Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Expected utility hypothesis
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
== Further reading == {{refbegin|30em}} * {{cite book | vauthors = Anand P |title=Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford |year=1993 |isbn=978-0-19-823303-9 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/foundationsofrat00anan }} * {{cite journal | vauthors = Arrow KJ |title=Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care |journal=American Economic Review |volume=53 |pages=941–73 |year=1963}} * {{cite journal | vauthors = de Finetti B | author-link1 = Bruno de Finetti | title = Probabilism: A Critical Essay on the Theory of Probability and on the Value of Science (translation of 1931 article) | journal = Erkenntnis | volume = 31 | date = September 1989 }} * {{cite journal | vauthors = de Finetti B | author-link1 = Bruno de Finetti | date = 1937 | title = La Prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives | journal = Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré }} : {{cite book | vauthors = de Finetti B | author-link1 = Bruno de Finetti | chapter = Foresight: its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources (translation of the 1937 article in French | url = http://www.numdam.org/item?id=AIHP_1937__7_1_1_0 | veditors = Kyburg HE, Smokler HE | title = Studies in Subjective Probability | location = New York | publisher = Wiley | date = 1964 | volume = 7 | issue = 1 | pages = 1–68 }} * {{cite book | vauthors = de Finetti B | author-link1 = Bruno de Finetti | title = Theory of Probability | translator = Smith AF | translator-link1 = Adrian Smith (statistician) | location = New York | publisher = Wiley | date = 1974 }} * {{cite book| vauthors = Morgenstern O |year=1976|publisher=New York University Press|chapter=Some Reflections on [[Expected utility|Utility]]|pages=65–70|title=Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgenstern|editor=Andrew Schotter|isbn=978-0-8147-7771-8|author-link=Oskar Morgenstern}} * {{cite journal| vauthors = Peirce CS, Jastrow J | author-link1 = Charles Sanders Peirce | author-link2 = Joseph Jastrow |year=1885|title=On Small Differences in Sensation| journal=Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences|volume=3|pages=73–83|url=http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Peirce/small-diffs.htm}} * {{cite book| vauthors = Pfanzagl J|year=1967|publisher=Princeton University Press|chapter=Subjective Probability Derived from the [[Oskar Morgenstern|Morgenstern]]-[[John von Neumann|von Neumann]] [[Expected utility|Utility Theory]]|pages=[https://archive.org/details/essaysinmathemat0000shub/page/237 237–251]|title=Essays in Mathematical Economics In Honor of Oskar Morgenstern|url=https://archive.org/details/essaysinmathemat0000shub|url-access=registration|editor=[[Martin Shubik]] }} * {{cite book| vauthors = Pfanzagl J, Baumann V, Huber H |year=1968|publisher=Wiley|chapter=Events, Utility and Subjective Probability|pages=195–220|title=Theory of Measurement}} * {{cite book | vauthors = Plous S | author-link1 = Scott Plous | date = 1993 | title = The psychology of judgment and decision making | chapter = Chapter 7 (specifically) and 8, 9, 10, (to show paradoxes to the theory) }} * {{cite book | vauthors = Ramsey RP | author-link1 = Frank P. Ramsey | chapter = Chapter VII: Truth and Probability | chapter-url = http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/texts/ramsey/ramsess.pdf| title = The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays | date = 1931 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20061014122843/http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/texts/ramsey/ramsess.pdf | archive-date = 2006-10-14 }} * {{cite journal | vauthors = Schoemaker PJ |title=The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations |journal=Journal of Economic Literature |volume=20 |pages=529–563 |year=1982}} * {{cite book| title=Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach| vauthors = Davidson D, Suppes P, Siegel S | author-link1 = Donald Davidson (philosopher) | author-link2 = Patrick Suppes | author-link3 = Sidney Siegel | publisher=[[Stanford University Press]]|year=1957}} * {{cite journal | vauthors = Aase KK | title = On the St. Petersburg Paradox. | journal = Scandinavian Actuarial Journal | date = 2001 | volume = 2001 | issue = 1 | pages = 69–78 | doi = 10.1080/034612301750077356 | s2cid = 14750913 }} * {{cite book | vauthors = Briggs RA | chapter = Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility | title = The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date = 2019 | veditors = Zalta EN }} * {{cite journal | vauthors = Hacking I | date = 1980 | title = Strange Expectations | journal = Philosophy of Science | volume = 47 | issue = 4 | pages = 562–567 | doi = 10.1086/288956 | s2cid = 224830682 }} * {{cite journal | vauthors = Peters O | date = 2011 | title = The time resolution of the St Petersburg paradox | journal = Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences| volume = 369 | issue = 1956 | orig-year = 1956 | pages = 4913–4931 | doi = 10.1098/rsta.2011.0065 | pmid = 22042904 | pmc = 3270388 | arxiv = 1011.4404 | bibcode = 2011RSPTA.369.4913P }} * {{cite book | vauthors = Schoemaker PJ | date = 1980 | chapter = Experiments on Decisions under Risk: The Expected Utility Hypothesis. | title = Experiments on Decisions under Risk }} {{refend}} {{microeconomics}} {{Decision theory}} [[Category:Belief revision]] [[Category:Game theory]] [[Category:Motivational theories]] [[Category:Optimal decisions]] [[Category:Expected utility]]
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)