Editing Subjectivism (section)

=== Modern versions ===
Recently, more modest versions of metaphysical subjectivism have been explored. For example, I might hold that it is a ''fact'' that chocolate is tasty, even though I recognize that it is not tasty to everyone. This would imply that there are facts that are ''subjective''. (Analogously, one might hold that it is a fact that it is winter in the Northern Hemisphere, even though this is not always the case, implying that some facts are ''temporary''.) Giovanni Merlo has developed a specific version of metaphysical subjectivism, under which subjective facts always concern ''mental'' properties.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Merlo|first=Giovanni|title=Subjectivism and the Mental|journal=Dialectica|year=2016|volume=70|issue=3|pages=311–342|doi=10.1111/1746-8361.12153}}</ref> With Giulia Pravato, he has argued that his version of subjectivism provides a natural way to be both a [[Philosophical realism|realist]] and a [[Relativism|relativist]] about, for example, the proposition that chocolate is tasty—it is part of reality (a subjective fact) that chocolate is tasty, but that doesn't mean it's necessarily true from another's point of view.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Merlo|first1=Giovanni|last2=Pravato|first2=Giulia|title=Relativism, realism, and subjective facts|journal=Synthese|year=2020|volume=198|issue=9|pages=8149–8165|doi=10.1007/s11229-020-02562-x|s2cid=211053829|url=https://philarchive.org/rec/MERRRA-2 }}</ref> [[Caspar John Hare|Caspar Hare]]'s theory of [[egocentric presentism]] is another, closely related example.