Editing Predatory pricing (section)

==Legal features==
1. The principal aspect of predatory pricing is that the seller in the market has a certain economic or technical strength which distinguishes it from [[price discrimination]], where competition exists amongst both buyers and sellers.

2. The geographic market for predatory pricing is the country's domestic market which differentiates it from "dumping". Dumping refers to the practice of selling commodities in overseas markets at a lower price than within the domestic market. Though it can be determined that both concepts have similarities in terms of "low-cost sales" and "exhaustion of competitors", numerous differences have been noted:

(1) The scopes of application of the two are different. Predatory pricing applies to domestic trade, while dumping applies to international trade.

(2) The identification standards of the two are different. Predatory pricing is based on cost, while dumping is based on the price applicable to the normal trading of similar domestic products.

(3) The laws applicable to both are different. Predatory pricing mainly falls under domestic laws, while dumping falls to international treaties or the laws of other countries.

(4) The consequences of the two are different. Legal sanctions for predatory pricing are compensatory damages or administrative penalties, while dumping involves the levying of anti-dumping duties.

3. The objective performance of predatory pricing is that a company temporarily sells goods or services below cost to eliminate competitors from a certain market and create exclusivity. The predatory pricing company can then sell goods and services at monopoly prices to compensate for the losses from initial low price sales.

4. A dominant firm's subjective intention may be to eliminate competition to gain a monopoly advantage. Under EU law, if a dominant firm prices above AVC but below Average Total Costs (ATC), proving intention can be useful evidence for finding predatory pricing.<ref name="eur-lex.europa.eu">[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:4905ac67-5a02-44a0-ae93-7724be6073b0.0002.06/DOC_2&format=PDF Case 62/86] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308110005/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar%3A4905ac67-5a02-44a0-ae93-7724be6073b0.0002.06%2FDOC_2&format=PDF |date=2021-03-08 }}, ''AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities'' [1991] ECR I-03359, para 72</ref> However, the difficulty is faced when distinguishing between an intention to eliminate competitors and an intention to win the competition.<ref>''Wanadoo Interactive'' ([https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38233/38233_87_1.pdf Case COMP/38.233] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308223615/https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38233/38233_87_1.pdf |date=2021-03-08 }}) Commission decision of 16 July 2003, para 271</ref> Thus, the European Commission does not have to establish an undertaking's subjective intention to prove that Article 102 applies, as abuse is an objective rather than a subjective concept.<ref>[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61976CJ0085&from=EN Case 85/76] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308105043/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61976CJ0085&from=EN |date=2021-03-08 }}, ''Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities'' [1979] ECR II-00461, para 91</ref>