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Subutai
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==As a general== Subutai was a major innovator in the art of war. In the invasions of China, Russia, and Europe, Subutai routinely coordinated large forces often separated by large distances. Subutai's maneuvers were designed to mislead his foes and strike them from unexpected directions. The Mongol invasion of the Jin in 1232 continually pulled the hitherto successful Jin forces apart despite their highly advantageous terrain, as they could not determine which Mongol armies were the feints and which were the true threats until their main army became isolated and starved. Strongly fortified locations would be bypassed and ignored until all organized resistance had been destroyed. Sieges would be limited to critical or vulnerable locations; in other situations, the Mongols either left a blockading force, or simply ignored fortified citadels and [[Scorched earth|destroyed the surrounding agriculture]] so that the remaining people would starve if they remained within fortified walls.<ref>Gabriel, Chapter 8; Carl Svedrup, Sube`etei Ba`atur, Anonymous Strategist.</ref> In contrast to the common perception of steppe horse archer armies slowly weakening their foes with arrows for many hours or even days, such as at the [[battle of Carrhae]] or the [[battle of Manzikert]], Subutai fought in a much more decisive and fluid manner where heavy firepower was used to create openings for rapid cavalry charges with deep formations. At the [[battle of the Kalka River]] in 1223, Subutai's 20,000 man army routed the 80,000 man Russian army by stringing it out after a 9-day retreat, and then immediately turning and delivering a decisive charge without a prolonged missile bombardment. The vanguard of the Russian army was already put in flight before the second wave even reached the battlefield and began to deploy.<ref>Chris Peers, the Mongol War Machine (2015), 157β159.</ref> Subutai was one of the first Mongol generals, alongside Genghis Khan, who realized the value of engineers in [[siege warfare]]. Even in field battles he made use of [[siege engine]]s. In the [[Battle of Mohi]], the Hungarian crossbowmen repelled a night bridge crossing by the Mongols, and inflicted considerable casualties on the Mongols fighting to cross the river the following day. Subutai ordered huge [[Lithobolos|stonethrowers]] to clear the bank of Hungarian crossbowmen and open the way for his light cavalry to cross the river without further losses. This use of siege weapons was one of the first recorded uses of artillery bombardments against the enemy army to disrupt their resistance while simultaneously attacking them. In execution, his usage functioned more akin to the [[Barrage (artillery)|creeping barrage]] of World War I, used to soften and disrupt enemy lines right before an attack.<ref>Timothy May, the Mongol Art of War.</ref> Like Genghis Khan, Subutai was a master at creating divisions within the enemy ranks and surprising them. The terrifying Mongol reputation, combined with highly effective spy networks that spread discord, as well as incentives to key local leaders, prevented his opponents from effectively uniting and fighting at their full capacity.
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