Editing Richard Helms (section)

==Johnson presidency==
[[File:Ljohnson.jpeg|thumb|upright|[[Presidential portrait (United States)|White House portrait]] of [[Lyndon B. Johnson]]]]

In June 1966, Helms was appointed director of Central Intelligence. At the White House later that month, Helm was sworn in during a ceremony arranged by President [[Lyndon Baines Johnson]].<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 250–251 (DCI). A colorful event, it was a surprise to Helms.</ref> In April of the prior year, John McCone resigned as DCI. Johnson then had appointed Admiral [[William Raborn]], well regarded for his work on the submarine-launched [[UGM-27 Polaris|Polaris missile]], as the new DCI (1965–1966). Johnson chose Helms to serve as [[Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency|Deputy Director of Central Intelligence]] (DDCI). Raborn and Helms soon journeyed to the [[LBJ Ranch]] in Texas. Raborn did not fit well into the institutional complexities at the CIA, with its specialized intellectual culture. He resigned in 1966.<ref>Turner (2005) pp. 103–105, 112–114. Turner faults Raborn, who at the start of his tenure mishandled the CIA's role regarding Johnson's political maneuvering following America's invasion of the [[United States occupation of the Dominican Republic (1965-1966)|Dominican Republic]] in 1965 (pp. 103–105).</ref><ref>Helms (2003) pp. 246–249 (under Raborn as DDCI, LBJ ranch, DCI Raborn).</ref>

As DCI, Helms served under President Johnson during the second half of his administration, then continued in this post until 1973, through President Nixon's first term.<ref>Hathaway and Smith (1993) p. 1.</ref> At CIA Helms was its first Director to 'rise through the ranks'.<ref>Ranelaugh (1986) pp. 448, 731, 736.</ref>

The [[Vietnam War]] became the key issue during the Johnson years.<ref>Helms (2003), chapters 25 (Laos and Vietnam), 31 and 32 (Vietnam), 37 (Vietnam and Cambodia).</ref> The CIA was fully engaged in political-military affairs in Southeast Asia, both getting intelligence information and for overt and covert field operations. The CIA, for example, organized an armed force of minority [[Hmong people|Hmong]] in Laos, and in Vietnam of rural [[counterinsurgency]] forces, and of minority [[Montagnard (Vietnam)|Montagnards]] in the highlands. Further, the CIA became actively involved in South Vietnamese politics, especially after [[Ngo Dinh Diem|Diem]]. "One of the CIA's jobs was to coax a genuine South Vietnamese government into being."<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 204–206 (Hmong or [[Miao people|Meo]], Montagnard, and other forces); 209–212 (politics), 210 (quote).</ref><ref>Helms (2003), e.g., at 336–339 (''Phoenix'' program forces re rural "pacification").</ref> Helms traveled to Vietnam twice,<ref>Powers (1979) p. 213: first with DCI McCone in spring 1962, then with the CIA Vietnam specialist George Carver in October 1970.</ref> and with President Johnson to Guam.<ref>Hathaway and Smith (1993) p. 4.</ref>

===Vietnam: Estimates===
In 1966, Helms as the new DCI inherited a CIA "fully engaged in the policy debates surrounding Vietnam." The CIA had formed "a view on policy but [was] expected to contribute impartially to the debate all the same."<ref>Ranelagh (1986) at 450.</ref> American intelligence agents had a relatively long history in Vietnam, dating back to [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] contacts with the communist-led resistance to Japanese occupation forces during World War II.<ref>Tucker, editer, ''Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (Oxford Univ. 1998, 2000), "C.I.A." at 66.</ref> In 1953 the CIA's first annual [[National Intelligence Estimate]] on Vietnam reported that French prospects may "deteriorate very rapidly".<ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 430–431.</ref> After French withdrawal in 1954, CIA officers including Lt. Col. [[Edward Lansdale]] assisted the new President [[Ngo Dinh Diem]] in his efforts to reconstitute an independent government in the south: the [[Republic of Viet Nam]].<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 104, 142–145. Lansdale was an early counterinsurgency advisor.</ref><ref>Tucker, ed., ''Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (1998, 2000), "Lansdale" at 220.</ref>

Nonetheless, CIA reports did not present an optimistic appraisal of Diem's future. Many of its analysts reluctantly understood that, in the [[anti-colonialism|anti-colonialist]] and nationalist context then prevailing, a favorable outcome was more likely for the [[Democratic Republic of Viet Nam|new communist regime in the north]] under its long-term party leader [[Ho Chi Minh]], who was widely admired as a Vietnamese patriot. A 1954 report by the CIA qualifiedly stated that if nationwide elections scheduled for 1956 by the recent [[Geneva Conference (1954)|Geneva Accords]] were held, Ho's party "the [[Viet Minh]] will almost certainly win."<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 431. Earlier Eisenhower, supported by another CIA report, had rejected immediate American military intervention and the possible use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. Ranelagh (at 776, n11) refers to the Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Communist reaction to certain US courses of action with respect to Indochina" (June 1954).</ref><ref>CIA National Intelligence Estimate of August 3, 1954, referenced by the [[United States Department of Defense|Defense Department]] in its 12-volume edition of ''United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967'' (Washington: Government Printing Office [1972]) p. 10: 697. This once-secret DOD study became known as the [[Pentagon Papers]] after portions began to appear in ''The New York Times'' starting in June 1971. The multi-volume edition is quoted by Len Ackland in his ''Credibility Gap. A digest of the Pentagon Papers'' (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee 1972) p. 33 (1954 CIA estimate), at "introduction" (1971 ''NYT'' leak).</ref><ref>Cf., [[David Halberstam]], ''Ho'' (New York: Random House 1971; reprint McGraw-Hill 1987) pp. 60–64, 103–104, 106–107.</ref> The nationwide elections were avoided. According to 1959 reports, the CIA saw Diem as "the best anticommunist bet" if he undertook reforms, but also stated that Diem consistently avoided reform.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 431–432, quote at 431.</ref><ref>CIA National Intelligence Estimate of May 26, 1959: "Diem's regime reflects his ideas. A façade of representative government is maintained, but the government is in fact essentially authoritarian." [Defense Department], ''United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967'' (Washington [1972]) pp. 10: 1192, cited by Ackland, ''Credibility Gap'' (1972) p. 42.</ref>

[[File:Coat of Arms of South Vietnam (1954 - 1955).svg|thumb|150px|[[Emblem of Vietnam|Coat of arms of South Vietnam]]]]
As the political situation progressed during the 1960s and American involvement grew, subsequent CIA reports crafted by its analysts continued to trend pessimistic regarding the prospects for South Vietnam.<ref>Cf., Turner (2005) pp. 109–110.</ref> "Vietnam may have been a policy failure. It was not an intelligence failure."<ref>Senate [Church] (1976) pp. 268–269, statement by the Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) Edward Procter in 1975, but "the pessimistic CIA estimate on Vietnam had little or no effect on U.S. policy decisions there."</ref> The CIA eventually became sharply divided over the issue. Those active in CIA operations in Vietnam, e.g., [[Lucien Conein]], and [[William Colby]], adopted a robust optimism regarding the outcome of their contentious projects. Teamwork in dangerous circumstances, and social cohesion among such operatives in the field, worked to reinforce and intensify their positive views.<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 161–162, 278–280.</ref><ref>Cf., William Colby, ''Lost Victory. A firsthand account of America's sixteen-year involvement in Vietnam'' (Chicago: Contemporary Books 1989).</ref>

"At no time was the institutional dichotomy between the operational and analytic components more stark."<ref>Karalekas (1976) p. 81.</ref><ref>Cf., [[Richard Helms, early career]], section "Elephant and Gorilla".</ref> Helms later described the predicament at CIA as follows.

<blockquote>From the outset, the intelligence directorate and the Office of National Estimates held a pessimistic view of the military developments. The operations personnel—going full blast ... in South Vietnam—remained convinced the war could be won. Without this conviction, the operators could not have continued their difficult face-to-face work with the South Vietnamese, whose lives were often at risk. In Washington, I felt like a circus rider standing astride two horses, each for the best of reasons going its own way.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 311 (quote); 321.</ref><ref>See section above "Elephant and Gorilla".</ref></blockquote>

Negative news would prove to be highly unwelcome at the Johnson White House. "After each setback the CIA would gain little by saying 'I told you so' or by continuing to emphasize the futility of the war," author Ranelagh writes about the CIA predicament.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 446.</ref> In part it was DCI McCone's worrisome reports and unwelcome views about Vietnam that led to his exclusion from President Johnson's inner circle; consequently, McCone resigned in 1965. Helms remembered that McCone left the CIA because "he was dissatisfied with his relation with President Johnson. He didn't get to see him enough, and he didn't feel that he had any impact."<ref>Turner (2005) pp. 106–111, Helms quote at 111.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 421–423.</ref>

Helms' institutional memory probably contested for influence over his own decisions as DCI when he later served under Johnson. According to CIA intelligence officer [[Ray Cline]], "Up to about 1965/66, estimates were not seriously biased in any direction." As American political commitment to Vietnam surged under Johnson, however, "the pressure to give the right answer came along," stated Cline. "I felt increasing pressure to say the war was winnable."<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 452.</ref>

===Laos: "secret war"===
[[File:T-28D.jpg|thumb|[[Royal Lao Air Force|RLAF]] [[T-28 Trojan|T-28D]], at [[Long Tieng]], Laos, 1972<ref>{{cite web|title=Air America: Fairchild C-123 Providers |url=http://www.utdallas.edu/library/uniquecoll/speccoll/Leeker/123b.pdf |publisher=The University of Texas at Dallas |access-date=2009-01-18 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080512181920/http://www.utdallas.edu/library/uniquecoll/speccoll/Leeker/123b.pdf |archive-date=May 12, 2008 }}</ref>]]

The [[International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos|"second Geneva Convention" of 1962]] settled ''de jure'' the [[Neutrality (international relations)|neutrality]] of the Kingdom of [[History of Laos since 1945|Laos]], obtaining commitments from both the Soviets and the Americans. Nonetheless, such a neutral ''status quo'' in Laos soon became threatened ''de facto'', e.g., by North Vietnamese (NVN) armed support for the communist [[Pathet Lao]]. The CIA in 1963 was tasked to mount an armed defense of the "neutrality" of the Kingdom. Helms then served as DDP and thus directed the overall effort. It was a ''secret war'' because both NVN and CIA were in violation of Geneva's 1962 terms.<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 193, 194–195 (why CIA tasked to wage a ''secret'' war).</ref><ref>Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) at 29 (ch.2): Use of armed forces in Laos was "justified partly because the North Vietnamese were also violating the Geneva Accords".</ref>

Thereafter during the 1960s the CIA accomplished this mission largely by training and arming native tribal forces, primarily those called the [[Hmong people|Hmong]].<ref>Ranelagh (1978) at p. 425 note. "The CIA referred to the hill tribes as 'Meos' although they were, in fact, several different tribes."</ref> Helms called it "the war we won". At most several hundred CIA personnel were involved, at a small fraction of the cost of the Vietnam War. Despite prior criticism of the CIA's abilities due to the 1961 [[Bay of Pigs]] disaster in Cuba, here the CIA for years successfully managed a large-scale [[paramilitary]] operation. At the height of the Vietnam War, much of royal Laos remained functionally neutral, although over its southeast borderlands ran the contested [[Ho Chi Minh trail]]. The CIA operation fielded as many as 30,000 Hmong soldiers under their leader [[Vang Pao]], while also supporting 250,000 mostly Hmong people in the hills. Consequently, more than 80,000 NVN troops were "tied down" in Laos.<ref>Helms (2003) 250–263 (Chapter: "The war we won"), at 251–253 (second Geneva), at 255, 260–261 (NVN troops). Additional forces in Laos were Thai army instructors and 20,000 "Thai volunteers", and U.S. Army special forces (at 258, 259).</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 191–201, at 191–195 (Geneva); at 200 (large-scale paramilitary); at 198 (at most 200 to 300 CIA, at much reduced cost than Vietnam).</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 419, 425.</ref><ref>Also, American planes carried out an extensive "secret bombing" of Laos. Joseph Buttinger, ''Vietnam. The unforgettable tragedy'' (1977) pp. 94.</ref>

At the time of Nixon's [[Vietnamization]] policy, CIA concern arose over sustaining the ''covert'' nature of the secret war. In 1970 Helms decided "to transfer the budgetary allocations for operations in Laos from the CIA to the [[United States Department of Defense|Defense Department]]."<ref>Karalekas (1976) p. 69.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 543.</ref> [[William Colby]], then a key American figure in Southeast Asia and later DCI, comments that "a large-scale paramilitary operation does not fit the secret budget and policy procedures of CIA."<ref>Colby (1978) p. 202 (quote); also at 301 (CIA budget taken over by Defense).</ref>

About Laos, however, Helms wrote that "I will always call it the war we won."<ref>Helms (2003) at 262 (quote).</ref> In 1966, the CIA had termed it "an exemplary success story".<ref>1966 CIA memo to [[303 Committee]], cited by Weiner (2007) pp. 257, 610.</ref> Colby concurred.<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 198, 200.</ref> Senator [[Stuart Symington]], after a 1967 visit to the CIA [[Station chief|chief of station]] in [[Vientiane]], the Laotian capital, reportedly called it "a sensible way to fight a war."<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 204–205.</ref> Yet others disagreed, and the 'secret war' would later draw frequent political attacks.<ref>Cf., Ranelagh (1986) p. 425 and note.</ref><ref>E.g., Colby (1978) pp. 202, 348.</ref> Author Weiner criticizes the imperious insertion of American power, and the ultimate abandonment of America's Hmong allies in 1975.<ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 252–256, and 343–345 on the fate of the Hmong, abandoned in 1975. But see below regarding Hmong refugees coming to the US.</ref><ref>Richard L. Holm, "No Drums, No Bugles. Recollections of a Case Officer in Laos, 1962–1965" in ''Studies in Intelligence'' 47/1 (CIA/CSI 2003), is cited by Weiner (2007) pp. 213, 345. The CIA's Holm later rued "the arrogance of Americans" who "had only a minimal understanding of the history, culture, and politics of the people" onto whom America's "strategic interests were superimposed". About the Hmong, Holm summarizes: "Their way of life has been destroyed. They can never return to Laos."</ref> Other problems arose because of the Hmong's practice of harvesting poppies.<ref>Leftist writer Mark Zepezauer, ''The CIA's Greatest Hits'' (Odonian Press 1994, 1998) pp. 48–49, 90–91, claims that the CIA got involved in heroin trafficking through its ''Armée Clandistine'' in Laos, which later led the CIA to similar crimes in Central America and Afghanistan.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 425 note, states that in the mid-1970s the Senate's Church Committee "found no evidence" of such CIA activity in Laos.</ref><ref>Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) write (pp. 214–215) of unofficial drug dealing by CIA agents, including in Laos, ancillary to fighting the Cold War. The authors also relate (pp. 312–313) the CIA's failed attempt to stop the publication of Alfred McCoy's book ''The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia'' (Harper and Row 1972).</ref>

[[File:USA - HMONG Memorial.jpg|thumb|Hmong memorial at Fresno County Court House, in California]]
Due to political developments, the war ultimately ended badly. Helms acknowledges that after President Nixon, through his agent Kissinger, negotiated in [[Paris Peace Accords|Paris to end the Vietnam war]] in 1973, America failed to continue supporting its allies and "abdicated its role in Southeast Asia." Laos was given up and the Hmong were left in a desperate situation. Helms references that eventually 450,000 Laotians including 200,000 Hmong emigrated to the United States.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 261–262, at 262 (quote).</ref><ref>Spencer C. Tucker, ed., ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (2000) p. 173.</ref><ref>War critic David Harris, ''Our War'' (1996), p. 169, writes, "our evacuation of those we did take was likely the noblest act we performed" during the conflict. Yet he describes the sad plight of Hmong in Fresno, California (pp. 270–271).</ref>

While this Laotian struggle continued on the borderlands of the Vietnam War, DCI Helms was blindsided when several senators began to complain that they had been kept in the dark about the "CIA's secret war" in Laos. Helms recalls that three presidents, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, had each approved the covert operation, the "secret war", and that 50 senators had been briefed on its progress, e.g., Senator Symington had twice visited Laos.<ref>Helms (2007) p. 255 (three Presidents), at 261 (50 senators briefed on CIA in Laos, at 415 (Symington's visits).</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 201–202. Colby writes, one "Senator publicly attacked CIA's 'secret war' when he had been fully briefed on it and had actually visited the area."</ref> Helms elaborates on the turnabout:

<blockquote>In 1970, it came as a jolt when, with a group of senators, Senator [[Stuart Symington]] publicly expressed his "surprise, shock and anger" at what he and the others claimed was their "recent discovery" of "CIA's secret war" in Laos. At the time I could not understand the reason for this about-face. Nor have I since been able to fathom it.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 415 (quote).</ref><ref>Symington's "shock" in 1973 was "viewed with undisguised scorn in the agency." Ranelagh (1978) p. 425 note. Often such "congressional huffing and puffing was for public consumption only" with the CIA being "privately congratulated" later for its efforts in Laos. Ranelagh at 610 note.</ref></blockquote>

===Israel: Six Day War===
Liaison with [[Israeli Intelligence Community|Israeli intelligence]] was managed by [[James Jesus Angleton]] of CIA counterintelligence from 1953 to 1974.<ref>Colby (1986) p. 365.</ref><ref>[[Edward Jay Epstein|Epstein]] (1989) pp. 40–41, 100.</ref> For example, the Israelis quickly provided the CIA with the Russian text of [[Khrushchev's Secret Speech]] of 1956 which severely criticized the deceased Soviet dictator [[Joseph Stalin]].<ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 123–125. DCI Dulles then leaked the text to ''The New York Times''.</ref> In August 1966 [[Mossad]] had arranged for Israeli acquisition of a Soviet [[MiG-21]] fighter from a disaffected [[Iraq Air Force|Iraqi pilot]]. Mossad's [[Meir Amit]] later came to Washington to tell DCI Helms that Israel would loan America the plane, with its up-until-now secret technology, to find out how it flew.<ref>[[Dan Raviv]] and [[Yossi Melman]], ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'' (London: Sidgwick and Jackson 1989 [as ''Imperect Spies'']; New York: Houghton Mifflin 1990) at 142.</ref> At a May 1967 [[United States National Security Council|NSC]] meeting Helms voiced praise for Israel's military preparedness, and argued that from the captured MiG-21 the Israelis "had learned their lessons well".<ref>[[Ian Black (journalist)|Ian Black]] & [[Benny Morris]], ''Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services'' (London: Hamish Hamilton 1991; New York: Grove Weidenfeld 1991) pp. 206–210, quote 209.</ref><ref>In 1966 Helms had provided Johnson with a CIA memorandum "How We Have Helped Israel" May 19, 1966, cited in Ranelagh (1986) pp. 580 and 787, n46.</ref>

[[File:Hatzerim Mirage 20100129 1.jpg|thumb|French [[Dassault Mirage]]: key warplane of [[Israeli Air Force]] during the 1967 war]]
In 1967, CIA analysis addressed the possibility of an armed conflict between Israel and neighboring Arab states, predicting that "the Israelis would win a war within a week to ten days."<ref>Powers (1979) p. 202 (quote).</ref><ref>CIA analyst [[Sherman Kent]] estimated that "Israel would win a war within two weeks without any American aid." Ranelagh (1986) pp. 473–474.</ref><ref>Regarding CIA's forecast Weiner (2007) p. 277 seems to give primary credit to James Angleton's contacts in Israeli intelligence.</ref> Israel "could defeat any combination of Arab forces in relatively short order" with the time required depending on "who struck first" and circumstances.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 298–299. The CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) had indicated a crisis looming since early 1967 and had set up a special task force to track it.</ref> Yet CIA's pro-Israel prediction was challenged by [[Arthur Goldberg]], the [[United States Ambassadors to the United Nations|American ambassador to the United Nations]] and Johnson loyalist.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 473–474. Goldberg had "claimed that CIA estimates of Israeli strength were overly optimistic." Soon thereafter Israel sent President Johnson warnings that "Israel would be defeated by the Arabs if American assistance were not immediately forthcoming."</ref> Although Israel then had requested "additional military aid" Helms opines that here Israel wanted to control international expectations prior to the outbreak of war.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 298–299, at 298 (quote).</ref>

As Arab war threats mounted, President Johnson asked Helms about Israel's chances and Helms stuck with his agency's predictions. At a meeting of his top advisors Johnson then asked who agreed with the CIA estimate and all assented.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 299.</ref> "The temptation for Helms to hedge his bet must have been enormous".<ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 473–474 (quote).</ref> After all, opinions were divided, e.g., Soviet intelligence thought the Arabs would win and were "stunned" at the Israeli victory.<ref>Andrew and Mitrokhin (2005) pp. 229–230.</ref> Admiral [[Stansfield Turner]] (DCI 1977–1981) wrote that "Helms claimed that the high point of his career was the Agency's accurate prediction in 1967." Helms believed it had kept America out of the conflict. Also, it led to his entry within the inner circle of the Johnson administration, the regular 'Tuesday lunch' with the President.<ref>Turner (2005) at 119 (quote).</ref>

In the event, Israel decisively defeated its neighborhood enemies and prevailed in the determinative [[Six Day war]] of June 1967. Four days before the sudden launch of that war, "a senior Israeli official" had privately visited Helms in his office and hinted that such a preemptive decision was imminent. Helms then had passed the information to President Johnson.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 299–300.</ref><ref>The Israeli official was probably [[Meir Amit]] the chief at Mossad (Israeli foreign intelligence), who had visited Helms then. Black and Morris, ''Israel's Secret Wars'' (New York: Grove Weidenfeld 1991) p. 221. In the days before the war "Amit found 'no differences' between the Israeli and U.S. appreciations of the military situation."</ref><ref>Meir Amir visited Helms with information shortly before the war. Raviv and Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'' (1989, 1990) p. 161.</ref> The conflict reified America's "emotional sympathy" for Israel. Following the war, America dropped its careful balancing act between the belligerents and moved to a position in support of Israel, eventually supplanting France as Israel's chief military supplier.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 580 (quote; military aid "soared" after war).</ref><ref>Black and Morris, ''Israel's Secret Wars'' (1991) pp. 234–235.</ref>

In the afternoon of the third day of the war, the American [[Signals intelligence|SIGINT]] spy ship [[USS Liberty (AGTR-5)|''USS Liberty'']], outfitted by the [[National Security Agency|NSA]], was attacked by Israeli warplanes and torpedo boats in international waters north of Sinai. This U.S. Navy ship was [[USS Liberty incident|severely damaged with loss of life]].<ref>Powers (2002, 2004) pp. 251–252 [1983].</ref><ref>Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) p. 257: The American "[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] 'proposed a quick, retaliatory air strike on the Israeli naval base which launched the attack'" but their "recommendation was turned down".</ref> The Israelis quickly notified the Americans and later explained that they "had mistaken the ''Liberty'' (455 feet long) for the Egyptian coastal steamer ''El Quseir'' (275 feet long). The US government formally accepted the apology and the explanation."<ref>Powers (2002, 2004) p. 252 [1983].</ref> Some continue to accept this position.<ref>Raviv and Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince'' (1989, 1990) p. 162. Twenty years later neither country offered a "coherent explanation" which left many U.S. Navy veterans angry. "The Israelis said their forces had simply made a mistake." In Tel Aviv both the CIA station chief and the U.S. naval attache eventually agreed. "In the heat of battle, the Israeli navy and air force had ingloriously competed" to sink the ship.</ref><ref>Mistakes in war, episodes of [[friendly fire]] happen. The CIA, e.g., mistakenly bombed a British ship in Guatemala in 1954. Cf., Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) p. 253.</ref> Yet "scholars and military experts," according to author [[Thomas Powers]], state that "the hard question is not whether the attack was deliberate but why the Israelis thought it necessary."<ref>Powers (2002, 2004) pp. 251–252 [1983] (quotes).</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 253: "subsequent accumulation of evidence suggests that the attack was at the instigation of Israeli intelligence" to give Israel a free hand in the war.</ref><ref>Powers (2002, 2004) pp. 266–270 [2001], review of James Bamford's book ''Body of Secrets'' (2001) on the NSA, which provides new information and theories about why the ship was attacked.</ref> In his memoirs ''A Look Over My Shoulder'', Helms expressed his bewilderment as to how and why the USS ''Liberty'' was attacked: "One of the most disturbing incidents in the six days came in the morning of June 8 when the Pentagon flashed a message that the U.S.S. ''Liberty'', an unarmed U.S. Navy communications ship, was under attack in the Mediterranean, and that American fighters had been scrambled to defend the ship. The following urgent reports showed that Israeli jet fighters and torpedo reports had launched the attack. The seriously damaged ''Liberty'' remained afloat, with thirty-four dead and more than a hundred wounded members of the crew. Israeli authorities subsequently apologized for the accident, but few in Washington could believe that the ship had not been identified as an American naval vessel. Later, an interim intelligence memorandum concluded the attack was a mistake and "not made in malice against the U.S." When additional evidence was available, more doubt was raised. This prompted my deputy, Admiral [[Rufus Taylor]], to write me his view of the incident. "To me, this picture thus far presents the distinct possibility that the Israelis knew that ''Liberty'' might be their target and attacked anyway, either through confusion in Command and Control or through deliberate disregard of instructions on the part of subordinates."...I had no role in the board of inquiry that followed, or the board's finding that there could be no doubt that the Israelis knew exactly what they were doing in attacking the ''Liberty''. I have yet to understand why it was felt necessary to attack this ship or who ordered the attack."<ref>{{cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mF3fAAAAMAAJ | title=A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency | isbn=9780375500121 | last1=Helms | first1=Richard | last2=Hood | first2=William | last3=Kissinger | first3=Henry | year=2003 | publisher=Random House }}</ref> In his CIA special collection interview, Helms said, "...I don't think there can be any doubt that the Israelis knew exactly what they were doing. Why they wanted to attack the 'Liberty,' whose bright idea this was, I can't possibly know. But any statement to the effect that they didn't know that it was an American ship and so forth is nonsense."<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/11_8_oral.pdf |title=RICHARD HELMS INTERVIEW, BY ROBERT M. HATHAWAY, 8 NOVEMBER 1984 |website=Central Intelligence Agency, pp. 14}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/5076de59993247d4d82b5b43 |title=RICHARD HELMS INTERVIEW, BY ROBERT M. HATHAWAY, 8 NOVEMBER 1984 |website=CIA.gov Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room}}</ref>

On the morning of the sixth day of the war, President Johnson summoned Helms to the [[White House Situation Room]]. Soviet Premier [[Alexei Kosygin]] had called to threaten military intervention if the war continued. Defense Secretary [[Robert S. McNamara]] suggested that the [[United States Sixth Fleet|Sixth Fleet]] be sent east, from the mid Mediterranean to the Levant. Johnson agreed. Helms remembered the "visceral physical reaction" to the strategic tension, similar to the emotions of the 1962 [[Cuban Missile Crisis]]. "It was the world's good fortune that hostilities on the [[Golan Heights]] ended before the day was out," wrote Helms later.<ref>Lyndon Johnson, ''The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–1968'' (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston 1971) at 302.</ref><ref>Helms (2003) pp. 301–303, quote at 303. Helms then had remarked that Soviet "fishing trawlers" trailing the Sixth Fleet "would signal Moscow the moment it was apparent that the aircraft carriers and support ships were on the move." Helms at 303.</ref>

===LBJ: Tuesday lunch===
As a result of the CIA's accurate prognosis concerning the duration, logistics, and outcome of the [[Six-Day War]] of June 1967, Helms' practical value to the President, Lyndon Baines Johnson, became evident.<ref>Hathaway and Smith (1993) at 2.</ref> Recognition of his new status was not long in coming. Helms soon took a place at the table where the president's top advisors discussed foreign policy issues: the regular Tuesday luncheons with LBJ. Helms unabashedly called it "the hottest ticket in town".<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 294–295, 295 (quote); 307.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) p. 202.</ref><ref>Cf., Turner (2005) pp. 107–108 re Johnson's Tuesday lunch.</ref>

[[File:Richard Helms.jpg|thumb|left|Richard Helms in the White House Cabinet Room, March 27, 1968. Four days later Johnson announced his decision not to run for reelection.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 333.</ref>]]
In a 1984 interview with a CIA historian, Helms recalled that following the Six-Day War, he and Johnson had engaged in intense private conversations which addressed foreign policy, including the Soviet Union. Helms went on:

<blockquote>And I think at that time he'd made up his mind that it would be a good idea to tie intelligence into the inner circle of his policy-making and decision-making process. So starting from that time he began to invite me to the Tuesday lunches, and I remained a member of that group until the end of his administration.<ref>Helms Interview of 8 Nov. 1984 by Robert M. Hathaway (CIA staff historian) at 8. Interview posted at CIA website.</ref></blockquote>

Helms' invitation to lunch occurred about three-and-a-half years into Johnson's five-year presidency and a year into Helms' nearly seven-year tenure as DCI. Thereafter in the Johnson administration, Helms functioned in proximity to high-level policymaking, with continual access to America's top political leadership. It constituted the pinnacle of Helms' influence and standing in Washington. Helms describes the "usual Tuesday lunch" in his memoirs.

<blockquote>[W]e gathered for a sherry in the family living room on the second floor of the White House. If the President, who normally kept to a tight schedule, was a few minutes late, he would literally bound into the room, pause long enough to acknowledge our presence, and herd us into the family dining room, overlooking Pennsylvania Avenue. Seating followed protocol, with the secretary of state ([[Dean Rusk]]) at the President's right, and the secretary of defense ([[Robert McNamara]], later [[Clark Clifford]]) at his left. General [[Earle Wheeler|Bus Wheeler]] (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) sat beside the secretary of defense. I sat beside Dean Rusk. [[Walt Rostow]] (the [[National Security Advisor (United States)|Special Assistant for National Security Affairs]]), [[George Christian (journalist)|George Christian]] (the White House Press Secretary), and Tom Johnson (the deputy press secretary) made up the rest of the table.<ref>Helms (2002) p. 307 (quote, with inserts in parentheses of attendee titles and/or names from Helms at p. 294). Photograph of a Tuesday lunch appears at sixth page of photos.</ref></blockquote>

In CIA interviews long after the war ended, Helms recalled the role played in policy discussions. As the neutral party, Helms could come up with facts applicable to the issue at hand. The benefit of such a role was the decisiveness in "keeping the game honest". Helms comments that many advocates of particular policy positions will almost invariably 'cherry pick' facts supporting their positions, whether consciously or not. Then the voice of a neutral could perform a useful function in helping to steer the conversation on routes within realistic parameters.<ref>Hathaway and Smith (1993) pp. 2–4.</ref>

The out-sized political personality of Johnson, of course, was the dominating presence at lunch. From his perch Helms marveled at the learned way President Johnson employed the primary contradictions in his personality to direct those around him, and forcefully manage the atmosphere of discourse.<ref>Cf., Helms (2003) p. 332, see also photograph of Johnson and Helms at sixth page of photos.</ref><ref>Cf., e.g., [[David Halberstam]], ''The Best and the Brightest'' (New York: Random House 1972; reprint Penguin 1983) pp. 522–557 (Chap. 20). Johnson combined "earthy, frontier attitudes" with political sophistication to become "a man of stunning force, of drive and intelligence" (p. 522). Yet he remained personally insecure, so that "as a public communicator in the White House [he] would not let the real Lyndon Johnson surface ... not trusting himself, he did not trust the public" (p. 552).</ref>

Regarding the perennial issues of Vietnam, a country in civil war, Helms led as an important institutional player in the political mix of Washington. Staff within the CIA were divided on the conflict. As the DCI, Helms' daily duties involved the difficult task of updating CIA intelligence and reporting on CIA operations to the American executive leadership. Vietnam then dominated the news. Notoriously, the American political consensus eventually broke. The public became sharply divided, with the issues being vociferously contested. About the so-called Vietnamese 'quagmire' it seemed confusion reigned within and without. Helms saw himself as struggling to best serve his view of America and his forceful superior, the President.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 309–316.</ref><ref>Cf., Ranelagh (1986) pp. 453, 454.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) p. 203.</ref>

===Viet Cong numbers===
Differences and divisions might emerge within the ranks of analysts, across the spectrum of the [[Federal government of the United States|USG]] Intelligence Community. Helms had a statutory mandate with the responsibility for reconciling the discrepancies in information, or the conflicting views, promoted by the various American intelligence services, e.g., by the large [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] or by the [[Bureau of Intelligence and Research]] at the United States State Department. While the CIA might agree on its own Estimates, other department reports might disagree, causing difficulties, and making inter-agency concord problematic. The process of reaching the final consensus could become a contentious negotiation.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 198–199 (Helms re Vietnam drawn into "larger paper wars").</ref><ref>Cf., Cline (1976) pp. 207–208 (coordination of intelligence re Defense, State, CIA).</ref><ref>Cf., Ranelagh (1986) p. 25 (Helms re DCI), 26 ("countless bureaucratic battles"), 111 (coordination), 166 (Defense, State, CIA), 196–197 (estimates), 346 (finesss), 412–413 (DCI role).</ref>

[[File:Visit of President Johnson in Vietnam.jpg|thumb|[[Lyndon Baines Johnson|President Johnson]] in Vietnam 1966, awarding a medal to a U.S. soldier]]
In 1965, Johnson substantially escalated the war by sending large numbers of American combat troops to fight in South Vietnam, and ordered warplanes to bomb the North. Nonetheless, the military put stiff pressure on him to escalate further. In the "paper wars" that followed, Helms at the CIA was regularly asked for intelligence reports on military action, e.g., the political effectiveness of bombing [[Hanoi]]. The military resented such a review of its conduct in the war.<ref>Tucker, editor, ''Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (Oxford Univ. 1998, 2000) pp. 311–312: "Order of Battle Dispute (1967)".</ref>

The American strategy had become the pursuit of a [[Attrition warfare|war of attrition]]. The objective was to make the [[Viet Cong]] enemy suffer more losses than it could timely replace. Accordingly, the number of combatants fielded by the communist insurgency at any one time was a key factor in determining whether the course of the war was favorable or not. The political pressure on the CIA to conform to the military's figures of enemy casualties became intense. Under Helms, CIA reports on the Viet Cong order of battle numbers were usually moderate; the CIA also questioned whether the strategy employed by the U.S. Army would ever compel Hanoi to negotiate. Helms himself was evidently sceptical, yet Johnson never asked for his personal opinion.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 198–200 (CIA reports), 203 (Helm's own views).</ref> This dispute between the Army and the CIA over the number of Viet Cong combatants became bitter, and eventually common knowledge in the administration.<ref>Robert S. McNamara, ''In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam'' (New York: Times Books/Random House 1995) pp. 237–239.</ref><ref>Tucker, editor, ''Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (Oxford Univ. 1998, 2000) p. 311.</ref>

According to one source, CIA Director Richard Helms "used his influence with Lyndon Johnson to warn about the growing dangers of U.S. involvement in Vietnam."<ref>John Ranelagh, "Central Intelligence Agency" p. 122, in ''The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World'' (2d ed., 2001).</ref> On the other hand, [[Stansfield Turner]] (DCI 1977–1981) describes Helms' advisory relationship to Lyndon Johnson as being overly loyal to the office of president. Hence, the CIA staff's frank opinions on Vietnam were sometimes modified before reaching President Johnson.<ref>Turner (2005) pp. 120–121.</ref> At one point the CIA analysts estimated enemy strength at 500,000, while the military insisted it was only 270,000. No amount of discussion could resolve the difference. Eventually, in September 1967, the CIA under Helms went along with the military's lower number for the combat strength of the Vietnamese Communist forces.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 324–329.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) pp. 213–216.</ref> This led a CIA analyst directly involved in this work to file a formal complaint against DCI Helms, which was accorded due process within the Agency.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 326–328. The analyst was Sam Adams and his complaint about Helms was heard by a CIA review board.</ref><ref>Long after the war was over, civil litigation ensued between General Westmoreland and CBS which directly touched on the Viet Cong numbers controversy. Tucker, editor, ''Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (2000) p. 311. Also see below: "Later years".</ref>

===Vietnam: ''Phoenix''===
[[File:Vietnamese villagers suspected of being communists by the US Army - 1966.jpg|thumb|upright|Vietnamese peasants held, suspected of Viet Cong affiliation.]]
As a major element in his counterinsurgency policy, [[Ngo Dinh Diem]] (President 1954–1963) had earlier introduced the establishment of [[strategic hamlet]]s in order to contest Viet Cong operations in the countryside.<ref>Tucker, editor, ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (Oxford University 1998, 2000) p. 385.</ref><ref>The ''strategic hamlet'' was to counter the Viet Cong's ''combat hamlets'' in ''liberated zones''. Douglas Pike, ''Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam'' (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1966) p. 293.</ref> From several antecedents the controversial [[Phoenix program]] was launched during 1967–1968.<ref>Phoenix remains highly controversial. Douglas Valentine's ''The Phoenix Program'' (William Morrow 1992) offers a politically charged attack on its criminal misdeeds. [[Mark Moyar]] presents an establishment view in his ''Phoenix and the Birds of Prey'' (Naval Institute 2000).</ref> Various Vietnamese forces (intelligence, military, police, and civilian) were deployed in the field against Viet Cong support networks. The CIA played a key role in its design and leadership,<ref>Karnow, ''A History of Vietnam'' (1983) pp. 601–602.</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 266–286, at 266–267. The program was called by the Vietnamese government ''Phung Hoang'' (at 267), which in Vietnam was also a mythological bird.</ref> and built on practices developed by Vietnamese, i.e., the provincial chief, Colonel [[Tran Ngoc Chau]].<ref>Zalin Grant, ''Facing the Phoenix: The CIA and the Political Defeat of the United States in Vietnam'' (New York: W. W. Norton 1991) pp. 171–174. "Chau believed that democracy could be created in the countryside and that the best policy was to win the communists over to the government, not kill them. This was why he established an amnesty program." Grant, p. 173.</ref><ref>Cf., Tran Ngoc Chau, ''Vietnamese Labyrinth: Allies, Enemies, and Why the U.S. Lost the war'' (Lubbock: Texas Tech University 2013), foreword by [[Daniel Ellsberg]], e.g., at 229 re CIA and Diem. Yet Colonel Chau caustically writes:

{{quote|[T]he Phoenix Program [was] the infamous perversion of a portion of the Census Grievance pacification program I had instituted in Kien Hoa province. The Phoenix Program was aimed at kidnapping or eliminating enemy leaders, not true pacification—as I had envisioned it.}}|Chau at 332.</ref>

CIA was not officially in control of Phoenix, [[Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support|CORDS]] was. In early 1968, DCI Helms had agreed to allow [[William Colby]] to take a temporary leave of absence from the CIA in order to go to Vietnam and lead CORDS, a position with ambassadorial rank. In doing so, Helms personally felt "thoroughly disgusted"... thinking [[Robert Komer]] had "put a fast one over on him". Komer was then in charge of the CORDS pacification program in South Vietnam. Recently Helms had promoted Colby to a top CIA post: head of the Soviet Division (before Colby had been running the CIA's Far East Division, which included Vietnam). Now Colby transferred out of CIA, to CORDS to run Phoenix.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 335–336.</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 190, 242, 245–247; quotes at 245. Operation Phoenix was part of the CORDS program (at 246–247). [[Agency for International Development|U.S.AID]] funded CORDS, yet CORDS was placed in the [[Military Assistance Command, Vietnam]] (MACV) chain of command (at 267). Colby had served as CIA's chief of station in Saigon during the early 1960s (pp. 141, 162), then at Far East Division in Washington (pp. 178, 190).</ref> Many other Americans worked to monitor and manage the Phoenix program including, according to Helms, "a seemingly ever-increasing number of CIA personnel".<ref>Helms (2003) p. 336 (quote).</ref><ref>Tucker, editor, ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (Oxford University 1998, 2000) p. 329: Phoenix, CORDS, MACV, CIA. "After 1967, U.S.AID economic assistance was channeled through CORDS, established under [MACV] to organize all civilian and military aid programs involved in the pacification effort" (Tucker, p. 437). "Despite negative press reports, top-ranking CIA as well as [communist] leaders agreed that the Phoenix program was a success" (Tucker at 329).</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 436–441.</ref>

[[File:William Colby.jpg|thumb|left|[[William Colby]], a key U.S. officer in Vietnam, later DCI]]
After receiving special Phoenix training, Vietnamese forces in rural areas went head to head against the [[Viet Cong Infrastructure]], e.g., they sought to penetrate communist organizations, to arrest and interrogate or slay their [[Cadre (politics)|cadres]].<ref>Colby (1978) at 269. "Phoenix in fact had no forces of its own," but relied on various Vietnamese police and security services, and civilian programs.</ref><ref>Cf., Ranelagh (1986) at 444.</ref> The Vietnam War resembled a ferocious civil war; the Viet Cong had already assassinated thousands of Vietnamese village leaders.<ref>Pike, ''Viet Cong'' (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1966) p. 102: Table 5-1 (showing assassination numbers for 1957–1965); pp. 246–249 (incidents recounted). Incitement of hatred was often employed in order to keep its cadres prepared for war, quoting Viet Cong literature (Pike, pp. 283–285).</ref><ref>"Schoolteacers ... were another target." Viet Cong used intimidation, kidnapping, torture, indoctrination, execution. [[Denis Warner]], ''The Last Confucian'' (Baltimore: Penguin 1964) p. 161.</ref> Unfortunately, in its strategy of fighting fire with fire, forces in the Phoenix program used torture, and became entangled in actions involving local and official corruption, resulting in many questionable killings, perhaps thousands.<ref>Karnow, ''A History of Vietnam'' (1983) p. 238 (Viet Cong assassinations), p. 602 (Phoenix program brutality).</ref><ref>[[Al Santoli]], editor, ''Everything We Had. An oral history of the Vietnam war by thirty-three American soldiers who fought it'' (New York: Random House 1981; reprint Ballantine 1982) pp. 199–202 "The Phoenix". Bruce Lawlor (CIA case officer in Vietnam) said the Phoenix and pacification programs were "thought of by geniuses and implemented by idiots." The "press reports here in the United States" were "a factor in shutting down the whole program." At first, "the Green Berets were a symbol of counterinsurgency and they were excellent. ... [[Barry Sadler]] [his song] was the worst thing that ever happened to them. ... the Green Berets no more were an elite small unit."</ref><ref>[[David Harris (protester)|David Harris]], ''Our War: What We Did in Vietnam and What it Did to Us'' (New York: Random House 1996) pp. 100–106: a short, caustic sketch of Phoenix operations, which emphasizes the notorious crimes.</ref> Despite its grave faults, Colby opined that the program did work well enough to stop Viet Cong gains. Colby favorably compared ''Operation Phoenix'' with the CIA's relative success in its "secret war" in [[Laotian Civil War|Laos]].<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 266–286 (Phoenix); 194, 195–196, 300–301 (and Laos). Colby was aware of severe problems (pp. 270–271).</ref><ref>Colby wrote a book advancing his counterinsurgency analysis: ''Lost Victory: A First-Hand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam'' (McGraw-Hill 1989).</ref>

Helms notes that the early efforts of Phoenix "were successful, and of serious concern to the NVN [North Vietnamese] leadership". Helms then goes on to recount the Phoenix program's progressive slide into corruption and counterproductive violence, which came to nullify its early success. Accordingly, by the time it was discontinued Phoenix had become useless in the field and a controversial if not a notorious political liability.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 337 (quote), 338.</ref><ref>Antiwar critics at home became convinced that by ''Operation Phoenix'' the CIA was "secretly implementing policies repugnant to the American public". Ranelagh (1986) p. 437.</ref><ref>Joseph Buttinger, ''Vietnam. The unforgettable tragedy'' (New York: Horizon 1977) pp. 82–87, Phoenix program discussed at 86. Buttinger writes that [[Saigon]]'s land reform programs were often defeated by corruption, e.g., lands distributed to peasants in an area under pacification were later seized by former landlords who then charged the peasants rent (p. 114).</ref> Helms in his memoirs presents this situation:

<blockquote>PHOENIX was directed and staffed by Vietnamese over whom the American advisors and liaison officers did not have command or direct supervision. The American staff did its best to eliminate the abuse of authority—the settling of personal scores, rewarding of friends, [[summary execution]]s, prisoner mistreatment, false denunciation, illegal property seizure—that became the by-products of the PHOENIX counterinsurgency effort. In the blood-soaked atmosphere created by Viet Cong terrorism, the notion that regulations and directives imposed by foreign liaison officers could be expected to curb revenge and profit-making was unrealistic.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 336–339, quote at 338 ("staffed by Vietnamese").</ref></blockquote>

After the war, interviews were conducted with Vietnamese communist leaders and military commanders familiar with the Viet Cong organization, its war-making capacity, and support infrastructure. They said the Phoenix operations were very effective against them, reports [[Stanley Karnow]].<ref>Karnow, ''A History of Vietnam'' (1983) pp. 602, 603, citing a VC leader, a VC colonel, a communist general, and the foreign minister of Vietnam in 1975.</ref> [[Thomas E. Ricks (journalist)|Thomas Ricks]], in evaluating the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency tactics of the Marine Corps and of the Phoenix program, confirmed their value by reference to "Hanoi's official history of the war".<ref>[[Thomas E. Ricks (journalist)|Thomas E. Ricks]], ''The Generals. American military command from World War II to today'' (New York: The Penguin Press 2012) pp. 269–273, 320 (''Combined Action Platoon'' program of Marine Corps); at 320–325 (Hanoi's Military History Institute of Vietnam, ''Victory in Vietnam''); at 324–325 (Phoenix); at 269, 342, 433 (Gen. Cushman re counterinsurgency); at 261 (Special Forces and CIA). Ricks links such counterinsurgency actions to new "surge" tactics in Iraq under General [[David Petraeus]] (at 432–438).</ref><ref>Cf. re American counterinsurgency, Thomas Ricks, ''The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008'' (New York: Penguin 2009) pp. 14–17, 24–31, and, e.g., 202–208.</ref> If one discounts the corrupt criminality and its political fallout, the Phoenix partisans were perhaps better able tactically to confront the elusive Viet Cong support networks, i.e., ''the sea in which the fish swam'', than the regular units of the [[Army of the Republic of Viet Nam|ARVN]] and the U. S. Army.<ref>Cf., [[Denis Warner]], ''The Last Confucian'' (Baltimore: Penguin 1964) pp. 17–26.</ref><ref>Cf., Anthony F. Krepinevich, Jr., ''The Army and Vietnam'' (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 1986) p. 221.</ref> Yet the military lessons of the war in full complexity were being understood by the Army, later insisted [[Harry G. Summers, Jr.|Colonel Summers]].<ref>Cf., [[Harry G. Summers, Jr.]], ''On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context'' ([[United States Army War College]], Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute [1981]). Summers' complex work raised many issues, e.g., tactical victory versus strategic defeat (pp. 1–2, 57–58), military aims and political will (13–32); cold war, nuclear war, and of Chinese intervention (33–38); the Viet Cong's revolutionary warfare start versus conventional invasion finish (47–48, 53, 55–57); cohesion of civil and military leadership (87–92, 97–98). Summers opines that the army is not the appropriate institution for "civic action" and "nation-building" (at 48–50, 104).</ref>

Regarding the Phoenix legacy, a sinister controversy haunts it.<ref>Phoenix "became CIA's single most notorious program of the entire war." Powers (1979) p. 207.</ref><ref>The recent ''U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual'' ([2007]; reprint University of Chicago 2007) p. 73 ''et seq.'', positively appraises the CORDS effort in Vietnam, but does not name its Phoenix Program.</ref> Distancing himself, Helms summarized: "As successful a program as PHOENIX was when guided by energetic local leaders," as a national program it succumbed to political corruption and "failed".<ref>Helms (2003) p. 338.</ref> Colby admitted serious faults, yet in conclusion found a positive preponderance.<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 270–280, at 270–271 (his 1969 directive to cure wrongdoing), 272 and 279 (his testimony before congressional committees), and 278–279, 280 (positive improvement then to quality of Vietnamese life in the countryside).</ref> "It was not the CIA," writes [[John Ranelagh]], "that was responsible for the excesses of Phoenix (although the agency clearly condoned what was happening)."<ref>Ranelagh (1986), quote at 439 (the Vietnamese did the "dirty work"). Ranelagh remarks that when Saigon fell in 1975, left behind to cope with the triumphant Communists were "countless counterterrorist agents—perhaps as high as 30,000—specially trained to operate in the Phoenix Program" (pp. 605–606).</ref> Author [[Tim Weiner]] compares the violent excesses of Phoenix to such associated with the early years of the [[Second Iraq War]].<ref>Weiner directly compares Operation Phoenix to what Vice President [[Dick Cheney]] after the [[9/11|September 11, 2001 Attacks]] called ''the dark side'', i.e., "the torture of captured enemy combatants". Weiner (2007) p. 481.</ref><ref>Immediately after 2001 the CIA was radically transformed, according to a national security journalist. "No longer a traditional espionage service ... [the CIA had] become a killing machine, an organization consumed with man hunting." Mark Mazzetti, ''The Way of the Knife. The CIA, a secret army, and a war at the ends of the earth'' (New York: Penguin 2013) p. 4. Yet Mazzetti notes (at 128–129, 132–134) how much of this new paramilitary role has since shifted from CIA back to the military's [[Joint Special Operations Command]] (JSOC).</ref><ref>Priest and Arkin, ''Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State'' (Boston: Little, Brown 2011) p. 33 (some at CIA "despised what they believe the CIA had become" since 2001), at 202–208 (subsequent CIA kill lists re [[Unmanned aerial vehicle|drone]] attacks). Yet the CIA now has been supplanted by the JSOC as the favored agency for lethal covert operations (pp. 53–54, 210–211).</ref>

===Johnson withdraws===
[[File:L B Johnson Model Khe Sanh.jpeg|thumb|President Johnson during the Vietnam War, February 1968]]
In America, what became the Vietnam War lost domestic political support, and seriously injured the popularity of the Johnson administration. In the spring of election year 1968, following the unexpected January [[Tet offensive]] in Vietnam, the war issue reached a crisis.<ref>Joseph Buttinger, ''Vietnam. The unforgettable tragedy'' (1977) pp. 101–103.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 462–467.</ref> In March, Helms prepared yet another special CIA report for the President and arranged for CIA officer George Carver to present it in person to Johnson. Carver was then the CIA's Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA).<ref>Powers (19779) p. 213 re SAVA.</ref>

Helms writes, "In his typically unvarnished manner, George had presented a bleak but accurate view of the situation and again demonstrated that the NVN strength in South Vietnam was far stronger than had been previously reported by [[Military Assistance Command, Vietnam|MACV]]." Carver "closed by saying in effect that not even the President could not tell the American voters on one day that the United States planned to get out of Vietnam, and on the next day tell Ho Chi Minh that we will stick it out for twenty years. With this LBJ rose like a roasted pheasant and bolted from the room." But Johnson soon returned.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 331–332, quote at 332.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) p. 220.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1086) p. 467.</ref> Helms described what happened next.

<blockquote>The President, who was a foot and a half taller and a hundred pounds heavier than George, struck him a resounding clap on the back and caught his hand in an immense fist. Wrenching George's arm up and down with a pumping motion that might have drawn oil from a dry Texas well, Johnson congratulated him on the briefing, and on his services to the country and its voters. As he released George, he said, 'Anytime you want to talk to me, just pick up the phone and come over.' It was a vintage LBJ performance.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 332.</ref></blockquote>

Earlier, a group of foreign policy elders, known as [[The Wise Men (book)|The Wise Men]], having first heard from the CIA, then confronted Johnson about the difficulty of winning in Vietnam. The president was unprepared to accept their negative findings. "Lyndon Johnson must have considered March 1968 the most difficult month of his political career," wrote Helms later. Eventually, this frank advice contributed to Johnson's decision in March to withdraw from the [[1968 United States presidential election|1968 presidential election]].<ref>[[Walter Isaacson]] and [[Evan Thomas]], ''[[The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made]]'' (New York: Simon and Schuster 1986) pp. 676–713 (chapter 23).</ref><ref>Helms (2003) pp. 332–333 (quote).</ref><ref>Turner (2005) pp. 120–121. Turner faults Helms for not getting the frank truth about Vietnam to Johnson earlier.</ref>