Editing Roderick Chisholm (section)

==Philosophical work==

Chisholm's first major work was ''Perceiving'' (1957).  His epistemological views were summed up in a popular text, ''Theory of Knowledge'', which appeared in three very different editions (1966, 1977, and 1989). His masterwork was ''Person and Object'', its title deliberately contrasting with [[W. V. O. Quine]]'s ''[[Word and Object]]''. Chisholm was a metaphysical [[Platonist]] in the tradition of [[Bertrand Russell]], and a [[rationalist]] in the tradition of Russell, [[G. E. Moore]], and [[Franz Brentano]]; he objected to Quine's [[anti-realism]], [[behaviorism]], and [[relativism]].

Chisholm defended the possibility of [[empirical knowledge]] by appeal to ''[[a priori]]'' epistemic principles whose consequences include that it is more reasonable to trust your senses and memory in most situations than to doubt them. His theory of knowledge was also famously "foundationalist" in character:  all justified beliefs are either "directly evident" or supported by chains of [[Justification (epistemology)|justified]] [[belief]]s that ultimately lead to beliefs that are directly [[Evidence|evident]].  He also defended a controversial theory of [[Volition (psychology)|volition]] called "agent causation" much like that of [[Thomas Reid]].  He argued that [[free will]] is incompatible with [[determinism]], and believed that we do act freely; this combination of views is known as [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarianism]].

He developed a highly original theory of first person thought according to which the things we believe are [[Property (philosophy)|properties]], and believing them is a matter of self-attributing them.  (A similar view was developed independently by [[David Kellogg Lewis]], and enjoys considerable popularity, although it is now known mainly through Lewis's work.)  Chisholm was also famous for defending the possibility of robust self-knowledge (against the [[Skepticism|skeptical]] arguments of [[David Hume]]), and an objective ethics of requirements similar to that of [[W. D. Ross]]. Chisholm's other books include ''The Problem of the Criterion'', ''Perceiving'', ''The First Person'' and ''A Realist Theory of the Categories'', though his numerous journal articles are probably better known than any of these.

Chisholm read widely in the [[history of philosophy]], and frequently referred to the work of [[Ancient philosophy|Ancient]], [[Medieval philosophy|Medieval]], [[Modern philosophy|Modern]], and even [[Continental philosophy|Continental]] philosophers (although the use he made of this material has sometimes been challenged). Nonetheless, he greatly respected the history of philosophy, in the face of a prevailing indifference among [[Analytic philosophy|Analytic]] philosophers. Chisholm translated some work by Brentano and by Husserl, and contributed to the post-1970 renaissance of [[mereology]].

===Direct attribution theory of reference===<!-- "Direct attribution theory of reference" redirects here -->
Chisholm argued for the primacy of the [[mind|mental]] over [[linguistics|linguistic]] [[intentionality]], as suggested in the title of ''Person and Object'' (1976) that was deliberately contrasted with Quine's ''Word and Object'' (1960). In this regard, he defended the '''direct attribution theory of reference'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> in ''The First Person'' (1981). He argues that we refer to things other than ourselves by indirectly attributing properties to them, and that we indirectly or relatively attribute properties to them by directly attributing properties to ourselves. Suppose the following bed scene:

:(1) a man M is in bed B with a woman W, namely, M-B-W, or
:(2) a woman W is in bed B with a man M, namely, W-B-M.

If I were M and "U" were W, then I could directly attribute to myself the property (1) or M-B-W, while indirectly to "U" the property (2) or W-B-M, ''thereby referring to "U"''. That is, to say (1) is ''relatively'' to say (2), or to explicate M-B-W is to implicate W-B-M.

His idea of indirect attribution (1981) is relevant to [[John Searle]]'s "[[Speech act#Indirect speech acts|indirect speech act]]" (1975) and [[Paul Grice]]'s "[[implicature]]" (1975), in addition to [[Logical consequence|entailment]].

==="Chisholming"===
Stylistically, Chisholm was known for formulating definitions and subsequently revising them in the light of counterexamples. This led to a joke definition of a new verb:<ref>Feldman, Richard and Feldman, Fred, "Roderick Chisholm", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/chisholm/</ref> 
{{blockquote|text=chisholm, v. To make repeated small alterations in a definition or example. "He started with definition (d.8) and kept chisholming away at it until he ended up with (d.8′′′′′′′′)."|sign=[[Daniel Dennett]] and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen|source=[http://www.philosophicallexicon.com/ ''The Philosophical Lexicon''], 2008}}
While intended as a joke, the term has found some use in serious philosophical papers (for example, Kevin Meeker's "Chisholming away at Plantinga's critique of epistemic [[deontology]]").<ref>Kevin Meeker. Chisholming away at Plantinga's critique of epistemic deontology. ''Australasian Journal of Philosophy''. Volume 76, Issue 1, 1998, pp. 90-96</ref>