Editing Reflective equilibrium (section)

==Use in Rawls's political theory==
Reflective equilibrium serves an important justificatory function within Rawls's political theory. The nature of this function, however, is disputed. The dominant view, best exemplified by the work of [[Norman Daniels]] and [[T. M. Scanlon|Thomas Scanlon]], is that the method of reflective equilibrium is a kind of [[coherentism|coherentist]] method for the epistemic justification of moral beliefs. However, in other writings, Rawls seems to argue that his theory bypasses traditional [[Meta-ethics|metaethical]] questions, including questions of moral epistemology, and is intended instead to serve a practical function. This provides some motivation for a different view of the justificatory role of reflective equilibrium. On this view, the method of reflective equilibrium serves its justificatory function by linking together the cognitive and motivational aspects of the human sense of justice in the appropriate way.

Rawls argues that candidate principles of justice cannot be justified unless they are shown to be stable. Principles of justice are stable if, among other things, the members of society regard them as authoritative and reliably comply with them. The method of reflective equilibrium determines a set of principles rooted in the human sense of justice, which is a capacity that both provides the material for the process of reflective equilibration and our motivation to adhere to principles we judge morally sound. The method of reflective equilibrium serves the aim of defining a realistic and stable social order by determining a practically coherent set of principles that are grounded in the right way in the source of our moral motivation, such that we will be disposed to comply with them. As Fred D'Agostino puts it, stable principles of justice will require considerable "up-take" by the members of society. The method of reflective equilibrium provides a way of settling on principles that will achieve the kind of "up-take" necessary for stability.

Reflective equilibrium is not static, though Rawls allows for provisional fixed points; it will change as the individual considers his opinions about individual issues or explores the consequences of his principles.<ref>{{cite book |last=Rawls |first=John |author-link=John Rawls |date=1971 |title=A theory of justice |location=Cambridge, MA |publisher=[[Belknap Press]] of [[Harvard University Press]] |isbn=978-0674880108 |oclc=216912 |page=[https://archive.org/details/theoryofjustice00rawlrich/page/65 65] |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/theoryofjustice00rawlrich/page/65 }}</ref>

Rawls applied this technique to his conception of a hypothetical [[original position]] from which people would agree to a [[social contract]].  He arrived at the conclusion that the optimal theory of justice is the one to which people would agree from behind a [[veil of ignorance (philosophy)|veil of ignorance]], not knowing their social positions.