Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

====The "hard-wired view"====
Joseph Levine (who formulated the notion of the [[explanatory gap]]) states: "The explanatory gap argument doesn't demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature."<ref name="J. Levine 1999, pp 3"/> He nevertheless contends that full scientific understanding will not close the gap,<ref name="jw-iep"/> and that analogous gaps do not exist for other [[Identity (philosophy)|identities]] in nature, such as that between water and H<sub>2</sub>O.<ref name="rjg-iep">{{cite web|last1=Gennaro|first1=Rocco J.|title=Consciousness|url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/consciou|website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> The philosophers [[Ned Block]] and [[Robert Stalnaker]] agree that facts about what a conscious experience is like to the one experiencing it cannot be deduced from knowing all the facts about the underlying physiology, but by contrast argue that such gaps of knowledge ''are'' also present in many other cases in nature, such as the distinction between water and H<sub>2</sub>O.<ref name="block-stalnaker">{{cite journal|last1=Block|first1=Ned|last2=Stalnaker|first2=Robert|title=Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap|journal=The Philosophical Review|date=1999|volume=108|issue=1|pages=1–46|jstor=2998259|doi=10.2307/2998259|citeseerx=10.1.1.693.2421|url=http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/ExplanatoryGap.pdf}}</ref><ref name="harder-problem"/>

To explain why these two ways of knowing (i.e. third-person scientific observation and first-person introspection) yield such different understandings of consciousness, weak reductionists often invoke the ''phenomenal concepts strategy'', which argues the difference stems from our inaccurate [[Phenomenal consciousness|phenomenal]] concepts (i.e., how we think about consciousness), not from the nature of consciousness itself.<ref name="stoljar-2005">{{cite journal|last1=Stoljar|first1=Daniel|title=Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts|journal=Mind & Language|date=2005|volume=20|issue=5|pages=469–494|doi=10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00296.x}}</ref><ref name="chalmers-pceg">{{cite book|last1=Chalmers|first1=David|editor1-last=Alter|editor1-first=Torin|editor2-last=Walter|editor2-first=Sven|title=Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism|date=2006|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=9780195171655|chapter-url=http://consc.net/papers/pceg.pdf|access-date=27 March 2019|chapter=Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap}}</ref> By this view, the hard problem of consciousness stems from a dualism of concepts, not from a dualism of properties or substances.<ref name="jw-iep"/>