Editing Logical positivism (section)

===Thomas Kuhn===

[[Thomas Samuel Kuhn|Thomas Kuhn]]'s landmark book of 1962, ''[[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]''—which discussed [[paradigm shift]]s in [[fundamental interactions|fundamental physics]]—critically undermined confidence in scientific [[foundationalism]].<ref>{{cite book |title=Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction |last=Okasha|first=Samir|year=2002 |chapter=Scientific Change and Scientific Revolutions |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford}}</ref> Kuhn proposed in its place a [[coherentism|coherentist]] model of science, whereby scientific progress revolves around cores of established, coherent ideas which periodically undergo abrupt revolutionary changes.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Daston |first=Lorraine |year=2020 |title=Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/08992363-8090152 |journal=Public Culture |volume=32 |issue=2 |pages=405–413 |doi=10.1215/08992363-8090152 |issn=0899-2363}}</ref>

Though foundationalism was often considered a constituent doctrine of logical positivism (and Kuhn's thesis an [[epistemological]] criticism of the movement) such views were simplistic:<ref>{{harvnb|Uebel|2008}} 3.3</ref> In the 1930s, [[Otto Neurath|Neurath]] had argued for the adoption of [[coherentism]], famously comparing the progress of science to [[Neurath's boat|reconstruction of a boat at sea]].<ref name=ONPSP>{{cite book|title=Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics |volume=38 |series=Ideas in Context |first1=Nancy |last1=Cartwright |author-link1=Nancy Cartwright (philosopher) |first2=Jordi |last2=Cat |first3=Lola |last3=Fleck |first4=Thomas E. |last4=Uebel |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2008 |isbn=978-0521041119 |chapter=On Neurath's Boat |pages=89–94}}</ref> [[Rudolf Carnap|Carnap]] had entertained foundationalism from 1929 to 1930, but he, [[Hans Hahn (mathematician)|Hans Hahn]] and others would later join Neurath in converting to a coherentist philosophy. The [[Logical positivism#Vienna and Berlin Circles|conservative wing]] of the [[Vienna Circle]] under [[Moritz Schlick]] subscribed to a form of foundationalism, but its principles were defined unconventionally or ambiguously.<ref>{{harvnb|Uebel|2008}} 3.3 Uebel writes, "Even Schlick conceded, however, that all scientific statements were fallible ones, so his position on foundationalism was by no means the traditional one. The point of his “foundations” remained less than wholly clear and different interpretation of it have been put forward."</ref>

In some sense, Kuhn's book unified science, but through historical and social assessment rather than by [[Logical positivism#Unity of science|networking the scientific specialties]] using epistemological or [[linguistics|linguistic]] models.<ref name=Novick-p526>{{harvnb|Novick|1988}} pp. 526–27</ref> His ideas were adopted quickly by scholars in non-scientific disciplines, such as the social sciences in which neo-positivists were dominant,<ref name=Novick-p546/> ushering academia into [[postpositivism]] or postempiricism.<ref name=Novick-p526/>