Editing Russian Ground Forces (section)

== History ==
{{Russian military}}
{{Further|Military history of the Soviet Union}}
As the Soviet Union dissolved, efforts were made to keep the [[Soviet Armed Forces]] as a single military structure for the new [[Commonwealth of Independent States]]. The last [[Minister of Defence (Soviet Union)|Minister of Defence of the Soviet Union]], Marshal [[Yevgeny Shaposhnikov]], was appointed supreme commander of the CIS Armed Forces in December 1991.{{sfn|Odom|1998|pages=356-387}} Among the numerous treaties signed by the former republics, in order to direct the transition period, was a temporary agreement on general purpose forces, signed in [[Minsk]] on 14 February 1992. However, once it became clear that [[Ukraine]] (and potentially the other republics) was determined to undermine the concept of joint general purpose forces and form their own armed forces, the new Russian government moved to form its own armed forces.

Russian President [[Boris Yeltsin]] signed a [[decree]] forming the Russian Ministry of Defence on 7 May 1992, establishing the Russian Ground Forces along with the other branches of the [[Russian Armed Forces]]. At the same time, the General Staff was in the process of withdrawing tens of thousands of personnel from the [[Group of Soviet Forces in Germany]], the [[Northern Group of Forces]] in Poland, the [[Central Group of Forces]] in Czechoslovakia, the [[Southern Group of Forces]] in Hungary, and from Mongolia.

Thirty-seven [[Soviet Ground Forces]] divisions had to be withdrawn from the four groups of forces and the Baltic States, and four military districts—totaling 57 divisions—were handed over to Belarus and Ukraine.<ref>{{Cite book
  | last = International Institute for Strategic Studies
  | author-link = International Institute for Strategic Studies
  | title = The Military Balance 1995–96
  | publisher = Brassey's
  | year = 1995
  | location = London
  | page =102 }}</ref> Some idea of the scale of the withdrawal can be gained from the [[List of Soviet Army divisions 1989-91|division list]]. For the dissolving Soviet Ground Forces, the withdrawal from the former [[Warsaw Pact]] states and the Baltic states was an extremely demanding, expensive, and debilitating process.{{sfn|Austin|Muraviev|2001|page=257}}

As the military districts that remained in Russia after the collapse of the Union consisted mostly of the mobile [[en cadre|cadre]] formations, the Ground Forces were, to a large extent, created by relocating the formerly full-strength formations from Eastern Europe to under-resourced districts. However, the facilities in those districts were inadequate to house the flood of personnel and equipment returning from abroad, and many units "were unloaded from the rail wagons into empty fields."{{sfn|Orr|1998|page=2}} The need for destruction and transfer of large amounts of weaponry under the [[Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]] also necessitated great adjustments.

=== Post-Soviet reform plans ===
The [[Ministry of Defence (Russia)|Ministry of Defence]] newspaper ''[[Krasnaya Zvezda]]'' published a reform plan on 21 July 1992. Later one commentator said it was "hastily" put together by the General Staff "to satisfy the public demand for radical changes."<ref name="Baev 1996">{{Cite book
  | last = Baev
  | first = Pavel
  | title = The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles
  | publisher = Sage Publications
  | location = Oslo
  | year = 1996
  | page = [https://archive.org/details/russianarmyintim00baev/page/67 67]
  | isbn = 978-0-7619-5187-2
  | series = International Peace Research Institute
  | url = https://archive.org/details/russianarmyintim00baev/page/67
  }}</ref> The [[General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation|General Staff]], from that point, became a bastion of conservatism, causing a build-up of troubles that later became critical. The reform plan advocated a change from an Army-Division-Regiment structure to a Corps-Brigade arrangement. The new structures were to be more capable in a situation with no front line, and more capable of independent action at all levels.<ref name="dick1993">{{Cite journal
  | last = Dick
  | first = Charles
  | title = Russian Views on Future War—Part 3
  | journal = Jane's Intelligence Review
  | date = November 1993
  | page = 488
  | publisher = IHS Jane's
  | issn = 1350-6226}}</ref>

Cutting out a level of command, omitting two out of three higher echelons between the theatre headquarters and the fighting battalions, would produce economies, increase flexibility, and simplify command-and-control arrangements.<ref name="dick1993" /> The expected changeover to the new structure proved to be rare, irregular, and sometimes reversed. The new brigades that appeared were mostly divisions that had broken down until they happened to be at the proposed brigade strengths. New divisions—such as the new [[3rd Motor Rifle Division]] in the [[Moscow Military District]], formed on the basis of disbanding tank formations—were formed, rather than new brigades.

Few of the reforms planned in the early 1990s eventuated, for three reasons: Firstly, there was an absence of firm civilian political guidance, with President Yeltsin primarily interested in ensuring that the Armed Forces were controllable and loyal, rather than reformed.<ref name="Baev 1996"/>{{sfn|Arbatov|1998|page=112}} Secondly, declining funding worsened the progress. Finally, there was no firm consensus within the military about what reforms should be implemented. General [[Pavel Grachev]], the first Russian Minister of Defence (1992–96), broadly advertised reforms, yet wished to preserve the old Soviet-style Army, with large numbers of low-strength formations and continued mass conscription. The General Staff and the armed services tried to preserve Soviet-era doctrines, deployments, weapons, and missions in the absence of solid new guidance.{{sfn|Arbatov|1998|page=113}}

British military expert Michael Orr claims that the hierarchy had great difficulty in fully understanding the changed situation, due to their education. As graduates of [[Military academies in Russia|Soviet military academies]], they received great operational and staff training, but in political terms they had learned an ideology, rather than a wide understanding of international affairs. Thus, the generals—focused on [[Enlargement of NATO|NATO expansion]] in Eastern Europe—could not adapt themselves and the Armed Forces to the new opportunities and challenges they faced.{{sfn|Orr|2003|pages=2-3}}

=== Crime and corruption in the ground forces ===
The new Russian Ground Forces inherited an increasing crime problem from their Soviet predecessors. As draft resistance grew in the last years of the Soviet Union, the authorities tried to compensate by enlisting men with criminal records and who spoke little or no Russian. Crime rates soared, with the military procurator in Moscow in September 1990 reporting a 40-percent increase in crime over the previous six months, including a 41-percent rise in serious bodily injuries.{{sfn|Odom|1998|page=302}} Disappearances of weapons rose to rampant levels, especially in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.{{sfn|Odom|1998|page=302}}

Generals directing the withdrawals from Eastern Europe diverted arms, equipment, and foreign monies intended to build housing in Russia for the withdrawn troops. Several years later, the former commander in Germany, General [[Matvey Burlakov]], and the Defence Minister, [[Pavel Grachev]], had their involvement exposed. They were also accused of ordering the murder of reporter [[Dmitry Kholodov]], who had been investigating the scandals.{{sfn|Odom|1998|page=302}} In December 1996, Defence Minister [[Igor Rodionov]] ordered the dismissal of the Commander of the Ground Forces, General [[Vladimir Magomedovich Semyonov|Vladimir Semyonov]], for activities incompatible with his position&nbsp;— reportedly his wife's business activities.<ref name="nupi">{{cite report| url = http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?314| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070319042913/http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?314| archive-date = 19 March 2007| title = Chronology of events—Rodionov dismisses commander of ground forces and then cancels visit to United States| publisher = Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
| date = 4 December 1996| access-date = 27 September 2008}}</ref>

A 1995 study by the U.S. [[Foreign Military Studies Office]]<ref>{{cite web|last=Turbiville |first=Graham H. |url=http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/mafia.htm |archive-url=https://archive.today/20070801170345/http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/mafia.htm |archive-date=1 August 2007 |title=Mafia in Uniform: The criminalization of the Russian Armed Forces }}</ref> went as far as to say that the Armed Forces were "an institution increasingly defined by the high levels of military criminality and corruption embedded within it at every level." The FMSO noted that crime levels had always grown with social turbulence, such as the trauma Russia was passing through. The author identified four major types among the raft of criminality prevalent within the forces—weapons trafficking and the arms trade; business and commercial ventures; military crime beyond Russia's borders; and contract murder. Weapons disappearances began during the dissolution of the Union and has continued. Within units "rations are sold while soldiers grow hungry ... [while] fuel, spare parts, and equipment can be bought."{{sfn|Orr|2003|page=10}} Meanwhile, ''voyemkomats'' take bribes to arrange avoidance of service, or a more comfortable posting.

Beyond the Russian frontier, drugs were smuggled across the [[Tajikistan|Tajik]] border—supposedly being patrolled by Russian guards—by military aircraft, and a Russian senior officer, General Major Alexander Perelyakin, had been dismissed from his post with the United Nations peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Hercegovina ([[UNPROFOR]]), following continued complaints of smuggling, profiteering, and corruption. In terms of contract killings, beyond the Kholodov case, there have been widespread rumours that GRU [[Spetsnaz]] personnel have been moonlighting as ''mafiya'' hitmen.<ref>{{Cite journal| last = Galeotti | page = 52| first = Mark
| title = Moscow's Armed Forces: a city's balance of power| journal = Jane's Intelligence Review | issn = 1350-6226}}</ref>

Reports such as these continued. Some of the more egregious examples have included a constant-readiness motor rifle regiment's tanks running out of fuel on the firing ranges, due to the diversion of their fuel supplies to local businesses.{{sfn|Orr|2003|page=10}} Visiting the 20th Army in April 2002, [[Sergei Ivanov|Sergey Ivanov]] said the volume of theft was "simply impermissible".{{sfn|Orr|2003|page=10}} Ivanov said that 20,000 servicemen were wounded or injured in 2002 as a result of accidents or criminal activity across the entire armed forces - so the ground forces figure would be less.<ref>Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 December 2003, p.27.</ref>

Abuse of personnel, sending soldiers to work outside units—a long-standing tradition which could see conscripts doing things ranging from being large scale manpower supply for commercial businesses to being officers' families' servants—is now banned by Sergei Ivanov's Order 428 of October 2005. What is more, the order is being enforced, with several prosecutions recorded.<ref name="keir-07"/> President Putin also demanded a halt to dishonest use of military property in November 2005: "We must completely eliminate the use of the Armed Forces' material base for any commercial objectives."

The spectrum of dishonest activity has included, in the past, exporting aircraft as scrap metal; but the point at which officers are prosecuted has shifted, and investigations over trading in travel warrants and junior officers' routine thieving of soldiers' meals are beginning to be reported.<ref name="keir-07"/> However, British military analysts comment that "there should be little doubt that the overall impact of theft and fraud is much greater than that which is actually detected".<ref name="keir-07"/> Chief Military Prosecutor Sergey Fridinskiy said in March 2007 that there was "no systematic work in the Armed Forces to prevent embezzlement".<ref name="keir-07"/>

In March 2011, Military Prosecutor General Sergei Fridinsky reported that crimes had been increasing steadily in the Russian ground forces for the past 18 months, with 500 crimes reported in the period of January to March 2011 alone. Twenty servicemen were crippled and two killed in the same period as a result. Crime in the ground forces was up 16% in 2010 as compared to 2009, with crimes against other servicemen constituting one in every four cases reported.<ref name="pravda">[http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/25-03-2011/117335-army_hazing-0/ "No solution to hideous army hazing in Russia"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141213124012/http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/25-03-2011/117335-army_hazing-0/ |date=13 December 2014 }}, [[Pravda]] (25 March 2011)</ref>

Compounding this problem was also a rise in "extremist" crimes in the ground forces, with "''servicemen from different ethnic groups or regions trying to enforce their own rules and order in their units''", according to the Prosecutor General. Fridinsky also lambasted the military investigations department for their alleged lack of efficiency in investigative matters, with only one in six criminal cases being revealed. Military commanders were also accused of concealing crimes committed against servicemen from military officials.<ref name="rferl">[http://www.rferl.org/content/violent_crimes_in_russian_army_increase/3538265.html "Violent Crimes In Russian Army Increase"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141213043702/http://www.rferl.org/content/violent_crimes_in_russian_army_increase/3538265.html |date=13 December 2014 }}, [[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty]] (27 March 2011)</ref>

A major corruption scandal also occurred at the elite [[Lipetsk Air Base|Lipetsk pilot training center]], where the deputy commander, the chief of staff and other officers allegedly extorted 3 million roubles of premium pay from other officers since the beginning of 2010. The Tambov military garrison prosecutor confirmed that charges have been lodged against those involved. The affair came to light after a junior officer wrote about the extortion in his personal blog. Sergey Fridinskiy, the Main Military Prosecutor acknowledged that extortion in the distribution of supplementary pay in army units is common, and that "criminal cases on the facts of extortion are being investigated in practically every district and fleet."<ref>{{cite web|url = http://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2011/07/26/latest-on-sulim-and-premium-pay-extortion/|title = Latest on Sulim and Premium Pay Extortion {{!}} Russian Defense Policy|date = 26 July 2011|access-date = 14 August 2011|archive-date = 15 August 2011|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110815032504/https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2011/07/26/latest-on-sulim-and-premium-pay-extortion/|url-status = live}}</ref>

In August 2012, Prosecutor General Fridinsky again reported a rise in crime, with murders rising more than half, bribery cases doubling, and drug trafficking rising by 25% in the first six months of 2012 as compared to the same period in the previous year. Following the release of these statistics, the [[Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia]] denounced the conditions in the Armed Forces as a "crime against humanity".<ref name="dw">[http://www.dw.de/crime-reportedly-flourishes-in-russian-army/a-16175665 "Crime reportedly flourishes in Russian army"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403014352/http://www.dw.de/crime-reportedly-flourishes-in-russian-army/a-16175665 |date=3 April 2015 }}, [[Deutsche Welle]] (18 August 2012)</ref>

In July 2013, the [[Prosecutor General of Russia]]'s office revealed that corruption in the same year had grown 5.5 times as compared to the previous year, costing the Russian government 4.4 billion rubles (US$130 million). It was also revealed that total number of registered crimes in the Russian armed forces had declined in the same period, although one in five crimes registered were corruption-related.<ref>{{cite web |title=Ущерб государству от коррупции в армии в 2013 году превысил 4,4 млрд рублей |url=https://www.interfax.ru/russia/317810 |date=11 July 2013 |access-date=24 February 2023 |archive-date=24 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230224085202/https://www.interfax.ru/russia/317810 |url-status=live }}</ref>

"In 2019, Chief Military Prosecutor Valery Petrov reported that some $110 million had been lost due to corruption in the military departments and the number was on the uptick."<ref>'В 2018 Году Ущерб от Коррупции Военнослужащих в России Вырос до 7 Млрд Рублей', TASS, 21 March 2019, https://tass.ru/obschestvo/6242472 {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230222223810/https://tass.ru/obschestvo/6242472 |date=22 February 2023 }} via Coffey 2022 on the evolution of dedovschina.</ref>

=== Involvement in Russian constitutional crisis of 1993 ===
{{See also|1993 Russian constitutional crisis}}
The Russian Ground Forces reluctantly became involved in the Russian constitutional crisis of 1993 after President Yeltsin issued an [[unconstitutional]] decree dissolving the Russian Parliament, following its resistance to Yeltsin's consolidation of power and his neo-liberal reforms. A group of deputies, including Vice President [[Alexander Rutskoy|Alexander Rutskoi]], barricaded themselves inside the parliament building. While giving public support to the President, the Armed Forces, led by General Grachev, tried to remain neutral, following the wishes of the officer corps.<ref name="mcnair 34">{{cite report
  | url = http://www.ndu.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair34/34fal.html
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080114032038/http://www.ndu.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair34/34fal.html
  | archive-date = 14 January 2008
  | title = McNair Paper 34, The Russian Military's Role in Politics
  | date = January 1995}}</ref> The military leadership were unsure of both the rightness of Yeltsin's cause and the reliability of their forces, and had to be convinced at length by Yeltsin to attack the parliament.

When the attack was finally mounted, forces from five different divisions around Moscow were used, and the personnel involved were mostly officers and senior [[non-commissioned officer]]s.{{sfn|Austin|Muraviev|2001|page=257}} There were also indications that some formations deployed into Moscow only under protest.<ref name="mcnair 34"/> However, once the parliament building had been stormed, the parliamentary leaders arrested, and temporary censorship imposed, Yeltsin succeeded in retaining power.

=== Chechen Wars ===

==== First Chechen War ====
{{See also|First Chechen War}}
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Chechens declared independence in November 1991, under the leadership of a former Air Forces officer, General [[Dzhokhar Dudayev|Dzhokar Dudayev]].<ref>{{cite report
 |last        = Finch
 |first       = Raymond C. III, MAJ
 |url         = http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/yrusfail/yrusfail.htm
 |title       = Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya
 |publisher   = Foreign Military Studies Office
 |location    = Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20061015123847/http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/yrusfail/yrusfail.htm
 |archive-date= 15 October 2006
}}</ref> The continuation of Chechen independence was seen as reducing Moscow's authority; Chechnya became perceived as a haven for criminals, and a hard-line group within the Kremlin began advocating war. A Security Council meeting was held 29 November 1994, where Yeltsin ordered the Chechens to disarm, or else Moscow would restore order. Defence Minister [[Pavel Grachev]] assured Yeltsin that he would "take Grozny with one airborne assault regiment in two hours."<ref>{{Cite journal
 |last    = Herspring
 |first   = Dale
 |s2cid   = 110963490
 |title   = Undermining Combat Readiness in the Russian Military
 |journal = Armed Forces & Society
 |volume  = 32
 |issue   = 4
 |pages   = 512–531
 |date    = July 2006
 |issn    = 0095-327X
 |doi     = 10.1177/0095327X06288030
 }} [citing {{cite report
 |last        = Blandy
 |first       = C. W.
 |title       = Chechnya: Two Federal Interventions: An interim comparison and assessment
 |publisher   = Conflict Studies Research Centre
 |docket      = P29
 |date        = January 2000
 |page        = 13
 |url         = http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/caucasus/P29
 |access-date = 9 September 2010
 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20101219095730/http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/caucasus/P29
 |archive-date= 19 December 2010
}}]</ref>

The operation began on 11 December 1994 and, by 31 December, Russian forces were entering [[Grozny]], the Chechen capital. The 131st Motor Rifle Brigade was ordered to make a swift push for the centre of the city, but was then virtually destroyed in Chechen ambushes. After finally seizing Grozny amid fierce resistance, Russian troops moved on to other Chechen strongholds. When Chechen militants took hostages in the [[Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis]] in Stavropol Kray in June 1995, peace looked possible for a time, but the fighting continued. Following this incident, the separatists were referred to as ''insurgents'' or ''terrorists'' within Russia.

Dzhokar Dudayev was assassinated in a Russian [[airstrike]] on 21 April 1996, and that summer, a Chechen attack [[Battle of Grozny (August 1996)|retook Grozny]]. [[Alexander Lebed]], then Secretary of the Security Council, began talks with the Chechen rebel leader [[Aslan Maskhadov]] in August 1996 and signed an agreement on 22/23 August; by the end of that month, the fighting ended.<ref>{{Cite book
  |last1  = Scott
  |first1 = Harriet Fast
  |last2  = Scott
  |first2 = William F.
  |title  = Russian Military Directory
  |year   = 2002
  |page   = 328}}</ref>
The formal ceasefire was signed in the [[Dagestan]]i town of [[Khasavyurt]] on 31 August 1996, stipulating that a formal agreement on relations between the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the Russian federal government need not be signed until late 2001.

Writing some years later, [[Dmitri Trenin]] and Aleksei Malashenko described the Russian military's performance in Chechniya as "grossly deficient at all levels, from commander-in-chief to the drafted private."<ref>{{Cite book
  | last1 = Trenin
  | first1 = Dmitri V.
  | last2 = Malashenko
  | first2 = Aleksei V.
  | title = Russia's Restless Frontier
  | location = Washington DC
  | publisher = Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  | year = 2004
  | page = 106
  | isbn = 0-87003-204-6}}</ref> The Ground Forces' performance in the First Chechen War has been assessed by a British academic as "appallingly bad".{{sfn|Orr|2000||page=82}} Writing six years later, Michael Orr said "one of the root causes of the Russian failure in 1994–96 was their inability to raise and deploy a properly trained military force."{{sfn|Orr|2000|page=87}}

Then Lieutenant Colonel [[Mark Hertling]] of the U.S. Army had the chance to visit the Ground Forces in 1994:
<blockquote>The Russian barracks were spartan, with twenty beds lined up in a large room similar to what the U.S. Army had during World War II. The food in their mess halls was terrible. The Russian "training and exercises" we observed were not opportunities to improve capabilities or skills, but rote demonstrations, with little opportunity for maneuver or imagination. The military college classroom where a group of middle- and senior-ranking officers conducted a regimental map exercise was rudimentary, with young soldiers manning radio-telephones relaying orders to imaginary units in some imaginary field location. On the motor pool visit, I was able to crawl into a T-80 tank—it was cramped, dirty, and in poor repair—and even fire a few rounds in a very primitive simulator.{{sfn|Hertling|2022}}</blockquote>

In June 1999 Russian forces, though not the Ground Forces, were involved in a confrontation with NATO. Parts of the [[1st Separate Airborne Brigade]] of the [[Russian Airborne Forces]] raced to seize control of [[Pristina Airport]] in what became [[Kosovo]], leading to the [[Incident at Pristina airport]].

==== Second Chechen War ====
{{See also|Second Chechen War}}
<!-- [[WP:NFCC]] violation: [[File:Chechnya9268.jpg|thumb|Russian artillery shell militant positions
near the village of Duba-Yurt in January 2000.]] -->
The Second Chechen War began in August 1999 after Chechen militias [[War of Dagestan|invaded]] neighboring [[Dagestan]], followed quickly in early September by a [[Russian apartment bombings|series of four terrorist bombings]] across Russia. This prompted Russian military action against the alleged Chechen culprits.

In the first Chechen war, the Russians primarily laid waste to an area with artillery and airstrikes before advancing the land forces. Improvements were made in the Ground Forces between 1996 and 1999; when the Second Chechen War started, instead of hastily assembled "composite regiments" dispatched with little or no training, whose members had never seen service together, formations were brought up to strength with replacements, put through preparatory training, and then dispatched. Combat performance improved accordingly,{{sfn|Orr|2000|pages=88–90}} and large-scale opposition was crippled.

Most of the prominent past Chechen separatist leaders had died or been killed, including former President [[Aslan Maskhadov]] and leading [[warlord]] and terrorist attack mastermind [[Shamil Basayev]]. However, small-scale conflict continued to drag on; as of November 2007, it had spread across other parts of the [[North Caucasus|Russian Caucasus]].<ref name="alert">{{cite web
 |url          = http://www.trust.org/alertnet/crisis-centre/crisis/chechnya-and-the-north-caucasus?v=in_detail
 |title        = Chechnya and the North Caucasus
 |work         = AlertNet
 |date         = 4 November 2007
 |publisher    = Thomson Reuters Foundation
 |access-date  = 8 September 2010
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20110224025814/http://www.trust.org/alertnet/crisis-centre/crisis/chechnya-and-the-north-caucasus?v=in_detail
 |archive-date = 24 February 2011
}}</ref> It was a divisive struggle, with at least one senior military officer dismissed for being unresponsive to government commands: General Colonel [[Gennady Troshev]] was dismissed in 2002 for refusing to move from command of the [[North Caucasus Military District]] to command of the less important Siberian Military District.<ref>{{cite web
 |url          = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2587871.stm
 |title        = Top Russian general sacked
 |date         = 18 December 2002
 |work         = BBC News World Edition (Europe)
 |publisher    = BBC
 |access-date  = 8 September 2010
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20071024024350/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2587871.stm
 |archive-date = 24 October 2007
 |url-status   = live
}}</ref>

The Second Chechen War was officially declared ended on 16 April 2009.<ref>{{cite news
 |url          = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8001495.stm
 |title        = Russia 'ends Chechnya operation'
 |work         = BBC News
 |date         = 16 April 2009
 |publisher    = BBC
 |access-date  = 1 March 2011
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20110208124854/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8001495.stm
 |archive-date = 8 February 2011
 | url-status   = live
}}</ref>

=== Reforms under Sergeyev ===
When [[Igor Sergeyev]] arrived as Minister of Defence in 1997, he initiated what were seen as real reforms under very difficult conditions.{{sfn|Parchomenko|1999}} The number of military educational establishments, virtually unchanged since 1991, was reduced, and the amalgamation of the Siberian and Trans-Baikal Military Districts was ordered. A larger number of army divisions were given "constant readiness" status, which was supposed to bring them up to 80 percent manning and 100 percent equipment holdings. Sergeyev announced in August 1998 that there would be six divisions and four brigades on 24-hour alert by the end of that year. Three levels of forces were announced; constant readiness, low-level, and strategic reserves.<ref>Armeiskii Sbornik, Aug 1998, FBIS-UMA-98-340, 6 Dec 98 'Russia: New Look of Ground Troops'.</ref>

However, personnel quality—even in these favored units—continued to be a problem. Lack of fuel for training and a shortage of well-trained junior officers hampered combat effectiveness.<ref>[[Krasnaya Zvezda]] 28 January and 9 February 1999, in Austin & Muraviev, 2000, p. 268, and M.J. Orr, 1998, p. 3</ref> However, concentrating on the interests of his old service, the [[Strategic Missile Forces|Strategic Rocket Forces]], Sergeyev directed the disbanding of the Ground Forces headquarters itself in December 1997.{{sfn|Austin|Muraviev|2001|page=259}} The disbandment was a "military nonsense", in Orr's words, "justifiable only in terms of internal politics within the Ministry of Defence".{{sfn|Orr|2003|page=6}} The Ground Forces' prestige declined as a result, as the headquarters disbandment implied—at least in theory—that the Ground Forces no longer ranked equally with the Air Force and Navy.{{sfn|Orr|2003|page=12}}

=== Reforms under Putin ===
[[File:AirborneExercise2017 01.jpg|thumb|A Russian airborne exercise in 2017]]
Under President [[Vladimir Putin]], more funds were committed, the Ground Forces Headquarters was reestablished, and some progress on professionalisation occurred. Plans called for reducing mandatory service to 18 months in 2007, and to one year by 2008, but a mixed Ground Force, of both contract soldiers and conscripts, would remain. (As of 2009, the length of conscript service was 12 months.)<ref name="2006 factbook">{{cite encyclopedia
  | title = The World Factbook
  | date = 2006
  | publisher = United States Government Printing
  | isbn = 0-16-076547-1
  | url = https://archive.org/details/worldfactbook20000ciac
  }}</ref>

Funding increases began in 1999. After some recovery of the economy and the associated rise in income, especially from oil, "..officially reported defence spending [rose] in nominal terms at least, for the first time since the formation of the Russian Federation".{{sfn|IISS|2000|page=115}} The budget rose from 141 billion rubles in 2000 to 219 billion rubles in 2001.<ref>{{Cite book| title = The Military Balance, 2001–2002| author = International Institute for Strategic Studies
| publisher = International Institute for Strategic Studies | year = 2001
| isbn = 978-0-19-850979-0 | issn = 0459-7222| page = 109}}</ref> Much of this funding has been spent on personnel—there have been several pay rises, starting with a 20-percent rise authorised in 2001.<ref>Military Balance 2001-02, p.107.</ref> The current professionalisation programme, including 26,000 extra [[sergeant]]s, was expected to cost at least 31 billion roubles (US$1.1 billion).<ref>{{Cite journal
  | title = The Military Balance
  | author = International Institute for Strategic Studies
  | publisher = International Institute for Strategic Studies
  | issn = 0459-7222}} (recent editions)</ref> Increased funding has been spread across the whole budget, with personnel spending being matched by greater procurement and [[research and development]] funding.

However, in 2004, Alexander Goltz said that, given the insistence of the hierarchy on trying to force contract soldiers into the old conscript pattern, there is little hope of a fundamental strengthening of the Ground Forces. He further elaborated that they are expected to remain, to some extent, a military liability and "Russia's most urgent social problem" for some time to come.{{sfn|Goltz|2004}} Goltz summed up by saying: "All of this means that the Russian armed forces are not ready to defend the country and that, at the same time, they are also dangerous for Russia. Top military personnel demonstrate neither the will nor the ability to effect fundamental changes."{{sfn|Goltz|2004}}

More money is arriving both for personnel and equipment; Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated in June 2008 that monetary allowances for servicemen in permanent-readiness units will be raised significantly.{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} In May 2007, it was announced that enlisted pay would rise to 65,000 roubles (US$2,750) per month, and the pay of officers on combat duty in rapid response units would rise to 100,000–150,000 roubles (US$4,230–$6,355) per month. However, while the move to one year conscript service would disrupt ''[[dedovshchina]]'', it is unlikely that bullying will disappear altogether without significant societal change.<ref name="keir-07">{{cite report
  | first = Keir
  | last = Giles
  | date = May 2007
  | title = Military Service in Russia: No New Model Army
  | url = https://conflictstudies.academia.edu/KeirGiles/Papers/966108/Military_Service_in_Russia_-_No_New_Model_Army
  | type = PDF
  | publisher = Conflict Studies Research Centre
  | access-date = 2 December 2017
  | archive-date = 14 April 2023
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230414020910/https://www.academia.edu/929855/Military_Service_in_Russia_No_New_Model_Army
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> Other assessments from the same source point out that the Russian Armed Forces faced major disruption in 2008, as demographic change hindered plans to reduce the term of conscription from two years to one.<ref name="giles 2006">{{cite report
  | first = Keir
  | last = Giles
  | title = Where Have All The Soldiers Gone? Russian military manpower plans versus demographic reality
  | url = https://conflictstudies.academia.edu/KeirGiles/Papers/966102/Where_Have_All_the_Soldiers_Gone_Russias_Military_Plans_Versus_Demographic_Reality
  | publisher = Conflict Studies Research Centre
  | date = October 2006
  | access-date = 2 December 2017
  | archive-date = 14 April 2023
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230414020918/https://www.academia.edu/929850/Where_Have_All_the_Soldiers_Gone_Russias_Military_Plans_Versus_Demographic_Reality
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref><ref name="Mighty have Fallen">{{Cite news
  | url = http://www.economist.com/node/12262231?story_id=12262231
  | title = How are the mighty fallen
  | date = 18 September 2008
  | newspaper = The Economist
  | access-date = 21 September 2008
  | archive-date = 29 June 2011
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110629202301/http://www.economist.com/node/12262231?story_id=12262231
  | url-status = live
  }} (subscription required)</ref>

=== Serdyukov reforms ===
{{Update section|date=July 2021}}
{{main|2008 Russian military reform}}
A major reorganisation of the force began in 2007 by the Minister for Defence [[Anatoliy Serdyukov]], with the aim of converting all divisions into brigades, and cutting surplus officers and establishments.<ref>{{cite web
 |url          = http://rbth.ru/articles/2008/12/18/181208_reform.html
 |title        = Serdyukovґs radical reform
 |date         = 18 December 2008
|last         = Yegorov
 |first        = Ivan
 |work         = Russia Beyond the Headlines
 |publisher    = Rossiyskaya Gazeta
 |access-date  = 8 September 2010
|archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20100913222403/http://rbth.ru/articles/2008/12/18/181208_reform.html
 |archive-date = 13 September 2010
|url-status   = live
}}</ref> In the course of the reorganization, the 4-chain command structure ([[military district]] – [[field army]] – [[Division (military)|division]] – [[regiment]]) that was used until then was replaced with a 3-chain structure: strategic command – operational command – brigade. Brigades are supposed to be used as mobile permanent-readiness units capable of fighting independently with the support of highly mobile task forces or together with other brigades under joint command.{{citation needed|date=February 2023}}

In a statement on 4 September 2009, RGF [[Commander-in-chief|Commander-in-Chief]] Vladimir Boldyrev said that half of the Russian land forces were reformed by 1 June and that 85 brigades of constant combat preparedness had already been created. Among them are the combined-arms brigade, missile brigades, assault brigades and electronic warfare brigades.<ref>Russia Reshapes Army Structure to U.S.-Style Brigades, 5 October 2009</ref>

During General [[Mark Hertling]]'s term as Commander, [[United States Army Europe]] in 2011–2012, he visited Russia at the invitation of the Commander of the Ground Forces, "Colonel-General (corresponding to an American lieutenant general) [[Aleksandr Postnikov|Aleksandr Streitsov]]. ..[A]t preliminary meetings" with the [[Embassy of the United States, Moscow]], the U.S. Defence Attache told Hertling that the Ground Forces "while still substantive in quantity, continued to decline in capability and quality. My subsequent visits to the schools and units [Colonel General] Streitsov chose reinforced these conclusions. The classroom discussions were sophomoric, and the units in training were going through the motions of their scripts with no true training value or combined arms interaction—infantry, armor, artillery, air, and resupply all trained separately."{{sfn|Hertling|2022}}

=== Reforms under Sergey Shoygu ===
{{Update section|date=July 2021}}

[[File:The Union Minister for Defence, Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman and the Russian Defence Minister, General Sergey Shoygu at the delegation level talks, in Moscow on April 03, 2018.jpg|thumb|Sergey Shoygu meeting with Indian officials in 2018]]
After [[Sergey Shoygu]] took over the role of [[Ministry of Defence (Russia)|Ministry of Defence]], the reforms [[Anatoliy Serdyukov|Serdyukov]] had implemented were reversed. He also aimed to restore trust with senior officers as well as the [[Ministry of Defence (Russia)|Ministry of Defence]] in the wake of the intense resentment Serduykov's reforms had generated. He did this a number of ways but one of the ways was integrating himself by wearing a [[Uniforms of the Russian Armed Forces|military uniform]].<ref>{{Cite news|title=Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu Survives Government Reshuffle|url=https://jamestown.org/program/russias-defense-minister-sergei-shoigu-survives-government-reshuffle/|access-date=11 July 2020|website=Jamestown|language=en-US|archive-date=11 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200711205157/https://jamestown.org/program/russias-defense-minister-sergei-shoigu-survives-government-reshuffle/|url-status=live}}</ref>

Shoygu ordered 750 military exercises, such as [[Vostok 2018]]. The exercises also seemed to have helped validate the general direction of reform. The effect of this readiness was seen during [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014]]. Since [[Anatoliy Serdyukov]] had already completed the unpopular reforms (military downsizing and reorganization), it was relatively easy for Shoygu to be conciliatory with the officer corps and [[Ministry of Defence (Russia)|Ministry of Defence]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Gorenburg|first=Dmitry|date=14 June 2013|title=The Russian Military under Sergei Shoigu: Will the Reform Continue?|url=https://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/russian-military-under-sergei-shoigu-will-reform-continue|journal=PonarsEuarasia – Policy Memos|language=en|access-date=11 July 2020|archive-date=12 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200712033232/https://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/russian-military-under-sergei-shoigu-will-reform-continue|url-status=live}}</ref>

Rearmament has been an important goal of reform, with the goal of 70% modernization by 2020. From 1998 to 2001, the Ground Forces received almost no new equipment. Sergey Shoygu took a less confrontational approach with the [[Defense industry of Russia|defence industry]]. By showing better flexibility on terms and pricing, the awarding of new contracts for the upcoming period was much better. Shoygu promised that future contracts would be awarded primarily to domestic firms. While easing tensions, these concessions also weakened incentives for companies to improve performance.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Sergei Shoigu: Progress Report on Military Modernization|url=https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/sergei-shoigu-progress-report-military-modernization|access-date=11 July 2020|website=www.csis.org|language=en|archive-date=11 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200711214039/https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/sergei-shoigu-progress-report-military-modernization|url-status=live}}</ref>

Shoygu also focused on forming [[battalion tactical group]]s (BTGs) as the permanent readiness component of the Russian army, rather than brigade-sized formations. According to sources quoted by the Russian [[Interfax]] agency, this was due to a lack of the manpower needed for permanent-readiness brigades. BTGs made up the preponderance of units deployed by Russia in the [[war in Donbas]]. By August 2021 Shoygu claimed that the Russian army had around 170 BTGs.<ref name="Fiore 9-10">{{cite journal |last1=Fiore |first1=Nicholas J. |title=Defeating the Russian Battalion Tactical Group |journal=Armor |date=Spring 2017 |volume=CXXVIII |issue=2 |pages=9–10 |url=https://www.benning.army.mil/Armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2017/Spring/ARMOR%20Spring%202017%20edition.pdf |access-date=27 December 2021 |archive-date=27 December 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211227093421/https://www.benning.army.mil/Armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2017/Spring/ARMOR%20Spring%202017%20edition.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name="Tass">{{cite news |title=Russian Army operates around 170 battalion tactical groups — defense chief |url=https://tass.com/defense/1324461 |access-date=27 December 2021 |work=TASS |date=10 August 2021 |archive-date=27 December 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211227093418/https://tass.com/defense/1324461 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="McDermott">{{cite journal |last1=McDermott |first1=Roger |title=Moscow Resurrects Battalion Tactical Groups |journal=Eurasia Daily Monitor |date=6 November 2012 |volume=9 |issue=203 |url=https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-resurrects-battalion-tactical-groups/ |access-date=27 December 2021 |archive-date=27 December 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211227110459/https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-resurrects-battalion-tactical-groups/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Russo-Ukrainian War===
Russia conducted a military buildup on the Ukrainian border starting in late 2021. By mid February 2022, elements of the [[29th Combined Arms Army|29th]], [[35th Combined Arms Army|35th]] and [[36th Combined Arms Army|36th]] Combined Arms Armies (CAAs) were deployed to [[Belarus]],<ref>{{Cite web|url = https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-hybrid-threats-report-troops-arrive-in-belarus-as-propaganda-narratives-heat-up/|title = Russian Hybrid Threats Report: Troops arrive in Belarus as propaganda narratives heat up|date = 21 January 2022|access-date = 12 February 2022|archive-date = 12 February 2022|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220212173452/https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-hybrid-threats-report-troops-arrive-in-belarus-as-propaganda-narratives-heat-up/|url-status = live}}</ref> supported by additional S-400 systems, a squadron of Su-25 and a squadron of Su-35; additional S-400 systems and four Su-30 fighters were deployed to the country for joint use with Belarus. Russia also had the 20th and 8th CAAs and the 22nd AC regularly deployed near the Ukrainian border, while elements of 41st CAA were deployed to [[Yelnya, Yelninsky District, Smolensk Oblast|Yelnya]], elements of 1st TA and 6th CAA were deployed to [[Voronezh Oblast|Voronezh]]<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000017d-a0bd-dca7-a1fd-b1bd6cb10000 |title=Russia builds up forces on Ukrainian border |author=<!--Not stated--> |date=9 December 2021 |website=Politico |publisher=Jane’s Group UK Limited |access-date=8 August 2024 |quote= |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211210003833/https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000017d-a0bd-dca7-a1fd-b1bd6cb10000 |archive-date=10 December 2021}}</ref> and elements of the 49th<ref>{{Cite web|url = https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-ukraine-crisis-putin-troops-visual-guide-explainer|title = Russia-Ukraine crisis: Where are Putin's troops and what are his options?|website = [[TheGuardian.com]]|date = 14 February 2022|access-date = 12 February 2022|archive-date = 27 December 2021|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211227054403/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-ukraine-crisis-putin-troops-visual-guide-explainer|url-status = live}}</ref> and the 58th CAA were deployed to [[Crimea]]. In all, Russia deployed some 150,000 soldiers around Ukraine during this time, in preparation for the eventual Russian invasion.

On 11 February, the US and western nations communicated that Putin had decided to invade Ukraine, and on 12 February, the US and Russian embassies in Kyiv started to evacuate personnel.<ref>{{cite tweet|number=1492201860794662923|user=AliRogin|title=BIG Ukraine news: @nickschifrin reports: The US believes Russian President Vladimir Putin has decided to invade Ukr…|date=11 February 2022}}; {{Cite web|url = https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-states-europe-russia-kyiv-ff41abf90650aa5f456cbb6aafa4c5b3|title = US evacuating most Ukraine embassy staff over invasion fears|website = [[Associated Press]]|date = 12 February 2022|access-date = 12 February 2022|archive-date = 28 February 2022|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220228215321/https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-states-europe-russia-kyiv-ff41abf90650aa5f456cbb6aafa4c5b3|url-status = live}}</ref> On 24 February, Russian troops began [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine|invading Ukraine]].<ref name="aljazeera.com">{{Cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2022/2/24/photos-russia-launches-full-scale-invasion-in-ukraine|title=Photos: Russia launches 'full-scale invasion' in Ukraine|access-date=24 February 2022|archive-date=24 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220224072114/https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2022/2/24/photos-russia-launches-full-scale-invasion-in-ukraine|url-status=live}}</ref>

During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian tank losses were reported as a consequence of the Ukrainian use of sophisticated anti-tank weapons and a lack of air support. The Russian army has been described by Phillips O'Brien, a professor of strategic studies at [[St Andrews University]] as "a boxer who has a great right hook and a glass jaw."<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61021388 |title=Ukraine conflict: Why is Russia losing so many tanks? |publisher=[[BBC]] |date=12 April 2022 |access-date=12 April 2022 |archive-date=12 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220412101206/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61021388 |url-status=live }}</ref> Quoting [[Napoleon]] "In war, moral power is to physical as three parts out of four." Retired US four-star general [[Curtis Scaparrotti]] has blamed confusion and poor morale amongst Russian soldiers over their mission as to their poor performance.<ref>{{Cite web|url = https://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-everything-210243552.html|title = 'Give Ukraine everything they say they need'|publisher = [[BBC]]|date = 13 April 2022|access-date = 14 April 2022|archive-date = 14 April 2022|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220414014119/https://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-everything-210243552.html|url-status = live}}</ref>

Due to the fighting in Ukraine the [[2022 Moscow Victory Day Parade]] was to be reduced by some 35%, purely in ground combat vehicles or systems. The parade on 9 May 2022, according to the official guide, would feature only 25 combat systems and 131 ground combat vehicles, compared to 2021 where it featured 198 vehicles and 35 combat systems. In particular there was a shortage of display ready T-80 tanks and Russia used older equipment to make up numbers. An example is usage of tank transporters in lieu of actual tanks.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2022/05/02/russian-victory-day-parade-cut-by-35-emphasizing-ukraines-battlefield-prowess/?sh=4e6401863485|title=Russian Victory Day Parade Cut By 35%, Emphasizing Ukraine's Battlefield Prowess|website=[[Forbes]]|date=2 May 2022|access-date=3 May 2022|archive-date=3 May 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220503042324/https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2022/05/02/russian-victory-day-parade-cut-by-35-emphasizing-ukraines-battlefield-prowess/?sh=4e6401863485|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=17 April 2022 |title=Russia-Ukraine war: Sanctions cripple Russia's tank production - GUR |url=https://www.jpost.com/international/article-704376 |access-date=3 May 2022 |archive-date=3 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220503062702/https://www.jpost.com/international/article-704376 |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2023 the trend accelerated; only a single World War II-vintage tank was at the parade. As of 6 May, [[List of Russian generals killed during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine|at least 12 generals have been killed in Ukraine]], according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence. This "suggests that the generals need to be at the front lines to ensure that their troops are conducting the battle plan in the way that they want. But that also suggests a lack of confidence in their troops if they need to be that far forward with that many senior folks."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://abcnews.go.com/International/russia-suffered-loss-extraordinary-number-generals/story?id=84545931|title=Why Russia has suffered the loss of an 'extraordinary' number of generals|website=ABCNews|date=8 May 2022|access-date=31 May 2022|archive-date=31 May 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220531000204/https://abcnews.go.com/International/russia-suffered-loss-extraordinary-number-generals/story?id=84545931|url-status=live}}</ref> Ukraine further claims that some 317 officers have been killed, a third of whom are senior command staff.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/06/high-death-toll-of-russian-generals-in-ukraine-a-blow-to-military-capability-a77609|title=High Death Toll of Russian Generals in Ukraine a Blow to Military Capability|website=The Moscow Times|date=6 May 2022|access-date=31 May 2022|archive-date=3 June 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220603120948/https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/06/high-death-toll-of-russian-generals-in-ukraine-a-blow-to-military-capability-a77609|url-status=live}}</ref> In a tweet the [[UK MoD]] said that the Russian officer corps was suffering "devastating losses" particularly in the junior to mid officer ranks.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://inews.co.uk/news/world/russian-army-devastating-losses-junior-officers-1658085|title=Russian army suffering devastating losses of junior officers in war in Ukraine, MoD claims|website=News.co.uk|date=30 May 2022|access-date=31 May 2022|archive-date=31 May 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220531005854/https://inews.co.uk/news/world/russian-army-devastating-losses-junior-officers-1658085|url-status=live}}</ref> United States officials estimated that Russian forces had lost 150,000+ killed and wounded from 24 February 2022 – 21 January 2023.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/video/staggering-toll-ukraine-war-focus-96587955 |title=Video The staggering toll of Ukraine war comes into focus |website=[[ABC News (United States)|ABC News]] |access-date=22 February 2023 |archive-date=25 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230125152229/https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/video/staggering-toll-ukraine-war-focus-96587955 |url-status=live }}</ref> In stark contrast, the Russian Defence Minister said that only 5,937 personnel from the entire Russian Armed Forces had been killed from 24 February – 21 September 2022, the first seven months of fighting.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Defence Minister Says 5,937 Russian Soldiers Killed In Ukraine |agency=[[Associated Press]] |url=https://www.barrons.com/news/defence-minister-says-5-937-russian-soldiers-killed-in-ukraine-01663743607?refsec=topics_afp-news |access-date=21 September 2022 |archive-date=22 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220922132853/https://www.barrons.com/news/defence-minister-says-5-937-russian-soldiers-killed-in-ukraine-01663743607?refsec=topics_afp-news |url-status=live }}</ref> Reported figures from Donetsk and Luhansk would add some 22,000 to this figure.

After 14 months of fighting, Russian forces are estimated to have lost over 2,000 tanks, struggling to replace its tank losses due to sanctions by Europe and the United States. This has caused Russia to compensate by instead of using imported goods, using locally made equipment deemed less efficient, and reactivating tanks from the 1950s and 1960s.{{sfn|Bergmann|Snegovaya|Dolbaia|Fenton|2023|pages=13-14}}

On 14 February 2023, British defence secretary [[Ben Wallace (politician)|Ben Wallace]] told the BBC that 97% of the Russian ground forces were now committed to the war in Ukraine.<ref>Isabel Coles and David Luhnow, "Russia Has Deployed 97% of Army in Ukraine but Is Struggling to Advance, U.K. Says" ''Wall Street Journal'' (15 Feb 2023).</ref> Three months afterwards, Russia did not display a single modern tank for the [[2023 Moscow Victory Day Parade]].

In February 2023, launching the 2023 Military Balance, the IISS estimated Ground Forces numbers had climbed to an estimated 550,000, including an estimated 100,000 conscripts and up to 300,000 mobilized personnel.{{sfn|IISS|2023|page=184}} This number should be set against the Central Intelligence Agency's estimate of 300,000 active duty before February 2022.<ref>{{cite web |author=Central Intelligence Agency |work=World Fact Book |title=Russia |date=12 October 2022 |url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012173411/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/ |archive-date=12 October 2022 }}</ref>

In October 2023, it was reported that there was a growth of mutinies among Russian troops due to large amount of losses in offensives around [[Avdiivka]] with a lack of artillery, food, water and poor command also being reported.<ref name="Cole 2023 r879">{{cite web | last=Cole | first=Brendan | title=Mutiny is brewing in the Russian army | website=Newsweek | date=26 October 2023 | url=https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-avdiivka-astra-army-1838107 | access-date=26 October 2023}}</ref>