Editing Philosophical analysis (section)

==Criticism==
While the method of analysis is characteristic of contemporary [[analytic philosophy]], its status continues to be a source of great controversy even among analytic philosophers. Several current criticisms of the analytic method derive from [[W.V. Quine]]'s famous rejection of the [[analytic–synthetic distinction]]. While Quine's critique is well-known, it is highly controversial.

Further, the analytic method seems to rely on some sort of definitional structure of concepts, so that one can give necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept. For example, the concept "bachelor" is often analyzed as having the concepts "unmarried" and "male" as its components. Thus, the definition or analysis of "bachelor" is thought to be an unmarried male. But one might worry that these so-called necessary and sufficient conditions do not apply in every case. [[Wittgenstein]], for instance, argues that language (e.g., the word 'bachelor') is used for various purposes and in an indefinite number of ways. Wittgenstein's famous thesis states that meaning is determined by use. This means that, in each case, the meaning of 'bachelor' is determined by its use in a context. So if it can be shown that the word means different things across different contexts of use, then cases where its meaning cannot be essentially defined as 'unmarried man' seem to constitute counterexamples to this method of analysis. This is just one example of a critique of the analytic method derived from a critique of definitions. There are several other such critiques.<ref>Margolis, E. & Laurence, S. (2006). "Concepts".  ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' ([http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/#ConConAna link]).</ref> This criticism is often said to have originated primarily with Wittgenstein's ''[[Philosophical Investigations]]''.

A third critique of the method of analysis derives primarily from psychological critiques of [[intuition (psychology)|intuition]]. A key part of the analytic method involves analyzing concepts via "intuition tests". Philosophers tend to motivate various conceptual analyses by appeal to their intuitions about thought experiments.<ref>See DePaul, M. & Ramsey, W. (eds.). (1998). ''Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry''. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, for a collection of current essays on the controversy over analysis as it relates to intuition and [[reflective equilibrium]].</ref>

In short, some philosophers feel strongly that the analytic method (especially conceptual analysis) is essential to and defines philosophy.<ref>e.g. {{multiref2
|* Jackson, Frank. (1998). ''From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
|* Chalmers, David. (1996). ''The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
|* Bealer, George. (1998). "Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy". In M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (eds.) (1998), pp.&nbsp;201–239.}}</ref> Yet, some philosophers argue that the method of analysis is problematic.<ref>{{multiref2
|* Stich, Stephen. (1998). "Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology, and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity". In DePaul and Ramsey (eds.) (1998), pp.&nbsp;95–112.
|* Ramsey, William. (1998). "Prototypes and Conceptual Analysis". In M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (eds.) (1998), pp.&nbsp;161–177.}}</ref> Some, however, take the middle ground and argue that while analysis is largely a fruitful method of inquiry, philosophers should not limit themselves to only using the method of analysis.