Editing Timor-Leste Defence Force (section)

== History ==

{{See also|History of Timor-Leste}}

=== Pre-independence ===

The F-FDTL was formed from the national liberation movement [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla army]] known as [[FALINTIL]] ([[Portuguese language|Portuguese]] [[acronym]] for ''Forças Armadas de Libertação de Timor-Leste'' or Armed Forces for the Liberation of Timor-Leste). During the period before 1999 some East Timorese leaders, including the current President [[José Ramos-Horta]], proposed that a future East Timorese state would not have a military. The widespread violence and destruction that followed the independence referendum in 1999 and the need to provide employment to FALINTIL veterans led to a change in policy.<ref name=Wainwright23>Wainwright (2002), p. 23</ref> The inadequate number of police officers who were deployed to East Timor as part of the United Nations-led peacekeeping force contributed to high rates of crime. The presence of 1,300 armed and increasingly dissatisfied FALINTIL personnel in [[cantonment]]s during late 1999 and most of 2000 also posed a threat to security.{{sfn|Glendhill|2014|pp=131–132}} Following the end of Indonesian rule, FALINTIL proposed the establishment of a large military of about 5,000 personnel.<ref>The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. Paragraph 205.</ref>

In mid-2000 the [[United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor]] (UNTAET) contracted a team from [[King's College London]] to conduct a study of East Timor's security force options and options to demobilise the former guerrilla forces.{{sfn|Glendhill|2014|p=132}} The team's report identified three options for an East Timorese military. Option&nbsp;1 was based on FALINTIL's preference for a relatively large and heavily armed military of 3,000–5,000 personnel, option&nbsp;2 was a force of 1,500 regulars and 1,500 conscripts and option&nbsp;3 was for a force of 1,500 regulars and 1,500 volunteer reservists.<ref>The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. Paragraphs 7.2 to 7.4</ref> The study team recommended option&nbsp;3 as being best suited to East Timor's security needs and economic situation. This recommendation was accepted by UNTAET in September 2000 and formed the basis of East Timor's defence planning.<ref name=Wainwright23/>{{refn | group = Note | The King's College report estimated that a military of 1,500 regulars and 1,500 reservists would cost approximately one per cent of East Timor's GDP and that this was the highest level of military expenditure the country could sustain.<ref>The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. Paragraphs 7.4 and 158.</ref>}} The plan was also accepted by all the countries that had contributed peacekeeping forces to East Timor.<ref>Fawthrop and Harris (2001), p. 37</ref> The King's College report was criticised by [[Greg Sheridan]], foreign editor of ''[[The Australian]]'', on the grounds that it led East Timor to establish a large police force and a large Army when its security needs might have been better met by a single smaller paramilitary force.<ref>{{cite news |first=Greg |last=Sheridan |author-link=Greg Sheridan |title=Fretilin still a stranger to democracy |url=http://blogs.theaustralian.news.com.au/gregsheridan/index.php/theaustralian/comments/fretilin_still_a_stranger_to_democracy/ |newspaper=[[The Australian]] |date=9 August 2007 |access-date=9 August 2007 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070828232523/http://blogs.theaustralian.news.com.au/gregsheridan/index.php/theaustralian/comments/fretilin_still_a_stranger_to_democracy |archive-date=28 August 2007  }}</ref>

While East Timor's decision to form a military has been criticised by some commentators,<ref name=Sedra_2010a_5 /> the East Timorese government has consistently believed that the force is necessary for political and security reasons. Critics of the F-FDTL's establishment argue that as East Timor does not face any external threats the government's limited resources would be better spent on strengthening the PNTL. While East Timor's political leadership recognised that the country does not currently face an external threat, they believed that it is necessary to maintain a military capacity to deter future aggression. The establishment of the F-FDTL was also seen as an effective means of integrating FALINTIL into an independent East Timor.<ref>Smith (2005), pp. 31–32</ref>

=== Formation of the F-FDTL ===

[[File:FALINTIL veterans USAID photo.jpg|thumb|upright|FALINTIL veterans]]
An Office for Defence Force Development staffed mainly by foreign military officers was established to oversee the process of forming Timor-Leste's armed forces and demobilising the former guerrillas. The Office delegated responsibility for recruiting personnel to FALINTIL's leaders.{{sfn|Glendhill|2014|p=132}}

FALINTIL officially became F-FDTL on 1 February 2001. The first 650 members of the F-FDTL were selected from 1,736 former FALINTIL applicants and began training on 29 March. The FDTL's 1st Battalion was established on 29 June 2001 and reached full strength on 1 December. Most members of the battalion were from Timor-Leste's eastern provinces.<ref>Ball (2002), p. 180</ref> The 2nd Battalion was established in 2002 from a [[En cadre|cadre]] of the 1st Battalion and was composed mainly of new personnel under the age of 21 who had not participated in the independence struggle.<ref>Rees (2004), p. 31</ref> Due to the force's prestige and relatively high pay, there were 7,000 applications for the first 267 positions in the battalion.<ref>{{cite news |first=Hamish |last=McDonald |title=East Timor's Tiny Army Aims High |url=http://www.etan.org/et2002b/april/14-20/20ettiny.htm |work=Reproduced on the East Timor Action Network's website |publisher=[[The Sydney Morning Herald]] |date=20 April 2002 |access-date=3 February 2008 |archive-date=1 October 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061001215006/http://www.etan.org/et2002b/april/14-20/20ettiny.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> The F-FDTL's small naval component was established in December 2001.<ref name="Ref-1">''Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment&nbsp;– Southeast Asia.'' Issue 20&nbsp;– 2007, p. 148</ref> The Australian UNTAET contingent provided most of the F-FDTL's training, and the United States equipped the force.<ref name="Dobbins_et_al_2013_139">Dobbins et al. (2013), p. 139</ref>

Some of the problems that have affected the F-FDTL throughout its existence were caused by the process used to establish the force. A key flaw in this process was that FALINTIL's high command was allowed to select candidates for the military from members of FALINTIL without external oversight. As a result, the selection was conducted, to a large degree, on the basis of applicants' political allegiance. This led to many FALINTIL veterans feeling that they had been unfairly excluded from the military and reduced the force's public standing.<ref>Rees (2004), pp. 47–49</ref> The decision to recruit young people who had not served in FALINTIL in the subsequent rounds of recruitment led to further tensions within the F-FDTL due to the often large age gap between the veterans and the new recruits and the fact that while the senior officers tended to be from the east of the country most of the junior officers and [[infantry]] were from the west.{{sfn|Glendhill|2014|pp=133–134}} Furthermore, UNTAET failed to establish adequate foundations for the East Timorese security sector by developing legislative and planning documents, administrative support arrangements and mechanisms for the democratic control of the military. These omissions remained uncorrected after Timor-Leste achieved independence on 20 May 2002.<ref name=icg5>International Crisis Group (2008), p. 5</ref>

[[File:F-FDTL soldiers standing in formation.JPG|thumb|F-FDTL soldiers standing in formation]]
The F-FDTL gradually assumed responsibility for Timor-Leste's security from the UN peacekeeping force. The [[Lautém District]] was the first area to pass to the F-FDTL in July 2002. After further training the F-FDTL took over responsibility for the entire country's external security on 20 May 2004, although some foreign peacekeepers remained in Timor-Leste until mid-2005.<ref name="Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment 2007, p. 116">''Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment&nbsp;– Southeast Asia''. Issue 20&nbsp;– 2007, p. 116</ref> The F-FDTL conducted its first operation in January 2003 when an army unit was called in to quell criminal activity caused by west Timorese militia gangs in the [[Ermera district]]. While the F-FDTL operated in a "relatively disciplined and orderly fashion" during this operation, it illegally arrested nearly 100 people who were released 10&nbsp;days later without being charged.{{sfn|Rees|2004|pp=20–21}}

The F-FDTL has suffered from serious morale and disciplinary problems since its establishment.<ref>Horta (2006)</ref> These problems have been driven by uncertainty over the F-FDTL's role, poor conditions of service due to limited resources, tensions arising from FALINTIL's transition from a guerrilla organisation to a regular military and political and regional rivalries. The F-FDTL's morale and disciplinary problems have resulted in large numbers of soldiers being disciplined or dismissed.{{sfn|Rees|2004|pp=32–33}} The East Timorese Government was aware of these problems before the 2006 crisis but did not rectify the factors that were contributing to low morale.<ref name=icg2>International Crisis Group (2008), p. 2</ref>

Tensions between the F-FDTL and PNTL have also reduced the effectiveness of Timor-Leste's security services. In 2003, the East Timorese Government established three new paramilitary police forces equipped with modern military-grade weapons. The formation of these units led to dissatisfaction with the Government among some members of the F-FDTL.<ref name=Robinson_1011 />{{sfn|Glendhill|2014|p=133}} During 2003 and 2004, members of the police and F-FDTL clashed on a number of occasions, and groups of soldiers attacked police stations in September 2003 and December 2004.<ref name=icg2/> These tensions were caused by the overlapping roles of the two security services, differences of opinion between members of Timor-Leste's leadership and the fact that many members of the PNTL had served with the [[Indonesian National Police]] prior to Timor-Leste's independence while the F-FDTL was based around FALINTIL.<ref name="Robinson_1011">Robinson (2011), p. 1011</ref>

=== 2006 crisis ===

{{Further|topic=Timor-Leste's political and security sector crisis in 2006|2006 crisis in Timor-Leste}}
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The tensions within the F-FDTL came to a head in 2006. In January, 159 soldiers from most units in the F-FDTL complained in a petition to then President [[Xanana Gusmão]] that soldiers from the east of the country received better treatment than westerners. The 'petitioners' received only a minimal response and left their barracks three weeks later, leaving their weapons behind.<ref name=Inquiry21>United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste (2007), p. 21</ref> They were joined by hundreds of other soldiers and on 16 March the F-FDTL's commander, [[Brigadier General]] [[Taur Matan Ruak]], dismissed 594 soldiers, which was nearly half of the force.<ref name=icg2/> The soldiers dismissed were not limited to the petitioners, and included about 200 officers and other ranks who had been chronically [[absent without leave]] in the months and years before March 2006.<ref name=Inquiry21/>

The crisis escalated into violence in late April. On 24 April, the petitioners and some of their supporters held a four-day demonstration outside the Government Palace in Dili calling for the establishment of an independent commission to address their grievances. Violence broke out on 28 April when some of the petitioners and gangs of youths who had joined the protest attacked the Government Palace. The PNTL failed to contain the protest and the Palace was badly damaged. After violence spread to other areas of Dili, Prime Minister [[Mari Alkatiri]] requested that the F-FDTL help restore order. Troops with no experience in crowd control were deployed to Dili on 29 April and three deaths resulted. On 3 May Major [[Alfredo Reinado]], the commander of the F-FDTL's [[military police]] unit, and most of his soldiers including Lt [[Gastão Salsinha]] abandoned their posts in protest at what they saw as the army's deliberate shooting of civilians.<ref>United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste (2007), pp. 21–30 and International Crisis Group (2008), p. 2</ref>

Fighting broke out between the remnants of the East Timorese security forces and the rebels and gangs in late May. On 23 May Reinado's rebel group opened fire on F-FDTL and PNTL personnel in the Fatu Ahi area. On 24 May F-FDTL personnel near the Force's headquarters were attacked by a group of rebel police officers, petitioners and armed civilians. The attack was defeated when one of the F-FDTL naval component's patrol boats fired on the attackers.<ref>United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste (2007), pp. 31–33</ref> During the crisis the relationship between the F-FDTL and PNTL had deteriorated further, and on 25 May members of the F-FDTL attacked the PNTL's headquarters, killing nine unarmed police officers.<ref name=icg2/>

As a result of the escalating violence the government was forced to appeal for international peacekeepers on 25 May. Peacekeepers [[Operation Astute|began to arrive in Dili]] the next day and eventually restored order. A total of 37 people were killed in the fighting in April and May and 155,000 fled their homes. A United Nations inquiry found that the interior and defence ministers and the commander of the F-FDTL had illegally transferred weapons to civilians during the crisis and recommended that they be prosecuted.<ref>{{cite press release |title=UN commission of inquiry issues report on violent crisis that shook Timor-Leste |publisher=United Nations |date=17 October 2006 |url=https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20284&Cr=timor&Cr1=inquiry |access-date=1 September 2007 |archive-date=10 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170810051344/https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20284&Cr=timor&Cr1=inquiry |url-status=live }}</ref>

By September the F-FDTL had been much reduced, and comprised Headquarters (95 personnel), Force Communications Unit
(21), Military Police Unit (18), First Battalion (317), Naval Component (83), Force Logistics Unit (63) and Nicolau Lobato Training Centre, Metinaro (118). In addition, 43 former Second Battalion members were on courses.<ref name="icg5"/>

=== Force development plans ===

The 2006 crisis left the F-FDTL "in ruins".<ref name=icgi>International Crisis Group (2008), p. i</ref> The F-FDTL's strength fell from 1,435 in January 2006 to 715 in September and the proportion of westerners in the military fell from 65&nbsp;per cent to 28&nbsp;per cent.<ref name=icg5/> The F-FDTL started a rebuilding process with support from several nations and the United Nations, but was still not ready to resume responsibility for Timor-Leste's external security two years after the crisis.<ref name=icgi/>
[[File:F-FDTL-Centro de Instrução-Metinaro-2009.JPG|thumb|alt=White gates with buildings behind them|The gate to the F-FDTL Nicolau Lobato Training Centre near Metinaro]]

In 2004 the commander of the F-FDTL formed a team, which included international contractors, to develop a long-term strategic vision document for the military. This study was supported by the Australian Government.<ref>Burton (2007), p. 101</ref> The resulting ''Force 2020'' document was completed in 2006 and made public in 2007.<ref name=icg8>International Crisis Group (2008), p. 8</ref> The document sets out an 'aspirational' vision for the development of the F-FDTL to 2020 and beyond and is of equivalent status to a defence [[white paper]]. It proposes expanding the military to a strength of 3,000 regular personnel in the medium term through the introduction of [[conscription]]. It also sets longer-term goals such as establishing an air component and purchasing modern weapons, such as [[Anti-tank warfare|anti-armour weapons]], [[armoured personnel carrier]]s and [[missile boat]]s, by 2020.<ref>{{cite news |first=Mark |last=Dodd |title=Secret missile plan for East Timor |url=http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21869293-601,00.html |newspaper=[[The Australian]] |date=8 June 2007 |access-date=10 August 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070711130500/http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21869293-601,00.html|archive-date=11 July 2007}}</ref>

The ''Force 2020'' plan is similar to option&nbsp;1 in the King's College report. The King's College study team strongly recommended against such a force structure, labelling it "unaffordable" and raising concerns over the impact of conscription upon East Timorese society and military readiness. The team estimated that sustaining such a force structure would cost 2.6 to 3.3&nbsp;per cent of Timor-Leste's annual gross domestic product and would "represent a heavy burden on the East Timor economy".<ref>The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. Paragraphs 7.2 and 205–212.</ref> Moreover, the ''Force 2020'' plan may not be realistic or suitable as it appears to emphasise military expansion to counter external threats over spending on other government services and internal security and outlines ideas such as the long-term (~2075) development of [[Militarisation of space|space forces]].<ref>International Crisis Group (2008), pp. 6, 9</ref>

While the ''Force 2020'' plan has proven controversial, it appears to have been adopted by the East Timorese government. The plan was criticised by the United Nations and the governments of Australia and the United States as unaffordable and in excess of Timor-Leste's needs.<ref>{{cite news |first=Mark |last=Dodd |title=Timor military blueprint unrealistic: Downer |url=http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21871852-2702,00.html?from=public_rss |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120918142233/http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21871852-2702,00.html?from=public_rss |url-status=dead |archive-date=18 September 2012 |newspaper=[[The Australian]] |date=6 August 2007 |access-date=10 August 2007 }}</ref> East Timorese President José Ramos-Horta defended the plan, however, arguing that its adoption will transform the F-FDTL into a professional force capable of defending Timor-Leste's sovereignty and contributing to the nation's stability.<ref>{{cite press release |title=Force 2020 is important for the East Timor Government |publisher=East Timor Ministry of Defence |date=3 July 2007|url=http://www.timor-leste.gov.tl/mindef/Eng/n3.htm |access-date=11 August 2007}} {{dead link| date=June 2010 | bot=DASHBot}}</ref> East Timorese defence officials have also stressed that ''Force 2020'' is a long-term plan and does not propose acquiring advanced weapons for some years.<ref name=icg8/>
[[File:F-FDTL Infanteria Componente Terrestre.jpg|thumb|left|alt=Photograph of a group of men in military uniforms marching in close formation|East Timorese soldiers during a parade in 2019]]

The repercussions of the 2006 crisis lasted for several years. On 11 February 2008, a group of rebels led by Alfredo Reinado [[2008 East Timorese assassination attempts|attempted to kill or kidnap]] President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmão. Although Ramos-Horta and one of his guards were badly wounded, these attacks were not successful and Reinado and another rebel were killed. A joint F-FDTL and PNTL command was established to pursue the surviving rebels and the military and police demonstrated a high degree of co-operation during this operation.<ref>{{cite news |title=East Timor's window of opportunity |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7288484.stm |work=BBC News |date=10 March 2008 |access-date=6 April 2008 |archive-date=7 April 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080407052924/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7288484.stm |url-status=live }}</ref> The joint command was disbanded on 19 June 2008. While the joint command contributed to the surrender of many of Reinado's associates, it has been alleged that members of this unit committed human rights violations.<ref>UNMIT (2008), pp. 2, 5–6</ref> More broadly, the shock caused by the attack on Ramos-Horta and Gusmão led to lasting improvements in cooperation between the F-FDTL and PNTL.{{sfn|Glendhill|2014|p=142}} In June 2008 the Government offered to provide financial compensation to the petitioners who wished to return to civilian life. This offer was accepted, and all the petitioners returned to their homes by August that year.<ref>UNMIT (2009), p. 2</ref>

In May 2009, the F-FDTL accepted its first intake of recruits since the 2006 crisis. While the regional diversity of the 579 new recruits was generally much greater than that of the pre-crisis intakes, 60.3 per cent of officer candidates were from the country's eastern districts.<ref name=Sedra_11 /> From 2009 the F-FDTL established platoon-sized outposts to support the PNTL border police in the Bobonaro and Cova Lima border districts, and it has increasingly been deployed to undertake internal security tasks.<ref name="Sedra_2010a_5">Sedra et al. (2010a), p. 5</ref> From February to August 2010, 200 members of the F-FDTL were deployed to support PNTL operations against "Ninja" gangs. These troops undertook community engagement tasks, and were unarmed and not closely integrated with the PNTL efforts.<ref name="autogenerated1">Sedra et al. (2010a), pp. 11–12</ref>

In 2011 the F-FDTL was still under-strength and yet to reform its training and discipline standards.<ref name="Patrikainen_141">Patrikainen et al. (2011), p. 141</ref> Tensions within the F-FDTL also continued to threaten the stability of the force.<ref name="Robinson_1014">Robinson (2011), p. 1014</ref> However, the East Timorese government placed a high priority on re-establishing the F-FDTL and developing it into a force capable of defending the country.<ref name=Patrikainen_141 /> In 2012 the Government authorised an expansion of the F-FDTL to 3,600 personnel by 2020, of whom approximately one quarter will be members of the Naval Component.{{sfn|International Security Sector Advisory Team|2016}} The 2016 edition of the [[International Institute for Strategic Studies]]' (IISS) publication ''The Military Balance'' stated that the F-FDTL was "only capable of internal and border-security roles".{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2016|p=296}}

The East Timorese Government published a new Strategic Defence and Security Concept during 2016. This document defined the role of the F-FDTL as defending the country against external threats and countering violent crime within Timor-Leste. The Strategic Defence and Security Concept also called for the F-FDTL's naval capabilities to be improved to adequately protect Timor-Leste's [[exclusive economic zone]]. In 2020 the IISS judged that the F-FDTL "has been reconstituted but is still a long way from meeting the ambitious force-structure goals set out in the Force 2020 plan".{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2020|p=317}} Similarly, a 2019 [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] noted that there has been little progress in completing the acquisition program set out in the Force 2020 plan, likely due to a shortage of funds and "possibly also because there seems to be no rationale for
acquiring some of the equipment".{{sfn|Wezeman|2019|p=42}}

On 29 October 2020, the Council of Ministers approved of a plan to start compulsory national service for Timorese citizens who are 18 years old and above.<ref>Timor-Leste’s Government approves the decree law of compulsory military service, Independente, 29 October 2020</ref>

In a 2023 journal article, the academic Deniz Kocak noted that the F-FDTL does not have a written [[military doctrine|doctrine]], and the force's role was unclear. He observed that the F-FDTL continues to regard itself as the direct successor to FALINTIL and has a focus on [[guerrilla warfare]].{{sfn|Kocak|2023|pp=122-124}}