Editing Strategic voting (section)

==Frequency and susceptibility==

Strategic voting is highly dependent on the voting method being used. A strategic vote which improves a voter's satisfaction under one method could have no effect or be outright self-defeating under another method. [[Gibbard's theorem]] shows that no deterministic single-winner voting method can be completely immune to strategy, but makes no claims about the severity of strategy or how often strategy succeeds.

Later results show that some methods are more manipulable than others.<ref name="Armytage-SVN" /><ref name="Durand MCN">{{cite arXiv |last1=Durand |first1=François |title=On the Manipulability of Voting Systems: Application to Multi-Carrier Networks |date=2012-04-29 |eprint=1204.6455 |class=cs.NI |last2=Mathieu |first2=Fabien |last3=Noirie |first3=Ludovic}}</ref>

[[Michel Balinski]] and Rida Laraki, the inventors of the [[majority judgment]] method, performed an initial investigation of this question using a set of [[Monte Carlo method|Monte Carlo]] simulated elections based on the results from a poll of the [[2007 French presidential election]] which they had carried out using rated ballots. Comparing [[range voting]], [[Borda count]], [[plurality voting]], [[approval voting]] with two different absolute approval thresholds, [[Condorcet voting]], and [[majority judgment]], they found that range voting had the highest (worst) strategic vulnerability, while their own method majority judgment had the lowest (best).<ref name="auto2">{{cite book |last1=Balinski |first1=Michel |title=In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform |last2=Laraki |first2=Rida |year=2011 |isbn=978-1-4419-7538-6 |series=Studies in Public Choice |volume=25 |pages=13–54 |chapter=Election by Majority Judgment: Experimental Evidence |doi=10.1007/978-1-4419-7539-3_2}}</ref> Further investigation would be needed to be sure that this result remained true with different sets of candidates. 

[[Electoral list|Party-list proportional]] methods typically show less strategic voting,<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Shikano |first1=Susumu |last2=Herrmann |first2=Michael |last3=Thurner |first3=Paul W. |year=2009 |title=Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation: Threshold Insurance in German Elections |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380902779147 |journal=West European Politics |volume=32 |issue=3 |pages=634–656 |doi=10.1080/01402380902779147 |s2cid=154800908}}</ref> although the existence of electoral thresholds can lead voters to vote strategically to avoid [[Wasted vote|wasted votes]].<ref name="v742">{{cite journal | last=Jenssen | first=Anders Todal | title=Tactical Voting in Norway: Context, Motives and Occurrence | journal=Scandinavian Political Studies | volume=39 | issue=1 | date=2016 | issn=0080-6757 | doi=10.1111/1467-9477.12057 | pages=22–51 |quote=Of the voters in the survey, 18.3 percent reported casting a tactically motivated vote. The 4 percent threshold on the distribution of compensatory seats, the competition for the last district seats and the composition of government coalitions triggered tactical voting.}}</ref>