Editing Universal prescriptivism (section)

==Criticisms==
Prescriptivism has faced extensive criticism and currently has few adherents.<ref>Price, Anthony, "Richard Mervyn Hare", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/hare/>.</ref> Ethicists commonly dispute Hare's assertion that moral language lacks informativeness, challenging the idea that the primary purpose of moral discourse is not to convey moral truths or facts.<ref>Feldman, Fred. ''Introductory Ethics''. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978, pp. 246-47.</ref> Hare's argument that offering guidance always constitutes the primary goal of moral discourse is also questioned by numerous critics.<ref>Feldman, ''ibid''., p. 247; Warnock, ''Contemporary Moral Philosophy'', p. 35.</ref>

Some critics observe that Hare seems to presume moral language is exclusively employed in discussions, debates, or commands, where one person instructs another or others on what to do. This perspective, it is argued, overlooks the broader usage of moral talk as a "language-game" serving diverse purposes. Lastly, critics contend that prescriptivism contradicts the common-sense differentiation between good and bad reasons for holding moral beliefs.<ref>Kerner, George C. ''The Revolution in Ethical Theory''. New York: Oxford, 1966, pp. 192-96; Feldman, ''Introductory'' ''Ethics'', pp. 246-47.</ref> 

Hare's stance suggests that a racist "fanatic" advocating the deportation of all minority-group members, while maintaining consistency (even if the racist is a member of the minority group), cannot be criticized for either irrationality or falsehood.<ref>Hare, R. M. ''Freedom and Reason''. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 220.</ref> Kerner argues that, for Hare, morality fundamentally involves non-rational choice and commitment.<ref>Kerner, ''The Revolution'' ''in Ethical Theory'', p. 193.</ref> However, critics of Hare argue that reason should and does play a more substantial role in ethics than he acknowledges.