Editing Protectionism (section)

==History==
[[File:Tariff Rates in Japan (1870-1960).gif|thumb|Tariff Rates in Japan (1870–1960)]]
[[File:Tariff Rates in Spain and Italy (1860-1910).gif|thumb|Tariff Rates in Spain and Italy (1860–1910)]]
In the 18th century, [[Adam Smith]] famously warned against the "interested sophistry" of industry, seeking to gain an advantage at the cost of the consumers.<ref name="FreeToChoose">[[Free to Choose]], Milton Friedman</ref> [[Friedrich List]] saw Adam Smith's views on [[free trade]] as disingenuous, believing that Smith advocated for free trade so that British industry could lock out underdeveloped foreign competition.<ref>''The National System of Political Economy'', by Friedrich List, 1841, translated by Sampson S. Lloyd M.P., 1885 edition, Fourth Book, "The Politics", Chapter 33.</ref>

According to economic historians Douglas Irwin and Kevin O'Rourke, "shocks that emanate from brief financial crises tend to be transitory and have a little long-run effect on trade policy, whereas those that play out over longer periods (the early 1890s, early 1930s) may give rise to protectionism that is difficult to reverse. Regional wars also produce transitory shocks that have little impact on long-run trade policy, while global wars give rise to extensive government trade restrictions that can be difficult to reverse."<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last1=C|first1=Feenstra, Robert|last2=M|first2=Taylor, Alan|date=23 December 2013|title=Globalization in an Age of Crisis: Multilateral Economic Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century|url=https://www.nber.org/books/feen11-1|journal=NBER|doi=10.7208/chicago/9780226030890.001.0001|isbn=978-0-226-03075-3|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

One study shows that sudden shifts in comparative advantage for specific countries have led some countries to become protectionist: "The shift in comparative advantage associated with the opening up of New World frontiers, and the subsequent "grain invasion" of Europe, led to higher agricultural tariffs from the late 1870s onwards, which as we have seen reversed the move toward freer trade that had characterized mid-nineteenth-century Europe. In the decades after World War II, Japan's rapid rise led to trade friction with other countries. Japan's recovery was accompanied by a sharp increase in its exports of certain product categories: cotton textiles in the 1950s, steel in the 1960s, automobiles in the 1970s, and electronics in the 1980s. In each case, the rapid expansion in Japan's exports created difficulties for its trading partners and the use of protectionism as a shock absorber."<ref name=":0"/>

===Canada===
{{Main|National Policy}}
Since 1971 Canada has protected producers of eggs, milk, cheese, chicken, and turkey with a system of [[supply management (Canada)|supply management]]. Though prices for these foods in Canada exceed global prices, the farmers and processors have had the security of a stable market to finance their operations.{{Citation needed|date=May 2021}} Doubts about the safety of [[bovine growth hormone]], sometimes used to boost dairy production, led to hearings before the [[Senate of Canada]], resulting in a ban in Canada. Thus, supply management of milk products is [[consumer protection]] of Canadians.<ref>Richard Wolfson (1999) [http://www.consumerhealth.org/articles/display.cfm?ID=19991128221446 How Bovine Growth Hormone Was Rejected in Canada] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230107190727/http://www.consumerhealth.org/how-bovine-growth-hormone-was-rejected-in-canada/ |date=7 January 2023 }}, from Consumerhealth.org 22(9)</ref>

===China===
In 2010, [[Paul Krugman]] wrote that China pursues a mercantilist and predatory policy, i.e., it keeps its currency undervalued to accumulate trade surpluses by using capital flow controls. The Chinese government sells [[renminbi]] and buys foreign currency to keep the renminbi low, giving the Chinese manufacturing sector a cost advantage over its competitors. China's surpluses drain US demand and slow economic recovery in other countries with which China trades. Krugman writes: "This is the most distorted exchange rate policy any great nation has ever followed". He notes that an undervalued renminbi is tantamount to imposing high [[tariff]]s or providing export subsidies. A cheaper currency improves employment and competitiveness because it makes imports more expensive while making domestic products more attractive. He expects Chinese surpluses to destroy 1.4 million American jobs by 2011.<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/15/opinion/15krugman.html?src=me Taking On China</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2010/09/paul-krugman-taking-on-china.html | title=Economist's View: Paul Krugman: Taking on China }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/macroeconomic-effects-of-chinese-mercantilism/ | title=Macroeconomic effects of Chinese mercantilism | date=31 December 2009 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/opinion/01krugman.html?mtrref=blogs.worldbank.org&gwh=B3231576E9FD9BDAEC5EBD56EFDCC866&gwt=pay | title=Opinion &#124; Chinese New Year (Published 2010) | website=[[The New York Times]] | date=January 2010 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2009/12/paul-krugman-chinese-new-year.html | title=Economist's View: Paul Krugman: Chinese New Year }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/opinion/25krugman.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=BC216C8BA8F1415F915F9DE7DFDFCCD14CA846&gwt=pay | title=Opinion &#124; the Renminbi Runaround (Published 2010) | website=[[The New York Times]] | date=25 June 2010 }}</ref>
<ref>{{cite web | url=https://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2010/06/paul-krugman-the-renminbi-runaround.html | title=Economist's View: Paul Krugman: The Renminbi Runaround }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/13/opinion/13krugman.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=24A582538B90C0FDEA00892926110017&gwt=pay | title=Opinion &#124; China, Japan, America (Published 2010) | website=[[The New York Times]] | date=13 September 2010 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2010/09/paul-krugman-china-japan-america.html | title=Economist's View: Paul Krugman: China, Japan, America }}</ref>

In June 2015, the international community, through the [[International Monetary Fund|IMF]], rejected this notion and assessed the renminbi as suggested to be no longer undervalued.<ref>{{cite journal |title=2015 External Sector Report—Individual Economy Assessments |journal=International Monetary Fund |date=June 26, 2015 |page=13 |url=https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/062615a.pdf |access-date=11 April 2025}}</ref>

Later that year, American economist [[Charles Calomiris]] wrote that US presidential candidate at the time [[Donald Trump]] had falsely characterized the trajectory of the renminbi's exchange rate in nominal terms and especially so when using the [[w:Exchange_rate#Real_exchange_rate_equilibrium_and_misalignment|real exchange rate]], and that a recent devaluation by the [[People's Bank of China|PBC]] was a passive one where inaction would've led to an even steeper devaluation by market forces, understandably so after the disappearance of "a lot of [Chinese economic growth] low-hanging fruit that was easily picked in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s."<ref>{{cite web |last1=Calomiris W. |first1=Charles |title=Trump Gets His Facts Wrong On China |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlescalomiris/2015/08/25/trump-gets-facts-wrong-on-china-currency-depreciation-manipulation/ |website=Forbes |access-date=12 April 2025}}</ref>

===Europe===
==== Continental Europe ====
Europe became increasingly protectionist during the eighteenth century.<ref name=":3">{{Cite book|url=http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8493.html|title=Power and Plenty|date= 2009|publisher=Princeton University Press|access-date=16 October 2017|isbn=978-0-691-14327-9|last1=Findlay|first1=Ronald|last2=O'Rourke|first2=Kevin H.}}</ref> Economic historians Findlay and O'Rourke write that in "the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, European trade policies were almost universally protectionist", with the exceptions being smaller countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark.<ref name=":3" />

Europe increasingly liberalized its trade during the 19th century.<ref name=":1" /> Countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal and Switzerland, and arguably Sweden and Belgium, had fully moved towards free trade prior to 1860.<ref name=":1" /> Economic historians see the repeal of the [[Corn Laws]] in 1846 as the decisive shift toward free trade in Britain.<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{cite book| chapter-url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/the-cambridge-economic-history-of-modern-britain/trade-discovery-mercantilism-and-technology/A0D309440D728FC14CC299FACB7A5876 | chapter=7 – Trade: discovery, mercantilism and technology | title=The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain | publisher=Cambridge University | language=en | access-date=27 June 2017 | doi=10.1017/CHOL9780521820363.008 | isbn=978-1-139-05385-3 | year=2004 | last1=Harley | first1=C. Knick | pages=175–203 }}</ref> A 1990 study by the Harvard economic historian [[Jeffrey Williamson]] showed that the Corn Laws (which imposed restrictions and [[Trade barrier|tariffs]] on imported [[grain]]) substantially increased the cost of living for British workers, and hampered the British manufacturing sector by reducing the disposable incomes that British workers could have spent on manufactured goods.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Williamson|first=Jeffrey G|author-link = Jeffrey G. Williamson|date=1 April 1990|title=The impact of the Corn Laws just prior to repeal|journal=Explorations in Economic History|volume=27|issue=2|pages=123–156|doi=10.1016/0014-4983(90)90007-L}}</ref> The shift towards liberalization in Britain occurred in part due to "the influence of economists like David Ricardo", but also due to "the growing power of urban interests".<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal| first1=Ronald | last1=Findlay| last2=O'Rourke | first2=Kevin H. |date=1 January 2003| title=Commodity Market Integration, 1500–2000 | url=https://www.nber.org/chapters/c9585 |journal=NBER| pages=13–64}}</ref>

Findlay and O'Rourke characterize 1860 [[Cobden–Chevalier Treaty|Cobden Chevalier treaty]] between France and the United Kingdom as "a decisive shift toward European free trade."<ref name=":1" /> This treaty was followed by numerous free trade agreements: "France and Belgium signed a treaty in 1861; a Franco-Prussian treaty was signed in 1862; Italy entered the "network of Cobden-Chevalier treaties" in 1863 (Bairoch 1989, 40); Switzerland in 1864; Sweden, Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Hanseatic towns in 1865; and Austria in 1866. By 1877, less than two decades after the Cobden Chevalier treaty and three decades after British Repeal, Germany "had virtually become a free trade country" (Bairoch, 41). Average duties on manufactured products had declined to 9–12% on the Continent, a far cry from the 50% British tariffs, and numerous prohibitions elsewhere, of the immediate post-Waterloo era (Bairoch, table 3, p.&nbsp;6, and table 5, p.&nbsp;42)."<ref name=":1" />

Some European powers did not liberalize during the 19th century, such as the Russian Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire which remained highly protectionist. The [[Ottoman Empire]] also became increasingly protectionist.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Daudin|first1=Guillaume|last2=O’Rourke|first2=Kevin H.|last3=Escosura|first3=Leandro Prados de la|date=2008|title=Trade and Empire, 1700–1870|journal=Documents de Travail de l'Ofce |url=https://ideas.repec.org/p/fce/doctra/0824.html}}</ref> In the Ottoman Empire's case, however, it previously had [[Economic liberalism|liberal]] [[free trade]] policies during the 18th to early 19th centuries, which [[British prime minister]] [[Benjamin Disraeli]] cited as "an instance of the injury done by unrestrained competition" in the 1846 [[Corn Laws]] debate, arguing that it destroyed what had been "some of the finest manufacturers of the world" in 1812.<ref name="Paradoxes"/>

The countries of Western Europe began to steadily liberalize their economies after World War II and the protectionism of the interwar period,<ref name=":3" /> but [[John Tsang]], then [[Hong Kong]]'s [[Secretary for Commerce, Industry and Technology]] and chair of the [[World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference of 2005|Sixth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization]], MC6, commented in 2005 that the EU spent around €70 billion per year on "trade-distorting support".<ref>Tsang, J., "Towards a Brighter Future in Trade and World Development", ''Hong Kong Industrialist'', 2005/12, p. 28</ref>

==== United Kingdom====
{{Main article|Economic history of the United Kingdom}}
{{See also|British Empire}}
{{Conservatism UK}}
[[Great Britain]], and England in particular, became one of the most prosperous economic regions in the world between the late 17th century and the early 19th century as a result of being the birthplace of the [[Industrial Revolution]] that began in the mid-eighteenth century.<ref>{{cite book|author=Baten, Jörg |title=A History of the Global Economy. From 1500 to the Present.|date=2016|publisher=Cambridge University Press|page=13|isbn=978-1-107-50718-0}}</ref> The government protected its merchants—and kept others out—by trade barriers, regulations, and subsidies to domestic industries in order to maximize exports from and minimize imports to the realm. The [[Navigation Acts]] of the late 17th century required all trade to be carried in English ships, manned by English crews (this later encompassed all Britons after the [[Acts of Union 1707]] united Scotland with England).<ref>Darwin, 2012 pp. 21–22</ref> Colonists were required to send their produce and raw materials first of all to Britain, where the surplus was then sold-on by British merchants to other colonies in the British empire or bullion-earning external markets. The colonies were forbidden to trade directly with other nations or rival empires. The goal was to maintain the North American and Caribbean colonies as dependent agricultural economies geared towards producing raw materials for export to Britain. The growth of native industry was discouraged, in order to keep the colonies dependent on the United Kingdom for their finished goods.<ref>Darwin, 2012 p. 166</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Max Savelle|title=Seeds of Liberty: The Genesis of the American Mind|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hIgl_HNozQsC&pg=PA204|year=1948|page=204ff|publisher=Kessinger |isbn=978-1-4191-0707-8}}</ref> From 1815 to 1870, the United Kingdom reaped the benefits of being the world's first modern, industrialised nation. It described itself as "the workshop of the world", meaning that its finished goods were produced so efficiently and cheaply that they could often undersell comparable, locally manufactured goods in almost any other market.<ref>Harold Cox, ed., ''British industries under free trade'' (1903) pp, 17–18.</ref>

By the 1840s, the United Kingdom had adopted a free-trade policy, meaning open markets and no tariffs throughout the empire.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Lynn|first=Martin|year=1999|title=British Policy, Trade, and Informal Empire in the Mid-19th Century|editor-first=Andrew|editor-last=Porter|journal=The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century|volume=3|pages=101–121|doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205654.003.0006}}</ref> The [[Corn Laws]] were [[tariff]]s and other [[trade restriction]]s on imported food and [[grain|corn]] enforced in the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] between 1815 and 1846, and enhanced the profits and political power associated with [[land ownership]]. The laws raised [[food prices]] and the costs of living for the British public, and hampered the growth of other British economic sectors, such as manufacturing, by reducing the disposable income of the British public.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Williamson|first=Jeffrey G|date=1990-04-01|title=The impact of the Corn Laws just prior to repeal|journal=Explorations in Economic History|volume=27|issue=2|pages=123–156|doi=10.1016/0014-4983(90)90007-L}}</ref> The Prime Minister, [[Robert Peel|Sir Robert Peel]], a [[Tories (British political party)|Conservative]], achieved repeal in 1846 with the support of the [[Whigs (British political party)|Whigs]] in Parliament, overcoming the opposition of most of his own party.

While the United Kingdom espoused a policy of free trade in the late nineteenth century, it was hardly the case that Britain was unaffected by the tariffs imposed by its trade partners—tariffs that generally increased during the late nineteenth century.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Bairoch |first1=Paul |title=European trade policy, 1815–1914 |date=1989-06-15 |work=The Cambridge Economic History of Europe from the Decline of the Roman Empire |pages=1–160 |editor-last=Mathias |editor-first=Peter |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/CBO9781139054508A005/type/book_part |access-date=2024-11-06 |edition=1 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/chol9780521225045.002 |isbn=978-1-139-05450-8 |last2=Burke |first2=Susan |editor2-last=Pollard |editor2-first=Sidney|url-access=subscription }}</ref> According to one study, Britain's exports in 1902 would have been 57% higher, if all of Britain's trade partners also embraced free trade.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Varian |first=Brian D. |date=2023 |title=British exports and foreign tariffs: Insights from the Board of Trade's foreign tariff compilation for 1902 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ehr.13214 |journal=The Economic History Review |language=en |volume=76 |issue=3 |pages=827–843 |doi=10.1111/ehr.13214 |issn=0013-0117}}</ref> The decline in overseas demand for British exports, resulting from foreign tariffs, contributed to the so-called late-Victorian climacteric in the British economy: a decline in the growth rate, i.e. a deceleration.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Coppock |first=D. J. |date=1956 |title=The Climacteric of the 1890's: A Critical Note |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9957.1956.tb00972.x |journal=The Manchester School |language=en |volume=24 |issue=1 |pages=1–31 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9957.1956.tb00972.x |issn=1463-6786|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Crafts |first1=Nicholas |last2=Mills |first2=Terence C |date=2020-11-01 |title=Sooner than you think: the Pre-1914 UK Productivity Slowdown was Victorian not Edwardian |url=https://academic.oup.com/ereh/article/24/4/736/5804838 |journal=European Review of Economic History |language=en |volume=24 |issue=4 |pages=736–748 |doi=10.1093/ereh/hez022 |issn=1361-4916|hdl=10.1093/ereh/hez022 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

During the interwar era, Britain abandoned free trade. There was a limited erosion of free trade during the 1920s under a patchwork of legislation including the [[Safeguarding of Industries Act 1921|Safeguarding of Industries Act of 1921]], the [[Safeguarding of Industries (Customs Duties) Act 1925|Safeguarding of Industries Act of 1925]], and the [[Finance Act|Finance Act of 1925]]. The [[Reginald McKenna|McKenna Duties]], which were imposed during the First World War on motorcars; clocks and watches; musical instruments; and cinematographic film were retained.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Abel |first=Deryck |title=A History of British Tariffs, 1923-1942 |publisher=Heath, Cranton Limited |year=1945 |location=London}}</ref> Under commodities that were early to receive protection included matches, chemicals, scientific equipment, silk, rayon, embroidery, lace, cutlery, gloves, incandescent mantles, paper, pottery, enamelled holloware, and buttons.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Varian |first=Brian D. |date=2019 |title=The growth of manufacturing protection in 1920s Britain |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjpe.12223 |journal=Scottish Journal of Political Economy |language=en |volume=66 |issue=5 |pages=703–711 |doi=10.1111/sjpe.12223 |issn=0036-9292}}</ref> The duties on motorcars and rayon have been determined to have expanded output considerably.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Foreman-Peck |first=J. S. |date=1979 |title=Tariff Protection and Economies of Scale: The British Motor Industry Before 1939 |url=https://academic.oup.com/oep/article/2360834/TARIFF |journal=Oxford Economic Papers |language=en |volume=31 |issue=2 |pages=237–257 |doi=10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041444 |issn=1464-3812|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Varian |first=Brian D. |date=2022-08-18 |title=Protection and the British rayon industry during the 1920s |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00076791.2020.1753699 |journal=Business History |language=en |volume=64 |issue=6 |pages=1131–1148 |doi=10.1080/00076791.2020.1753699 |issn=0007-6791}}</ref> Amid the Depression, Britain passed the [[Import Duties Act 1932|Import Duties Act of 1932]], which imposed a general tariff of 10% on most imports and created the Import Duties Advisory Committee (IDAC), which could recommend even higher duties.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Abel |first=Deryck |title=A History of British Tariffs, 1923-1942 |publisher=Heath, Cranton Limited |year=1945 |location=London}}</ref> Britain's protectionism in the early 1930s was shown by Lloyd and Solomou to have been productivity-enhancing.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lloyd |first1=Simon P. |last2=Solomou |first2=Solomos |date=2020 |title=The impact of the 1932 General Tariff: a difference-in-difference approach |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11698-019-00184-z |journal=Cliometrica |language=en |volume=14 |issue=1 |pages=41–60 |doi=10.1007/s11698-019-00184-z |issn=1863-2505}}</ref>

The possessions of the [[East India Company]] in India, known as [[British India]], was the centrepiece of the British Empire, and because of an efficient taxation system it paid its own administrative expenses as well as the cost of the large [[British Indian Army]]. In terms of trade, India turned only a small profit for British business.<ref>P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, ''British Imperialism: 1688–2000'' (2nd ed. 2002) ch. 10</ref> However, transfers to the British government was massive: in 1801 unrequited (unpaid, or paid from Indian-collected revenue) was about 30% of British domestic savings available for capital formation in the United Kingdom.<ref name="jstor.org">{{cite journal |last1=Mukherjee |first1=Aditya |title=Empire: How Colonial India Made Modern Britain |journal=Economic and Political Weekly |date=2010 |volume=45 |issue=50 |pages=73–82 |jstor=25764217}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Habib |first1=Irfan |title=Essays in Indian History |date=1995 |publisher=Tulika Press |location=New Delhi |pages=304–46 |chapter=Colonisation of the Indian Economy}}</ref>

=== Latin America ===
{{See also|Economic history of Argentina}}

Most Latin American countries [[decolonization of the Americas|gained independence]] in the early 19th century, with notable exceptions including [[Captaincy General of Cuba|Spanish Cuba]] and [[Captaincy General of Puerto Rico|Spanish Puerto Rico]]. Following the achievement of their independence, many of the Latin American countries adopted protectionism. They both feared that any foreign competition would stomp out their newly created state and believed that lack of outside resources would drive domestic production.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Gallas |first1=Daniel |title=The Country Built on Trade Barriers |work=BBC News |date=August 2018 |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44902104 |access-date=10 November 2021}}</ref> The protectionist behavior continued up until and during the World Wars. During World War 2, Latin America had, on average, the highest tariffs in the world.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Coatsworth |first1=John |last2=Williamson |first2=Jeffrey |title=THE ROOTS OF LATIN AMERICAN PROTECTIONISM: LOOKING BEFORE THE GREAT DEPRESSION |journal=NBER Working Paper Series |date=June 2002}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Mercosur in Brief |url=https://www.mercosur.int/en/about-mercosur/mercosur-in-brief/ |website=mercosur}}</ref>

====Argentina====
Argentina, which had been insignificant during the first half of the 19th century, showed an impressive and sustained economic performance from the 1860s up until 1930. A 2018 study describes Argentina as a "super-exporter" during the period 1880–1929, and credits the boom to low trade costs and trade liberalization on one hand and on the other hand to the fact that Argentina "offered a diverse basket of products to the different European and American countries that consumed them". The study concludes "that Argentina took advantage of a multilateral and open economic system."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Pinilla|first1=Vicente|last2=Rayes|first2=Agustina|date=2018-09-27|title=How Argentina became a super-exporter of agricultural and food products during the First Globalisation (1880–1929)|journal=[[Cliometrica]]|volume=13|issue=3|pages=443–469|language=en|doi=10.1007/s11698-018-0178-0|s2cid=158598822|issn=1863-2505|url=http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/84206|hdl=11336/177360|hdl-access=free}}</ref>

Beginning in the 1940s, [[Juan Perón]] erected a system of almost complete protectionism against imports, largely cutting off Argentina from the international market. Protectionism created a domestically oriented industry with high production costs, incapable of competing in international markets. At the same time, output of beef and grain, the country's main export goods, stagnated.<ref name="cht">{{cite web|title=Argentina Trade Policy |work=Commanding Heights: The Battle For The World Economy |publisher=PBS |url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/countries/ar/ar_trade.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110426054555/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/countries/ar/ar_trade.html |archive-date=2011-04-26 |url-status=dead }}</ref> The IAPI began shortchanging growers and, when world grain prices dropped in the late 1940s, it stifled agricultural production, exports and business sentiment, in general.<ref>{{cite news|author=Antonio Cafiero |title=Intimidaciones, boicots y calidad institucional |newspaper=Página/12 |date=2008-05-07 |url=http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/subnotas/103697-32644-2008-05-07.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120211073528/http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/subnotas/103697-32644-2008-05-07.html |archive-date=2012-02-11 |url-status=dead }}</ref> Despite these shortcomings, protectionism and government credits did allow an exponential growth of the internal market: radio sales increased 600% and fridge sales grew 218%, among others.<ref>{{cite book|author=Pablo Gerchunoff |title=''Peronist Economic Policies, 1946–1955'' |publisher=di Tella y Dornbusch |pages=59–85 |year=1989}}</ref> During this period Argentina's economy continued to grow, on average, but more slowly than the world as a whole or than its neighbors, Brazil and Chile. By 1954, while still leading the region, Argentina's GDP per capita had fallen to less than half of that of the United States, from being 80% equivalent before the 1930s.<ref>{{cite web |last=Arnaut |first=Javier |title=Understanding the Latin American Gap during the era of Import Substitution: Institutions, Productivity, and Distance to the Technology Frontier in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico's Manufacturing Industries, 1935–1975 |url=http://www.fcs.edu.uy/archivos/Arnaut,%20Understanding%20the%20Latin%20American%20Gap%20during%20the%20era%20of%20Import%20Substitution.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120426051927/http://www.fcs.edu.uy/archivos/Arnaut,%20Understanding%20the%20Latin%20American%20Gap%20during%20the%20era%20of%20Import%20Substitution.pdf |archive-date=2012-04-26 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author=Jorge Avila |title=Ingreso per cápita relativo 1875–2006 |publisher=Jorge Avila Opina |date=2006-05-25 |url=http://www.jorgeavilaopina.com/?p=61 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303175246/http://www.jorgeavilaopina.com/?p=61 |archive-date=2016-03-03 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

=== United States ===
{{Main|Protectionism in the United States|Tariffs in United States history}}
[[File:Droits de douane (France, UK, US).png|thumb|Tariff rates (France, UK, and US)]]
[[File:Average Tariff Rates in USA (1821-2016).png|thumb|Average tariff rates in US (1821–2016)]]

The [[United States]] has employed tariffs throughout much of its history. [[Alexander Hamilton]], the first [[United States Secretary of the Treasury]], supported tariffs at the country's inception in his 1791 [[Report on Manufactures]]. [[Abraham Lincoln]] signed the 1861 [[Morrill Tariff]] to raise revenue during the [[United States Civil War]]. In the early years of [[the Great Depression]], over the objection of many economists, Hoover signed the [[Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act]] into law in June 1930.{{sfn|Whyte 2017|pp=414–415}}

According to economic historian [[Douglas Irwin]], a common myth about US trade policy is that low tariffs harmed American manufacturers in the early 19th century and then that high tariffs made the United States into a great industrial power in the late 19th century.<ref name=":5">{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21731616-douglas-irwin-agrees-trade-policy-important-all-manner-powers-are-wrongly?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/ahistorianonthemythsofamericantradescapegoatingtrade|title=A historian on the myths of American trade|newspaper=The Economist|access-date=26 November 2017|language=en}}</ref> A review by ''The Economist'' of Irwin's 2017 book ''Clashing over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy'' states:<ref name=":5"/>
<blockquote>Political dynamics would lead people to see a link between tariffs and the economic cycle that was not there. A boom would generate enough revenue for tariffs to fall, and when the bust came pressure would build to raise them again. By the time that happened, the economy would be recovering, giving the impression that tariff cuts caused the crash and the reverse generated the recovery. 'Mr. Irwin' also attempts to debunk the idea that protectionism made America a great industrial power, a notion believed by some to offer lessons for developing countries today. As its share of global manufacturing powered from 23% in 1870 to 36% in 1913, the admittedly high tariffs of the time came with a cost, estimated at around 0.5% of GDP in the mid-1870s. In some industries, they might have sped up development by a few years. But American growth during its protectionist period was more to do with its abundant resources and openness to people and ideas.</blockquote>

According to Irwin, tariffs have served three primary purposes in the United States: "to raise revenue for the government, to restrict imports and protect domestic producers from foreign competition, and to reach reciprocity agreements that reduce trade barriers."<ref name=":02">{{Cite journal|last=Irwin|first=Douglas A.|date=2 August 2020|title=Trade Policy in American Economic History|url=https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-economics-070119-024409|journal=Annual Review of Economics|language=en|volume=12|issue=1|pages=23–44|doi=10.1146/annurev-economics-070119-024409|s2cid=241740782|issn=1941-1383|url-access=subscription}}</ref> From 1790 to 1860, average tariffs increased from 20 percent to 60 percent before declining again to 20 percent.<ref name=":02" /> From 1861 to 1933, which Irwin characterizes as the "restriction period", the average tariffs increased to 50 percent and remained at that level for several decades. From 1934 onwards, which Irwin characterizes as the "reciprocity period", the average tariff declined substantially until it leveled off at 5 percent.<ref name=":02" />

Historian [[Paul Bairoch]] documented that the United States imposed among the highest rates in the world from around the founding of the country until the World War II period, describing the United States as "the mother country and bastion of modern protectionism" since the end of the 18th century and until the post-World War II period.<ref name="Paradoxes">{{cite book|title=Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes|author=Paul Bairoch|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1995|url=https://www.scribd.com/document/193124153/Economics-and-World-History-Myths-and-Paradoxes-Paul-Bairoch|pages=31–32|author-link=Paul Bairoch|access-date=16 August 2017|archive-date=12 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171012060209/https://www.scribd.com/document/193124153/Economics-and-World-History-Myths-and-Paradoxes-Paul-Bairoch|url-status=dead}}</ref> [[Alexander Hamilton]], the first [[United States Secretary of the Treasury]], was of the view, as articulated most famously in his "[[Report on Manufactures]]", that developing an [[industrialized economy]] was impossible without protectionism because import duties are necessary to shelter domestic "[[Infant industry argument|infant industries]]" until they could achieve [[economies of scale]].<ref>{{cite book|title=Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes|author=Paul Bairoch|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1995|page=33}}</ref> The industrial takeoff of the United States occurred under protectionist policies 1816–1848 and under moderate protectionism 1846–1861, and continued under strict protectionist policies 1861–1945.<ref>{{cite book|title=Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes|author=Paul Bairoch|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1995|page=34}}</ref> In the late 19th century, higher tariffs were introduced on the grounds that they were needed to protect American wages and to protect American farmers.<ref>{{cite book|title=Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes|author=Paul Bairoch|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1995|page=36}}</ref> Between 1824 and the 1940s, the U.S. imposed much higher average tariff rates on manufactured products than did Britain or any other European country, with the exception for a period of time of Spain and Russia.<ref>{{cite book|title=Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes|author=Paul Bairoch|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1995|pages=34, 40}}</ref> Until World War II, the United States maintained among the highest tariff rates globally.<ref name="MehrotraGuichard2020">{{cite book|author1=Santosh Mehrotra|author2=Sylvie Guichard|title=Planning in the 20th Century and Beyond: India's Planning Commission and the NITI Aayog|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6xzhDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA285|date=2020|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-108-49462-5|page=285|quote=Most importantly, the United States was the birthplace of the idea of infant industry protection, and indeed was the most heavily protected economy in the world for about a century, until the Second World War}}</ref>

The Bush administration implemented [[2002 United States steel tariff|tariffs on Chinese steel in 2002]]; according to a 2005 review of existing research on the tariff, all studies found that the tariffs caused more harm than gains to the US economy and employment.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Read|first=Robert|date=1 August 2005|title=The Political Economy of Trade Protection: The Determinants and Welfare Impact of the 2002 US Emergency Steel Safeguard Measures|journal=World Economy|language=en|volume=28|issue=8|pages=1119–1137|doi=10.1111/j.1467-9701.2005.00722.x|s2cid=154520390|issn=1467-9701|url=http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-university/content-assets/documents/lums/economics/working-papers/SteelSafeguard.pdf}}</ref> The Obama administration implemented tariffs on Chinese tires between 2009 and 2012 as an [[Dumping (pricing policy)|anti-dumping measure]]; a 2016 study found that these tariffs had no impact on employment and wages in the US tire industry.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=1 June 2016|title=Did China tire safeguard save U.S. workers?|journal=European Economic Review|language=en|volume=85|pages=22–38|doi=10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.12.009|issn=0014-2921|last1=Chung|first1=Sunghoon|last2=Lee|first2=Joonhyung|last3=Osang|first3=Thomas|url=https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59112/2/MPRA_paper_59112.pdf}}</ref>

In 2018, EU Trade Commissioner [[Cecilia Malmström]] stated that the US was "playing a dangerous game" in applying tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from most countries and stated that she saw the Trump administration's decision to do so as both "pure protectionist" and "illegal".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/why-american-allies-are-angry-1.2231528|title=Why American allies are angry|website=Gulfnews.com|date=4 June 2018 }}</ref>

The [[First Trump tariffs|tariffs]] imposed by the [[First presidency of Donald Trump|first Trump administration]] during the [[China–United States trade war]] led to a reduction in the United States trade deficit with China.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html|title=Foreign Trade – U.S. Trade with China|publisher=United States Census Bureau}}</ref>

The [[Republican Party (United States)]], a [[conservatism in the United States|fiscally conservative]] political party, has historically often supported protectionism and currently does so.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-republicans-have-a-long-history-of-protectionism-2018-06-14|title=The Republicans have a long history of protectionism|website=MarketWatch|first1=Jeffrey|last1=Frankel|date=June 15, 2018}}</ref>