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Modal logic
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== Metaphysical questions == {{Further| Accessibility relation|Possible worlds}} In the most common interpretation of modal logic, one considers "[[logically possible]] worlds". If a statement is true in all [[possible worlds]], then it is a necessary truth. If a statement happens to be true in our world, but is not true in all possible worlds, then it is a contingent truth. A statement that is true in some possible world (not necessarily our own) is called a possible truth. Under this "possible worlds idiom", to maintain that Bigfoot's existence is possible but not actual, one says, "There is some possible world in which Bigfoot exists; but in the actual world, Bigfoot does not exist". However, it is unclear what this claim commits us to. Are we really alleging the existence of possible worlds, every bit as real as our actual world, just not actual? [[Saul Kripke]] believes that 'possible world' is something of a misnomer β that the term 'possible world' is just a useful way of visualizing the concept of possibility.<ref>Kripke, Saul. ''Naming and Necessity''. (1980; Harvard UP), pp. 43β5.</ref> For him, the sentences "you could have rolled a 4 instead of a 6" and "there is a possible world where you rolled a 4, but you rolled a 6 in the actual world" are not significantly different statements, and neither commit us to the existence of a possible world.<ref>Kripke, Saul. ''Naming and Necessity''. (1980; Harvard UP), pp. 15β6.</ref> [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]], on the other hand, made himself notorious by biting the bullet, asserting that all merely possible worlds are as real as our own, and that what distinguishes our world as ''actual'' is simply that it is indeed our world β ''[[Indexicality|this]]'' world.<ref>David Lewis, ''On the Plurality of Worlds'' (1986; Blackwell).</ref> That position is a major tenet of "[[modal realism]]". Some philosophers decline to endorse any version of modal realism, considering it ontologically extravagant, and prefer to seek various ways to paraphrase away these ontological commitments. [[Robert Merrihew Adams|Robert Adams]] holds that 'possible worlds' are better thought of as 'world-stories', or consistent sets of propositions. Thus, it is possible that you rolled a 4 if such a state of affairs can be described coherently.<ref>Adams, Robert M. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2214751 ''Theories of Actuality'']. NoΓ»s, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Sep., 1974), particularly pp. 225β31.</ref> Computer scientists will generally pick a highly specific interpretation of the modal operators specialized to the particular sort of computation being analysed. In place of "all worlds", you may have "all possible next states of the computer", or "all possible future states of the computer".
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