Editing SWAT (section)

== History ==
=== Riots and political conflicts of the 1960s ===
<!-- Please don't enter any material without citations, sources, or references. We have a lot of anonymous editors adding apparent original research to the text. -->
[[File:Seal of LAPD Special Weapons and Tactics.svg|thumb|The [[LAPD Metropolitan Division#D Platoon (SWAT)|LAPD Metropolitan Division's "D" Platoon]] is one of the world's most prominent SWAT units and was the second SWAT team established in the United States, after that of the [[Philadelphia Police Department]] in 1964.<ref name="Mitchel P. Roth 2001, p. 333">Mitchel P. Roth & James Stuart Olson, ''Historical Dictionary of Law Enforcement'', Westport, Ct: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001, p. 333 and; John S. Dempsey & Linda S. Forst, ''An Introduction to Policing'', Clifton Park, NY: Delmar Cengage Learning, 2011, p. 276.</ref>]]

According to the ''Historical Dictionary of Law Enforcement'', the term "SWAT" was used as an acronym for the "Special Weapons and Tactics" established as a 100-man specialized unit in 1964 by the [[Philadelphia Police Department]] in response to an alarming increase in [[bank robbery|bank robberies]]. The purpose of this unit was to react quickly and decisively to bank robberies while they were in progress, using a large number of specially trained officers who had a great amount of firepower at their disposal. The tactic worked and was used to resolve other types of incidents involving heavily armed criminals.<ref name="Mitchel P. Roth 2001, p. 333" /><ref>{{cite book
| title      = Crime and Punishment: A History of the Criminal Justice System
| author     = Mitchel P. Roth
| pages      = 283
| date       = June 2, 2010
| publisher  = Cengage Learning; 2 edition
}}</ref> The [[Los Angeles Police Department]] (LAPD) [[LAPD Metropolitan Division#History of LAPD SWAT|Special Weapons and Tactics]] was established in 1967.<ref>{{cite web |title=S.W.A.T. |url=http://www.lapdonline.org/metropolitan_division/content_basic_view/848 |website=Los Angeles Police Department |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200221083432/http://www.lapdonline.org/metropolitan_division/content_basic_view/848 |archive-date=21 February 2020 |url-status=dead}}</ref> LAPD inspector [[Daryl Gates]] envisioned the "SWAT" acronym to be "Special Weapons Attack Team" but this was not accepted by deputy chief [[Edward M. Davis]] who instead approved Special Weapons and Tactics.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Gates |first1=Daryl F. |last2=Shah|first2=Diane K. |title=Chief : my life in the L.A.P.D. |date=1992 |publisher=Bantam Books |location=New York |isbn=055307301X |page=114}}</ref> 

The LAPD promoted what became known as SWAT teams for a variety of reasons. After the racially-charged [[Watts riots]] in [[Los Angeles]] in August 1965, the LAPD began considering tactics it could use when faced with urban unrest, rioting, or widespread violence. Daryl Gates, who led the LAPD response to the riots, would later write that police at the time did not face a single mob, but rather "people attacking from all directions".<ref name=warriorcop>{{cite book| last1= Balko| first1= Radley| title= Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America's Police Forces| date= 2013| publisher= PublicAffairs| url= https://books.google.com/books?id=vTkTTIF1IpUC| access-date = November 30, 2014| isbn = 9781610392129}}</ref> [[New York University]] professor [[Christian Parenti]] has written that SWAT teams were originally conceived of as an "urban [[counterinsurgency]] bulwark".<ref name=parenti>{{cite book
| last1     = Parenti
| first1     = Christian
| title     = Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis
| date     = 2000
| publisher     = Verso
| isbn     = 978-1-85984-303-1
| url-access     = registration
| url     = https://archive.org/details/lockdownamericap00pare
}}</ref>{{rp|112}}

Another reason for the creation of SWAT teams was the fear of lone or barricaded gunmen who might outperform police in a shootout, as happened in Austin with [[Charles Whitman]].<ref name=warriorcop />

After the LAPD's establishment of its own SWAT team, many [[law enforcement in the United States|law enforcement agencies in United States]] established their own specialized units under various names. Gates explained in his autobiography ''[[Chief: My Life in the LAPD]]'' that he neither developed SWAT tactics nor the associated and often distinctive equipment; but that he supported the underlying concept, tried to empower his people to develop it, and generally lent them moral support.<ref name="SWAT01" /><ref>{{cite web
| url        = http://www.lapdonline.org/metropolitan_division/content_basic_view/849
| title      = Development of SWAT
| access-date = June 19, 2006
| publisher  = Los Angeles Police Department
}}</ref>

SWAT-type operations were conducted north of Los Angeles in the farming community of [[Delano, California]] on the border between [[Kern County, California|Kern]] and [[Tulare County, California|Tulare]] Counties in the [[San Joaquin Valley]]. At the time, the [[United Farm Workers]] union led by [[César Chavez]] was staging [[Delano grape strike|numerous protests]] in Delano in a strike that would last over five years from 1965 to 1970.<ref name=warriorcop /> Though the strike never turned violent, the [[Delano Police Department]] responded by forming ad-hoc SWAT-type units involving crowd and riot control, sniper skills, and surveillance.<ref name=warriorcop /> Television news stations and print media carried live and delayed reportage of these events across the United States. Personnel from the LAPD, having seen these broadcasts, contacted Delano and inquired about the program. One officer then obtained permission to observe the Delano Police Department's special weapons and tactics units in action, and afterwards, he took what he had learned back to Los Angeles, where his knowledge was used and expanded on to form the LAPD's own first SWAT unit.

[[John Nelson (police officer)|John Nelson]] was the officer who conceived the idea to form a specially trained and equipped unit in the LAPD, intended to respond to and manage critical situations involving shootings while minimizing police casualties. Inspector Gates approved this idea, and he formed a small select group of volunteer officers. This first SWAT unit initially consisted of fifteen teams of four men each, making a total staff of sixty. These officers were given special status and benefits, and were required to attend special monthly training sessions. The unit also served as a security unit for police facilities during civil unrest. The [[LAPD Metropolitan Division#D Platoon (SWAT)|LAPD SWAT]] units were organized as "D Platoon" in the Metro division.<ref name="SWAT01">{{cite web
| url        = http://www.lapdonline.org/metropolitan_division/content_basic_view/849
| title      = Development of SWAT
| publisher  = Los Angeles Police Department
| access-date = June 19, 2006
}}</ref>

Early police powers and tactics used by SWAT teams were aided by legislation passed in 1967–68 with the help of [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican]] [[United States House of Representatives|House representative]] [[Donald Santarelli]]. The legislation was promoted within the context of fears over the [[civil rights movement]], [[mass racial violence in the United States|race riots]], the [[Black Panther Party]], and the emerging [[War on drugs|War on Drugs]].<ref name=warriorcop />

The first significant deployment of the LAPD SWAT was on December&nbsp;9, 1969, when an attempt by the LAPD to serve arrest warrants against the Black Panthers led to a four-hour standoff at their Los Angeles headquarters at 41st and Central, during which over 5,000 rounds were exchanged between police and the Panthers. During the shootout, Daryl Gates called the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]], requesting and receiving permission to use a [[grenade launcher]]; however, it was never actually used. The Panthers eventually surrendered, with four Panthers and four officers being injured. All six arrested Panthers were acquitted of the most serious charges brought against them, including conspiracy to murder police officers, because it was ruled that they acted in self-defense.<ref name=warriorcop />

By 1974, there was a general acceptance of SWAT as a police resource in Los Angeles.

==== 1974 Symbionese Liberation Army shootout ====
On the afternoon of May 17, 1974, elements of the [[Symbionese Liberation Army]] (SLA), a group of heavily armed [[left-wing politics|left-wing]] [[Left-wing terrorism|guerrillas]], barricaded themselves in a residence on East 54th Street at Compton Avenue in Los Angeles. Coverage of the siege was broadcast to millions via television and radio and featured in the world press for days afterwards. SWAT teams engaged in a several-hour gun battle with the SLA; no police were wounded, but the six SLA members died in the conflict, which ended when the house caught fire and burned to the ground.

By the time of the SLA shootout, SWAT teams had reorganized into six 10-man teams, each team being divided further into two five-man units, called elements. An element consisted of an element leader, two assaulters, a scout, and a rear-guard. The normal complement of weapons was a sniper rifle (a [[.243]]-caliber [[bolt action|bolt-action]], based on the ordnance expended by officers at the shootout), two [[.223]]-caliber semi-automatic rifles, and two shotguns. SWAT officers also carried their service revolvers in shoulder holsters. Standard gear included a [[first aid kit]], gloves, and a [[military gas mask]]. At a time when officers were usually issued six-shot revolvers and shotguns, it was a significant change to have police armed with semi-automatic rifles. The encounter with the heavily armed Symbionese Liberation Army, however, sparked a trend towards SWAT teams being issued [[Bulletproof vest|body armor]] and automatic weapons of various types.

A report issued by the LAPD after the SLA shootout offers one of the few firsthand accounts by the department regarding SWAT history, operations, and organization. On page 100 of the report, the department cites four trends which prompted the development of SWAT. These included riots such as the [[Watts riots]], which in the 1960s forced the LAPD and other police departments into tactical situations for which they were ill-prepared; the emergence of snipers as a challenge to civil order; political assassinations; and the threat of urban [[guerrilla warfare]] by militant groups. "The unpredictability of the sniper and his anticipation of normal police response increase the chances of death or injury to officers. To commit conventionally trained officers to a confrontation with a guerrilla-trained militant group would likely result in a high number of casualties among the officers and the escape of the guerrillas." To deal with these under conditions of urban violence, the LAPD formed SWAT, notes the report. The report states on page 109, "The purpose of SWAT is to provide protection, support, security, firepower, and rescue to police operations in high personal risk situations where specialized tactics are necessary to minimize casualties."<ref name="SWAT02">{{cite web
| url         = http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/soliah/docs/lapdreport.pdf
| title       = Report following the SLA Shoot-out (PDF)
| publisher   = Los Angeles Police Department
| access-date  = July 4, 2008
| url-status     = dead
| archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20120226115805/http://www.trutv.com/newname.html
| archive-date = February 26, 2012
}}</ref>

=== The War on Drugs: 1980s and 1990s ===
[[File:Members of the 60th Security Police Squadron's Base Swat Team.jpg|thumb|[[USAF Security Forces]] SWAT officers during a training exercise at [[Travis Air Force Base]] in 1995]]
In 1981 [[United States Congress|U.S. Congress]] passed the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act, giving police access to military intelligence, infrastructure, and weaponry in the fight against drugs. [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] subsequently declared drugs to be a threat to U.S. national security.<ref name="alexander" />{{rp|76–77}} In 1988 the Reagan administration encouraged Congress to create the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Program. The program modified existing federal aid structures to local police, making it easier to transfer money and equipment to fight the War on Drugs. Police forces also received increased assistance from the [[Drug Enforcement Administration|DEA]]. The money resulted in the creation of many narcotics task forces, and SWAT teams became an important part of these forces.<ref name="alexander">{{cite book
| last1     = Alexander
| first1    = Michelle
| title     = The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
| date      = 2013
| publisher = The New Press
| isbn      = 978-1-59558-819-7
| title-link = The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
}}</ref>{{rp|73–75}}

In 1972, paramilitary police units launched a few hundred drug raids annually within the United States. In the early 1980s, SWAT drug raid numbers increased to 3000 annually, and by 1996, 30,000 raids annually.<ref name="alexander" />{{rp|73–75}} During the 1990s, according to ''[[The Capital Times]]'' in [[Madison, Wisconsin]], weapons donations from the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] greatly bolstered the number of SWAT teams and the extent of their operations. The paper reported that the military transferred nearly 100,000 pieces of military equipment to Wisconsin police departments in the 1990s.<ref name="alexander" />{{rp|77}}

[[Criminal justice]] professors Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler, in their study ''Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units'', surveyed police departments nationwide and found that their deployment of paramilitary units had grown tenfold between the early 1980s and late 1990s.<ref name=Kraska>{{cite journal
| last      = Kraska
| first     = Peter B.
| author2   = Victor E. Kaeppler
| date      = Feb 1997
| title     = Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units
| journal   = Social Problems
| volume    = 44
| issue     = 1
| pages     = 1–18
| publisher = University of California Press
| jstor     = 3096870
| doi       = 10.1525/sp.1997.44.1.03x0209a
}}</ref>

==== Columbine shooting ====
{{further|Columbine effect}}
The [[Columbine High School massacre]] in Colorado on April&nbsp;20, 1999 was another seminal event in SWAT tactics and police response. As perpetrators [[Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold]] were shooting students and staff inside the school, officers did not intervene in the shooting, but instead set a perimeter as they were trained to do. By the time they did enter the school, 12 people were killed and Harris and Klebold had committed suicide. They were also heavily criticized for not saving teacher Dave Sanders, who had died from [[Bleeding#Blood loss|blood loss]], three hours after the SWAT first entered the school.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.westword.com/news/swat-leaders-defense-of-columbine-response-too-little-much-too-late-8028541 | title=SWAT Leader's Defense of Columbine Response: Too Little, Much Too Late| date=June 22, 2016}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.acolumbinesite.com/victim/sanders.php|title=Coach William "Dave" Sanders}}</ref> As noted in an article in the ''[[The Christian Science Monitor|Christian Science Monitor]]'', "Instead of being taught to wait for the SWAT team to arrive, street officers are receiving the training and weaponry to take immediate action during incidents that clearly involve suspects' use of deadly force."<ref name="SWAT03">{{cite web
| url         = http://csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/durableRedirect.pl?/durable/2000/05/31/fp2s2-csm.shtml
| title       = Report following the Columbine High School Massacre
| work        = The Christian Science Monitor
| access-date  = June 19, 2006
| archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20050904193551/http://csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/durableRedirect.pl?%2Fdurable%2F2000%2F05%2F31%2Ffp2s2-csm.shtml
| archive-date = September 4, 2005
| url-status     = dead
}}</ref> The article further reported that street officers were increasingly being armed with rifles, and issued heavy body armor and ballistic helmets, items traditionally associated with SWAT units. The idea was to train and equip street officers to make a rapid response to so-called [[active shooter]] situations. In these situations, it was no longer acceptable to simply set up a perimeter and wait for SWAT. As an example, in the policy and procedure manual of the [[Minneapolis Police Department]], it is stated, "MPD personnel shall remain cognizant of the fact that in many active shooter incidents, innocent lives are lost within the first few minutes of the incident. In some situations, this dictates the need to rapidly assess the situation and act quickly in order to save lives."<ref name="SWAT04">{{cite web
| url        = http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/mpdpolicy/7-900/7-900.asp#P94_7168
| title        = Policy & Procedure Manual
| publisher        = Minneapolis, Minnesota, Police Department
| access-date        = June 19, 2006
| archive-date        = July 25, 2006
| archive-url        = https://web.archive.org/web/20060725004357/http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/mpdpolicy/7-900/7-900.asp#P94_7168
| url-status        = dead
}}</ref>

=== Post-9/11 and the War on Terror ===
According to criminal justice professor Cyndi Banks, the [[War on Terror]], like the War on Drugs, became the context of a significant expansion of SWAT policing.<ref name="banks">{{cite book
| last1     = Banks
| first1    = Cyndi
| title     = Criminal Justice Ethics: Theory and Practice
| date      = 2016
| publisher = SAGE Publications
| isbn      = 978-1-5063-2604-7
}}</ref> Whereas some have attributed this expansion to "mission creep" and the [[militarization of police]], other scholars argue that increased SWAT policing is a response to real or perceived [[moral panic]]s associated with fear of crime and terrorism. Banks writes that SWAT team employment of military veterans has influenced their tactics and perspective.<ref name="banks" />{{rp|33–39}}

Countering the view that post-9/11 SWAT policing represents the militarization of police forces, scholar den Heyer writes that SWAT policing is part of a natural progression towards police professionalization. Den Heyer also argues that while SWAT teams continue to be deployed to execute large numbers of drug warrants, this is a rational use of available police resources.<ref name="banks" />{{rp|39}} Other defenders of SWAT deployments state that police have every reason to minimize risks to themselves during raids.<ref name="banks" />{{rp|39}}

By 2005, the number of yearly SWAT deployments in the United States had increased to 50,000,<ref name="lippman">{{cite book
| last1     = Lippman
| first1    = Matthew
| title     = Criminal Procedure
| date      = 2013
| publisher = SAGE
| isbn      = 978-1-4522-5814-0
}}</ref>{{rp|183–4}}<ref name="fisher">{{cite book
| last1     = Fisher
| first1    = James
| title     = SWAT Madness and the Militarization of the American Police: A National Dilemma
| date      = 2010
| publisher = ABC CLIO
| isbn      = 978-0-313-39191-0
}}</ref>{{rp|13–14}} most often to serve drug-related warrants in private homes.<ref name="banks" /><ref name="gaines">{{cite book
| last1     = Gaines
| first1    = Larry
| last2     = Miller
| first2    = Roger LeRoy
| title     = Criminal Justice in Action
| date      = 2016
| publisher = Cengage Learning
| isbn      = 978-1-305-85497-0
}}</ref>{{rp|205}} According to a study by the [[American Civil Liberties Union|ACLU]], just under 80% of SWAT deployments were used to serve arrest warrants.<ref name="stamper">{{cite book
| last1     = Stamper
| first1    = Norm
| title     = To Protect and Serve: How to Fix America's Police
| date      = 2016
| publisher = Nation Books
| isbn      = 978-1-56858-541-3
}}</ref>

Officers have cited safety as the main reason for use of SWAT teams, stating that SWAT units would frequently be called if there were a possibility a suspect might be armed. For instance, in 2006, only two police officers were killed in the arrest of 2 million drug suspects, a low casualty rate possibly stemming from the military equipment and tactics used in the raids.<ref name="fisher" />{{rp|13–14}}

On February 7, 2008, a siege and subsequent firefight with a shooter in the [[Winnetka, California|Winnetka]] neighborhood of Los Angeles led to the first line-of-duty death of a member of the LAPD's SWAT team in its 41 years of existence.<ref>{{cite news
| url         = http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-fivedead9feb09,1,5439551.story?ctrack=1&cset=true
| title       = Siege in Winnetka, California
| newspaper   = Los Angeles Times
| date        = February 9, 2008
| access-date  = June 5, 2009
| url-status     = dead
| archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20090115134112/http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-fivedead9feb09,1,5439551.story?ctrack=1&cset=true
| archive-date = January 15, 2009
}}</ref>

[[Radley Balko]], an analyst for the [[Libertarianism|libertarian]] [[Cato Institute]], argued in his book ''Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America'' that increased SWAT raids have made [[No-knock warrant|no-knock raids]], and danger to innocents and suspects, far greater.<ref>Radley Balko, [http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,193652,00.html "In Virginia, the Death Penalty for Gambling"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110615051217/http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,193652,00.html |date=June 15, 2011 }}, Fox News Channel, May 1, 2006</ref> Another study, ''Warrior Cops: The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism in American Police Departments'' by Diane Cecilia Weber, also of the Cato Institute, raised concern about the increasing use of SWAT teams for ordinary policing tasks.<ref>{{cite web
| url        = http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-050es.html
| title      = Warrior Cops The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism in American Police Departments
| publisher  = Cato.org
| date       = August 26, 1999
| access-date = June 19, 2012
}}</ref>