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Shapley value
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=== In terms of synergy === [[File:Shapley Value Venn Diagram.jpg|thumb|Venn Diagram displaying synergies for Shapley values]] [[File:Shapley Value Synergy Division Venn Diagram.jpg|thumb|Venn Diagram of the division of synergies that sum to the Shapley Value]] From the characteristic function <math>v</math> one can compute the ''synergy'' that each group of players provides. The synergy is the unique function <math> w \colon 2^N \to \mathbb{R} </math>, such that : <math>v(S) = \sum_{R \subseteq S } w(R) </math> for any subset <math>S \subseteq N </math> of players. In other words, the 'total value' of the coalition <math>S</math> comes from summing up the ''synergies'' of each possible subset of <math>S</math>. Given a characteristic function <math>v</math>, the synergy function <math>w</math> is calculated via : <math>w(S) = \sum_{R \subseteq S } (-1)^{|S| - |R|} v(R) </math> using the [[Inclusion-exclusion principle#Other forms|Inclusion exclusion principle]]. In other words, the synergy of coalition <math>S</math> is the value <math>v(S)</math> , which is not already accounted for by its subsets. The Shapley values are given in terms of the synergy function by<ref name="Grabisch Representations">{{Cite journal|last=Grabisch|first=Michel|date=October 1997|title=Alternative Representations of Discrete Fuzzy Measures for Decision Making|journal=International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems|language=en-US|volume=5|issue=5|pages=587β607|doi=10.1142/S0218488597000440|issn=0218-4885}}</ref><ref name="Grabisch Representations 2">{{cite journal |last1=Grabisch |first1=Michel |title=k-order additive discrete fuzzy measures and their representation |journal=Fuzzy Sets and Systems |date=1 December 1997 |volume=92 |issue=2 |pages=167β189 |doi=10.1016/S0165-0114(97)00168-1|issn=0165-0114}}</ref> : <math>\varphi_i(v) = \sum_{i \in S \subseteq N } \frac{w(S)}{|S|} </math> where the sum is over all subsets <math>S</math> of <math>N</math> that include player <math>i</math>. This can be interpreted as : <math>\varphi_i(v) = \sum_{\text{coalitions including i}} \frac{\text{synergy of the coalition}}{\text{number of members in the coalition}} </math> In other words, the synergy of each coalition is divided equally between all members. This can be interpreted visually with a [[Venn Diagram]]. In the first example diagram above, each region has been labeled with the synergy bonus of the corresponding coalition. The total value produced by a coalition is the sum of synergy bonuses of the composing subcoalitions - in the example, the coalition of the players labeled "You" and "Emma" would produce a profit of <math> 30+20+40=90 </math> dollars, as compared to their individual profits of <math> 30 </math> and <math> 20 </math> dollars respectively. The synergies are then split equally among each member of the subcoalition that contributes that synergy - as displayed in the second diagram.
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