Editing RAF Bomber Command (section)

==Early years of the Second World War==
{{main|Air warfare of World War II}}
At the start of the Second World War in 1939, Bomber Command faced four problems. The first was lack of size; Bomber Command was not large enough effectively to operate as an independent strategic force. The second was rules of engagement; at the start of the war, the targets allocated to Bomber Command were not wide enough in scope. The third problem was the Command's lack of technology; specifically radio or radar derived navigational aids to allow accurate target location at night or through cloud. (In 1938, [[Edward George Bowen|E. G. "Taffy" Bowen]] proposed using [[H2S (radar)|ASV radar]] for navigation, only to have Bomber Command disclaim need for it, saying the sextant was sufficient.{{sfn|Judkins|2012|p=114}}) The fourth problem was the limited accuracy of bombing, especially from high level.{{sfn|Walker|2016|p=25}}

When the war began on 1 September 1939, [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], President of the [[Neutrality (international relations)|neutral]] United States, issued an appeal to the major belligerents to confine their air raids to military targets.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dannen.com/decision/int-law.html#E |title=Letter from the President of the United States to the Governments of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and His Britannic Majesty: Appeal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on Aerial Bombardment of Civilian Populations|date=1 September 1939|publisher=US Government|access-date=21 November 2024}}</ref> The French and British agreed to abide by the request, provided "that these same [[rules of war]]fare will be scrupulously observed by all of their opponents".{{sfn|Taylor|2005|p=105}} British policy was to restrict bombing to military targets and [[infrastructure]], such as ports and railways which were of military importance. While acknowledging that bombing Germany would cause civilian casualties, the British government renounced deliberate bombing of civilian property (outside combat zones) as a military tactic.{{sfn|Grayling|2006|p=24}}

[[File:British WW2 medium bombers comparison.png|thumb|Scale [[comparison diagram]] of the trio of British twin-engined medium bombers at the outbreak of the Second World War; the [[Armstrong Whitworth A.W.38 Whitley|A.W.38 Whitley]] (pink), the [[Vickers Wellington]] (blue) and the [[Handley Page Hampden]] (yellow)]]

The British government did not want to violate its agreement by attacking civilian targets outside combat zones and the French were even more concerned lest Bomber Command operations provoke a German bombing attack on France. Since the {{lang|fr|[[Armée de l'Air]]}} had few modern fighters and no defence network comparable to the British [[Chain Home]] radar stations, this left France powerless before the threat of a German bombing attack. The final problem was lack of adequate aircraft. The Bomber Command workhorses at the start of the war, the [[Vickers Wellington]], [[Armstrong Whitworth Whitley]] and [[Handley Page Hampden|Handley Page Hampden/Hereford]], had been designed as tactical-support medium bombers and none of them had enough range or ordnance capacity for anything more than a limited strategic offensive. Of these the Wellington had the longest range at {{convert|2550|miles}}.{{sfn|Andrews|1967|p=16}}

Bomber Command became even smaller after the declaration of war. [[No. 1 Group RAF|No. 1 Group]], with its squadrons of [[Fairey Battle]]s, left for France to form the [[Advanced Air Striking Force]]. This action had two aims: to give the [[British Expeditionary Force (World War II)|British Expeditionary Force]] some air-striking power and to allow the Battles to operate against German targets, since they lacked the range to do so from British airfields.{{sfn|Jackson|1974|p=17}}

In May 1940, some of the [[Advanced Air Striking Force]] was caught on the ground by German air attacks on their airfields at the opening of the invasion of France. The remainder of the Battles proved to be horrendously vulnerable to enemy fire. Many times, Battles would set out to attack and be almost wiped out in the process. e.g. 10 May 1940 when a significant number of Battles were shot down or damaged.{{sfn|Baughen|2016|pp=99–100}}

Following the [[Rotterdam Blitz]] of 14 May, RAF Bomber Command was authorized to attack German targets east of the Rhine on 15 May; the Air Ministry authorized [[Air Marshal]] Charles Portal to attack targets in the [[Ruhr]], including [[oil]] plants and other civilian [[Industrial sector|industrial]] targets which aided the German war effort, such as [[blast furnace]]s (which were visible at night).{{sfn|Hastings|1979|p=6}}{{sfn|Taylor|2005|p=111}} The first attack took place on the night of 15/16 May, with 96 bombers setting off to attack targets east of the Rhine, 78 of which were against oil targets. Of these, only 24 claimed to have found their targets.{{sfn|Richards|1953|p=124}}

Bomber Command itself soon fully joined in the action; in the [[Battle of Britain]], Bomber Command was assigned to bomb invasion barges and fleets assembling in the Channel ports. This was much less public than the battles of the [[Spitfire]]s and [[Hawker Hurricane|Hurricanes]] of [[RAF Fighter Command]] but still vital and dangerous work, carried out night after night.{{sfn|Richards|1953|pp=186–187}}

Bomber Command was also indirectly responsible, in part at least, for the switch of {{lang|de|[[Luftwaffe]]}} attention away from Fighter Command to bombing civilian targets. A German bomber on a raid got lost due to poor navigation and bombed London. [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|Prime Minister]] [[Winston Churchill]] consequently ordered a retaliatory raid on the German capital of Berlin. The damage caused was minor but the raid sent [[Hitler]] into a rage. He ordered the ''Luftwaffe'' to level British cities, thus precipitating [[the Blitz]].{{sfn|Richards|1953|p=182}}

Like the [[United States Army Air Forces]] later in the war, Bomber Command had first concentrated on a doctrine of "precision" bombing in daylight. When the German defences inflicted costly defeats on British raids in late 1939, a switch to night bombing was forced upon the Command. The problems of enemy defences were then replaced with the problems of night navigation and target-finding. In the early years of the war bombers had to rely on dead reckoning navigation supported by radio fixes and astro-navigation.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/centre-for-air-and-space-power-studies/aspr/apr-vol10-iss1-5-pdf/| title= To hat Extent Did Royal Air Force Employment of Electronic Warfare Contribute to the Outcome of the Strategic Night Bomber Offensive of World War II?|first= Sqn Ldr Robert|last= O'Dell|publisher=Royal Air Force Centre for Air and Space Power Studies |page=99}}</ref>