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=== Metaphysics === A central problem in [[metaphysics]] is the [[mind–body problem]]. It involves the question of how to conceive the relation between body and mind.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Mind–Body Problem}}</ref><ref name="RobinsonHoward"/> Understood in its widest sense, it concerns not only experience but any form of [[mind]], including unconscious mental states.<ref name="RobinsonHoward"/> But it has been argued that experience has special relevance here since experience is often seen as the paradigmatic form of mind.<ref name="Pernu"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Bourget |first1=David |last2=Mendelovici |first2=Angela |title=Phenomenal Intentionality: 2. The phenomenal intentionality theory |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/#PhenInteTheo |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=11 October 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> The idea that there is a "problem" to begin with is often traced back to how different matter and experience seem to be.<ref name="Pernu">{{cite journal |last1=Pernu |first1=Tuomas K. |title=The Five Marks of the Mental |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=2017 |volume=8 |page=1084 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01084 |pmid=28736537 |language=English |issn=1664-1078|pmc=5500963 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Kim">{{cite book |last1=Kim |first1=Jaegwon |title=Philosophy of Mind |date=2006 |publisher=Boulder: Westview Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMPOM-3 |chapter=1. Introduction|edition=Second }}</ref> Physical properties, like size, shape and weight, are public and are ascribed to objects. Experiences, on the other hand, are private and are ascribed to subjects.<ref name="RobinsonHoward">{{cite web |last1=Robinson |first1=Howard |title=Dualism: 1.1 The Mind–Body Problem |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/#MinBod |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=11 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref> Another important distinctive feature is that experiences are intentional, i.e. that they are directed at objects different from themselves.<ref name="Smith"/><ref name="Representation in Mind"/> But despite these differences, body and mind seem to causally interact with each other, referred to as psycho-physical causation.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lowe |first1=E. J. |title=The Problem of Psychophysical Causation |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |date=1992 |volume=70 |issue=3 |pages=263–76 |doi=10.1080/00048409212345161 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LOWTPO|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name="Robb">{{cite web |last1=Robb |first1=David |last2=Heil |first2=John |title=Mental Causation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=11 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref> This concerns both the way how physical events, like a rock falling on someone's foot, cause experiences, like a sharp pain, and how experiences, like the intention to make the pain stop, cause physical events, like pulling the foot from under the rock.<ref name="Robb"/> Various solutions to the mind–body problem have been presented.<ref>{{cite web |title=Philosophy of mind - Traditional metaphysical positions |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/The-soul-and-personal-identity#ref283966 |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=12 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref> Dualism is a traditionally important approach. It states that bodies and minds belong to distinct ontological categories and exist independently of each other.<ref name="RobinsonHoward"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Calef |first1=Scott |title=Dualism and Mind |url=https://iep.utm.edu/dualism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=12 October 2021}}</ref> A central problem for dualists is to give a plausible explanation of how their interaction is possible or of why they seem to be interacting. Monists, on the other hand, deny this type of ontological bifurcation.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Schaffer |first1=Jonathan |title=Monism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 October 2021 |date=2018}}</ref> Instead, they argue that, on the most fundamental level, only one type of entity exists. According to materialism, everything is ultimately material. On this view, minds either do not exist or exist as material aspects of bodies.<ref>{{cite web |title=Materialism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/materialism-philosophy |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=12 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref> According to idealism, everything is ultimately mental. On this view, material objects only exist in the form of ideas and depend thereby on experience and other mental states.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Guyer |first1=Paul |last2=Horstmann |first2=Rolf-Peter |title=Idealism: 1. Introduction |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/#Intr |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref> Monists are faced with the problem of explaining how two types of entities that seem to be so different can belong to the same ontological category.<ref name="Pernu"/><ref name="Kim"/> The [[hard problem of consciousness]] is a closely related issue. It is concerned with explaining why some physical events, like brain processes, are accompanied by [[conscious]] experience, i.e. that undergoing them feels a certain way to the subject.<ref name="Weisberg">{{cite web |last1=Weisberg |first1=Josh |title=Hard Problem of Consciousness |url=https://iep.utm.edu/hard-con/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=11 October 2021}}</ref><ref name="Vasilyev">{{cite journal |last1=Vasilyev |first1=Vadim V. |title="The Hard Problem of Consciousness" and Two Arguments for Interactionism |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/VASTHP-2 |journal=Faith and Philosophy |pages=514–526 |doi=10.5840/faithphil200926552 |date=2009|volume=26 |issue=5 }}</ref><ref name="McClelland">{{cite journal |last1=McClelland |first1=Tom |title=The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky? |journal=Topoi |date=2017 |volume=36 |issue=1 |pages=17–30 |doi=10.1007/s11245-014-9257-4 |s2cid=145287229 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MCCTPO-36|url-access=subscription }}</ref> This is especially relevant from the perspective of the [[natural science]]s since it seems to be possible, at least in principle, to explain human behavior and cognition without reference to experience. Such an explanation can happen in relation to the processing of information in the form of electrical signals. In this sense, the hard problem of consciousness points to an explanatory gap between the physical world and conscious experience.<ref name="Weisberg"/><ref name="Vasilyev"/><ref name="McClelland"/> There is significant overlap between the solutions proposed to the mind–body problem and the solutions proposed to the hard problem of consciousness.<ref name="Weisberg"/><ref name="RobinsonHoward"/>
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