Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Polygraph
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
==Effectiveness== Assessments of polygraphy by scientific and government bodies generally suggest that polygraphs are inaccurate, may be defeated by countermeasures, and are an imperfect or invalid means of assessing truthfulness.<ref name=NatResearchCouncil/><ref name=faspol>{{cite web |url=https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/ota/index.html |access-date=2008-02-29 |title=Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation |publisher= Washington, DC: U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment |year=1983}}</ref><ref name=APA2004>{{cite web |url=http://www.apa.org/monitor/julaug04/polygraph.html |access-date=2008-02-29 |date=July 2004 |title=Monitor on Psychology – The polygraph in doubt |publisher=American Psychological Association}}</ref> Despite claims that polygraph tests are between 80% and 90% accurate by advocates,<ref>{{cite news|last=Evans|first=Gareth|date=October 4, 2018|title=How credible are lie detector tests?|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-45736631|quote="If the examiner is well-trained, if the test is properly carried out, and if there's proper quality controls, the accuracy is estimated between 80%-90%".}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://theconversation.com/polygraph-lie-detector-tests-can-they-really-stop-criminals-reoffending-130477|title=Polygraph lie detector tests: can they really stop criminals reoffending?|last=Warmelink|first=Lara|date=January 24, 2020|website=The Conversation|quote=There have been several reviews of polygraph accuracy. They suggest that polygraphs are accurate between 80% and 90% of the time.}}</ref> the [[National Research Council (United States)|National Research Council]] has found no evidence of effectiveness.<ref name=APA2004/><ref name="BBCpol">{{cite news|date=July 16, 2009|title=A scanner to detect terrorists|work=BBC News|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/8153539.stm}}</ref> In particular, studies have indicated that the relevant–irrelevant questioning technique is not ideal, as many innocent subjects exert a heightened physiological reaction to the crime-relevant questions.<ref name="Iacono, W. G. 2008">{{cite journal |last1=Iacono |first1=W. G. |year=2008 |title=Effective policing: Understanding how polygraph tests work and are used |journal=Criminal Justice and Behavior |volume=35 |issue=10 |pages=1295–1308 |doi=10.1177/0093854808321529 |s2cid=143302792}}</ref> The [[American Psychological Association]] states "Most psychologists agree that there is little evidence that polygraph tests can accurately detect lies."<ref name="apa1"/> In 2002, a review by the National Research Council found that, in populations "untrained in [[countermeasure]]s, specific-incident polygraph tests can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below perfection". The review also warns against generalization from these findings to justify the use of polygraphs—"polygraph accuracy for screening purposes is almost certainly lower than what can be achieved by specific-incident polygraph tests in the field"—and notes some examinees may be able to take countermeasures to produce deceptive results.<ref>National Research Council (2003); [http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309084369 Pages 4 - 5]</ref> In the 1998 [[Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] case ''[[United States v. Scheffer]]'', the majority stated that "There is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable [...] Unlike other expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the jurors' knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion." The Supreme Court summarized their findings by stating that the use of polygraph was "little better than could be obtained by the toss of a coin."<ref name = "us">{{cite web| title =United States v. Scheffer| url =https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-1133.ZO.html|publisher=[[Cornell Law School]]|date =March 31, 1998|access-date=May 12, 2025}}</ref> In 2005, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "polygraphy did not enjoy general acceptance from the scientific community".<ref name="pdf">{{cite web|date =May 23, 2005|title=United States v. Henderson|publisher=[[United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit]]|url =http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200411545.pdf| access-date =August 31, 2007| archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20071127173339/http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200411545.pdf| archive-date =November 27, 2007| url-status =dead}} [PDF]</ref> In 2001, William Iacono, Professor of Psychology and Neuroscience at the [[University of Minnesota]], concluded: <blockquote>Although the CQT [Control Question Test] may be useful as an investigative aid and tool to induce confessions, it does not pass muster as a scientifically credible test. CQT theory is based on naive, implausible assumptions indicating (a) that it is biased against innocent individuals and (b) that it can be beaten simply by artificially augmenting responses to control questions. Although it is not possible to adequately assess the error rate of the CQT, both of these conclusions are supported by published research findings in the best social science journals (Honts et al., 1994; Horvath, 1977; Kleinmuntz & Szucko, 1984; Patrick & Iacono, 1991). Although defense attorneys often attempt to have the results of friendly CQTs admitted as evidence in court, there is no evidence supporting their validity and ample reason to doubt it. Members of scientific organizations who have the requisite background to evaluate the CQT are overwhelmingly skeptical of the claims made by polygraph proponents.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Iacono|first=William G.|year=2001|title=Forensic 'Lie Detection': Procedures Without Scientific Basis|url=https://antipolygraph.org/articles/article-018.shtml|journal=Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice|volume=1|issue=1|pages=75–86|doi=10.1300/J158v01n01_05|s2cid=143077241|url-access=subscription}}</ref> </blockquote> Polygraphs measure [[arousal]], which can be affected by [[anxiety]], [[anxiety disorder]]s such as [[post-traumatic stress disorder]] (PTSD), nervousness, fear, confusion, hypoglycemia, psychosis, depression, substance-induced states (nicotine, stimulants), substance-withdrawal state (alcohol withdrawal) or other emotions; polygraphs do not measure "lies".<ref name="Lewis, J. A. 2009"/><ref name="dpca.state.ny.us">{{cite web |url=http://dpca.state.ny.us/pdfs/sopolygraphresearchbulletin3.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=2014-01-06 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605202732/http://www.dpca.state.ny.us/pdfs/sopolygraphresearchbulletin3.pdf |archive-date=2011-06-05 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news| url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/30/AR2006043001006.html | newspaper=The Washington Post | first1=Dan | last1=Eggen | first2=Shankar | last2=Vedantam | title=Polygraph Results Often in Question | date=May 1, 2006}}</ref> A polygraph cannot differentiate anxiety caused by dishonesty and anxiety caused by something else.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2002/11/lie-detector-roulette|title=Lie Detector Roulette|work=Mother Jones}}</ref> Since the polygraph does not measure lying, the [[Silent Talker Lie Detector]] inventors expected that adding a camera to film microexpressions would improve the accuracy of the evaluators. This did not happen in practice according to an article in the Intercept.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Gallagher |first1=Ryan |title=We Tested Europe's New Lie Detector for Travelors-and Immediately Triggered a False Positive |url=https://theintercept.com/2019/07/26/europe-border-control-ai-lie-detector/ |website=The Intercept |date=26 July 2019 |access-date=17 March 2023}}</ref> ===US Congress Office of Technology Assessment=== In 1983, the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment published a review of the technology<ref>{{cite journal|title=Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation – A Technical Memorandum|journal=(Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment|date=November 1983|issue=OTA-TM-H-15|url=http://ota.fas.org/reports/8320.pdf|access-date=3 September 2016}}</ref> and found that {{quote|there is at present only limited scientific evidence for establishing the validity of polygraph testing. Even where the evidence seems to indicate that polygraph testing detects deceptive subjects better than chance, significant error rates are possible, and examiner and examinee differences and the use of countermeasures may further affect validity.<ref>{{Skeptoid|id=4422|number=422|title=Lie Detection|access-date=3 September 2016}}</ref>}} ===National Academy of Sciences=== In 2003, the [[National Academy of Sciences]] (NAS) issued a report entitled "The Polygraph and Lie Detection". The NAS found that "overall, the evidence is scanty and scientifically weak", concluding that 57 of the approximately 80 research studies that the [[American Polygraph Association]] relied on to reach their conclusions were significantly flawed.<ref>[http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10420&page=212 "Conclusions and Recommendations"]. ''The Polygraph and Lie Detection'' (2003), [[National Academies Press]]. p. 212</ref> These studies did show that specific-incident polygraph testing, in a person untrained in counter-measures, could discern the truth at "a level greater than chance, yet short of perfection". However, due to several flaws, the levels of accuracy shown in these studies "are almost certainly higher than actual polygraph accuracy of specific-incident testing in the field".<ref>National Research Council (2013); [http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10420&page=212 Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations, p. 212])</ref> By adding a camera, the [[Silent Talker Lie Detector]] attempted to give more data to the evaluator by providing information about microexpressions. However adding the Silent Talker camera did not improve lie detection and was very expensive and cumbersome to include according to an article in the Intercept.<ref name="intercept" /> When polygraphs are used as a screening tool (in [[national security]] matters and for [[Law enforcement agency|law enforcement]] agencies for example) the level of accuracy drops to such a level that "Its accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in [[List of federal agencies in the United States|federal agencies]]." The NAS concluded that the polygraph "may have some utility but that there is "little basis for the expectation that a polygraph test could have extremely high accuracy".<ref name=NatResearchCouncil/> The NAS conclusions paralleled those of the earlier [[United States Congress]] [[Office of Technology Assessment]] report "Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation".<ref>{{cite web |title= Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation |author= Office of Technology Assessment |date= November 1983 |url=https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/ota/ |author-link= Office of Technology Assessment }}</ref> Similarly, a report to Congress by the [[Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy]] concluded that "The few Government-sponsored scientific research reports on polygraph validity (as opposed to its utility), especially those focusing on the screening of applicants for employment, indicate that the polygraph is neither scientifically valid nor especially effective beyond its ability to generate admissions".<ref name=moynihan>[http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/09ps.pdf IV Personnel Security: Protection Through Detection] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110612003618/http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/09ps.pdf |date=2011-06-12 }} quoting Ralph M. Carney, ''SSBI Source Yield: An Examination of Sources Contacted During the SSBI'' (Monterey: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 1996), 6, affirming that in 81% of cases, the derogatory informations were obtained through questionnaire and/or interrogation.</ref> Despite the NAS finding of a "high rate of false positives," failures to expose individuals such as [[Aldrich Ames]] and [[Larry Wu-Tai Chin]], and other inabilities to show a scientific justification for the use of the polygraph, it continues to be employed.<ref name="intercept">{{cite journal |last1=Randi |first1=James |author-link1=James Randi |title=A Consistently Erroneous Technology |journal=[[Skeptical Inquirer]] |date=2017 |volume=41 |issue=5 |pages=16–19 |url=https://www.csicop.org/si/show/a_consistently_erroneous_technology |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180728234040/https://www.csicop.org/si/show/a_consistently_erroneous_technology |archive-date=2018-07-28 |access-date=28 July 2018}}</ref>
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)