interested in such a security device, the research and development of prototypes would already be well advanced. At the beginning of the 1960s, the desire for the usage of such a system grew for both political and technological reasons.

Newer nuclear weapons were less complex in operation, relatively mass-produced (and therefore predictably similar), and less cumbersome to arm and use than previous designs. Accordingly, new methods were necessary to prevent their unauthorized use. As the [[Cold War]] came to a head in the 1960s, the government felt it best not to leave the use of nuclear weapons in the hands of possibly-renegade generals, including the commander of [[Strategic Air Command]] (SAC).<ref>Richard Rhodes: ''Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb''. Simon & Schuster, New York 1996, {{ISBN|978-0-684-81690-6}}.</ref> Without Permissive Action Links, each nuclear weapon was effectively under the independent control of one person, the general under whose command it happened to fall.

{{quote|I used to worry about the fact that <nowiki>[</nowiki>[[Thomas S. Power|General Power]]<nowiki>]</nowiki> had control over so many weapons and weapon systems and could, under certain conditions, launch the force. Back in the days before we had real positive control [i.e., PAL locks], SAC had the power to do a lot of things, and it was in his hands, and he knew it. |sign=[[Horace M. Wade|General Horace M. Wade]], (at that time subordinate of General Power)|source=<ref>Peter D. Feaver: ''Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations''. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2005, {{ISBN|978-0-674-01761-0}}, S.&nbsp;151.</ref>}}

In order to protect its [[NATO]] allies, the United States had stationed various nuclear weapons overseas; these weapons were thus at least under the partial control of the hosting allied state. This was especially concerning to the [[United States Congress]], as control of these weapons by a third party was in violation of U.S. federal law.{{Citation needed|date=August 2024}} Added to this was the fact that some of the allies were considered potentially unstable—particularly [[West Germany]] and Turkey.<ref name="Assuring Control">Peter Stein, Peter Feaver: ''Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links''. University Press of America, Lanham 1989, {{ISBN|978-0-8191-6337-0}}.</ref> There was considerable concern that in one of these countries the instructions of the civilian leadership of the host country could overrule that country's military. In addition, the U.S. realized that in the event of war, parts of West Germany would be [[Fulda gap#In the Cold War|overwhelmed early on]], and nuclear weapons stationed there could fall into the hands of the Soviet Union.

For a long time the U.S. military resisted the use of PALs. It feared the loss of its own independence, and it feared malfunction, which could put warheads out of action in a time of crisis. But the advantages of PALs outweighed the disadvantages: thanks to the PALs weapons were able to be distributed to a greater extent in Europe, so as to prevent a rapid and selective destruction or conquest by the Soviet bloc, while still retaining U.S. control over the farther-flung weapons.<ref name="Assuring Control" />