Editing Reverse domain hijacking (section)

== ACPA restrictions on reverse domain name hijacking ==

The [[Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act]] does not expressly recognize reverse domain name hijacking and often only limits defendants’ recovery to retention or transference of the domain name.<ref>Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(d)(2) (2006).</ref> It also fails to provide any remedies for victims of attempted reverse cybersquatting.<ref>Frayne v. Chicago 2016, 2009 WL 65236 *2 (N.D. Ill. 2009); General Media Comm., Inc. v. Crazy Troll, LLC, 2007 WL 102988 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).</ref> However, the statute permits some monetary relief where bad faith, reckless disregard or the willful violation of a court order are involved.<ref>Id. at 1125(d)(2)(ii).</ref>

Similarly, a 1975 amendment to the Lanham Act gives courts discretion in awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in “exceptional” circumstances.<ref>Christopher P. Bussert, Interpreting the “Exceptional Cases” Provision of Section 117(a) of the Lanham Act: When an Award of Attorney’s Fees is Appropriate, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1118, 1118-19 (2002).</ref> In attempting to define “exceptional,” Circuit courts are split as to what objectively constitutes malicious, fraudulent, or deliberate misconduct.<ref>S. Rep. No. 93-1440, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 7136.</ref> Some courts award such fees where bad faith or baseless litigation is involved while other courts look for economic coercion or failure to reference controlling law.<ref>Anne M. Mellen, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees Under the Lanham Act: Egregious Litigation Conduct in the “Exceptional” Case, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1111, 1117 (2006).</ref> Nevertheless, due to the inherent animosity arising from being sued, courts generally hold prevailing defendants to a higher level of scrutiny, requiring vexatious or harassing conduct to shift attorney’s fees in their favor.