Editing Sino-Soviet split (section)

=== Nuclear China with the US and the USSR ===

==== US strategy on China's nuclear development ====
{{see also|Two Bombs, One Satellite}}
In the early 1960s, the United States feared that a "nuclear China" would imbalance the bi-polar Cold War between the US and the USSR. To keep the PRC from achieving the geopolitical status of a nuclear power, the US administrations of both [[John F. Kennedy]] and [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] considered ways either to sabotage or to attack directly the [[China and weapons of mass destruction|Chinese nuclear program]] — aided either by [[Republic of China (1949-present)|Republic of China]] based in Taiwan or by the USSR. To avert nuclear war, Khrushchev refused the US offer to participate in a US-Soviet pre-emptive attack against the PRC.
<ref name="jstor2626706">{{cite journal |last1=Burr |first1=W. |last2=Richelson |first2=J. T. |year=2000–2001 |title=Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64 |journal=International Security |volume=25 |issue=3 |pages=54–99 |jstor=2626706 |url=https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/whether-strangle-baby-cradle-united-states-and-chinese-nuclear-program-1960-64 |doi=10.1162/016228800560525 |s2cid=57560352 |access-date=29 April 2019 |archive-date=30 April 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190430032544/https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/whether-strangle-baby-cradle-united-states-and-chinese-nuclear-program-1960-64 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

To prevent the Chinese from building a nuclear bomb, the [[United States Armed Forces]] recommended indirect measures, such as diplomacy and propaganda, and direct measures, such as infiltration and sabotage, an invasion by the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan, maritime blockades, a South Korean invasion of North Korea, conventional air attacks against the nuclear production facilities, and dropping a nuclear bomb against a "selected CHICOM [Chinese Communist] target".<ref>LeMay, Curtis. "A Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability" (1963), in "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64 (2000)</ref> On 16 October 1964, the PRC detonated their first nuclear bomb, a uranium-235 [[Nuclear weapon design|implosion-fission device]],<ref name=":0">[https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/16-october-1964-first-chinese-nuclear-test "16 October 1964 – First Chinese nuclear test: CTBTO Preparatory Commission"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200222034939/https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/16-october-1964-first-chinese-nuclear-test/ |date=22 February 2020 }}. ''ctbto.org''. Retrieved 1 June 2017.</ref> with an explosive yield of 22 [[kiloton]]s of TNT;<ref>Oleg; Podvig, Pavel Leonardovich; Hippel, Frank Von (2004). [https://books.google.com/books?id=CPRVbYDc-7kC&pg=PA441 ''Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191017052346/https://books.google.be/books?id=CPRVbYDc-7kC&pg=PA441 |date=17 October 2019 }}. MIT Press. p. 441. {{ISBN|9780262661812}}.</ref> and publicly acknowledged the USSR's technical assistance in realizing [[596 (nuclear test)|Project 596]].<ref>{{cite web |title=CTBTO World Map |url=https://www.ctbto.org/map/#mode=nuclear |website=www.ctbto.org |access-date=31 January 2019 |archive-date=1 February 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190201065733/https://www.ctbto.org/map/#mode=nuclear |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Planned Soviet nuclear strike on China ====
[[File:Brezhnev-color.jpg|left|thumb|[[Leonid Brezhnev]], the leader of the Soviet Union from 1964-1982, held tough position towards China.]]
According to declassified sources from both the PRC and the United States, the Soviet Union planned to launch a massive nuclear strike on China after the [[Zhenbao Island incident]] in 1969.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":6">{{Cite web |date=August 28, 1969 |title=27. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d27 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241010040418/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d27 |archive-date=2024-10-10 |access-date= |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Cite web |date=2011 |title=59. Editorial Note |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d59 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241217085844/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d59 |archive-date=2024-12-17 |access-date= |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":11">{{Cite web |date=2010-05-13 |title=USSR planned nuclear attack on China in 1969 |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100516014916/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |archive-date=2010-05-16 |access-date= |website=[[The Daily Telegraph|The Telegraph]] |language=en}}</ref> Soviet diplomat [[Arkady Shevchenko]] also mentioned in his memoir that "the Soviet leadership had come close to using nuclear arms on China",<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Shevchenko |first=Arkady |author-link=Arkady Shevchenko |date=February 11, 1985 |title=Breaking with Moscow |url=https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,960276-15,00.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250114011523/https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0%2C33009%2C960276-15%2C00.html |archive-date=2025-01-14 |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]}}</ref> while many documents are still classified.<ref name=":28">{{Cite web |last=Wu |first=Riqiang |date=2010–2011 |title=Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics |url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156889/4%20Wu%20POSSEIV.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240717043921/https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156889/4%20Wu%20POSSEIV.pdf |archive-date=2024-07-17 |website=[[Georgia Institute of Technology]] |page=18-21}}</ref> As a turning point during the [[Cold War]], this crisis almost led to a major nuclear war, seven years after the [[Cuban Missile Crisis|Cuban missile crisis]].<ref name=":11" /><ref name=":10" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Yu |first=Miles |author-link=Miles Yu |date=December 13, 2022 |title=The 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts As A Key Turning Point Of The Cold War |url=https://www.hoover.org/research/1969-sino-soviet-border-conflicts-key-turning-point-cold-war |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241222132336/https://www.hoover.org/research/1969-sino-soviet-border-conflicts-key-turning-point-cold-war |archive-date=2024-12-22 |access-date=2024-12-30 |website=[[Hoover Institution]] |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":12">{{Cite journal |last=Rajagopalan |first=Rajesh |date=2000-06-01 |title=Deterrence and nuclear confrontations: The Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-soviet border war |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160008455225 |journal=Strategic Analysis |volume=24 |issue=3 |pages=441–457 |doi=10.1080/09700160008455225 |issn=0970-0161|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Radchenko |first=Sergey |author-link=Sergey Radchenko |date=2019-03-02 |title=The Island That Changed History |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/opinion/soviet-russia-china-war.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250101053207/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/opinion/soviet-russia-china-war.html |archive-date=2025-01-01 |access-date=2025-01-03 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> 

On August 18, 1969, Boris N. Davydov, the Second Secretary of the [[Embassy of Russia, Washington, D.C.|Soviet Embassy to the United States]], brought up the idea of a Soviet attack on China's nuclear installations, during a luncheon in Washington.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5" /> According to Chinese sources, then [[Soviet Ambassador to the United States|Soviet ambassador to the US]], [[Anatoly Dobrynin]], met with [[Henry Kissinger]] on August 20 and informed him of the Soviets' intention to launch a nuclear strike on China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":10" /> On August 21, the US sent out a secret telegram to its [[embassies]] worldwide warning that "the Soviets have set in motion an extensive series of measures" which could "permit them a variety of military options".<ref>{{Cite web |date=1969-08-21 |title=Outgoing Telegram |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.11.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090903202126/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.11.pdf |archive-date=2009-09-03 |website=The George Washington University |publisher=United States Department of State}}</ref>  

The United States authorities subsequently informed certain [[News media in the United States|US news media]] regarding the possible Soviet attack, and the latter made the reports public on August 28 and the following days.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":6" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":21">{{Cite web |last=Gerson |first=Michael S. |date=November 2010 |title=The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict—Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969 |url=https://www.cna.org/reports/2010/d0022974.a2.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241218120231/https://www.cna.org/reports/2010/d0022974.a2.pdf |archive-date=2024-12-18 |website=[[Center for Naval Analyses]]}}</ref> Among them were a report appearing on ''[[The Washington Post]]'' on August 28,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Roberts |first=Chalmers M. |date=1969-08-28 |title=Russia Reported Eying Strikes at China A-Sites |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01284A001800110052-9.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250111060458/https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01284A001800110052-9.pdf |archive-date=2025-01-11 |website=[[CIA]] |publisher=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref> with another one reportedly mentioning further details that the Soviet Union had planned to launch nuclear missiles onto major Chinese cities including [[Beijing]], [[Changchun]] and [[Anshan]], as well as China's nuclear sites including [[Jiuquan]], [[Xichang]] and [[Lop Nur]].<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":28" /><ref name=":8" /> Meanwhile, unusual Soviet military activity in the [[Far East]] was detected by the US intelligence in the late August, with Soviet's ''[[Pravda]]'' on August 28 warning that a war with Communist China, if broke out, would involve "lethal armaments and modern means of delivery" and "would leave no continent untouched."<ref name=":28" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=[[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan)|Ministry of Foreign Affairs]] |date=1969-10-01 |title=Foreign Views |url=https://taiwantoday.tw/Politics/Taiwan-Review/6124/Foreign--Views |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250113100709/https://taiwantoday.tw/Politics/Taiwan-Review/6124/Foreign--Views |archive-date=2025-01-13 |access-date=2025-01-13 |website=[[Taiwan Today]] |language=en}}</ref> Besides the United States, the Soviet Union also approached a number of other foreign governments, including its Communist allies, and asked for their opinions and reactions if the Soviet were to launch nuclear strike against China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" /><ref name=":21" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Schumann |first=Anna |date=2023-11-13 |title=Fact Sheet: The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute |url=https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-sino-soviet-border-dispute/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240909112503/https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-sino-soviet-border-dispute/ |archive-date=2024-09-09 |access-date=2024-12-30 |website=[[Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation]] |language=en}}</ref>
[[File:Muhammed Ayub Khan and Alexei Kosygin (cropped).jpg|thumb|Alexei Kosygin, Premier of the Soviet Union from 1964-1980]]
As a result, the PRC soon entered the phase of war preparation.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8">{{Cite web |date=2010-05-23 |title=1969年，苏联欲对中国实施核打击 |trans-title=In 1969, the Soviet Union wanted to launch a nuclear strike on China |url=https://news.sina.com.cn/o/2010-05-23/095817551950s.shtml |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241209060523/https://news.sina.com.cn/o/2010-05-23/095817551950s.shtml |archive-date=2024-12-09 |access-date= |website=[[Sina Corporation|Sina]] |publisher=[[Changsha Evening News]] |language=zh}}</ref><ref name=":21" /> On September 11, 1969, [[Alexei Kosygin]], then [[Premier of the Soviet Union]], briefly met with Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] in Beijing after attending the funeral of [[Ho Chi Minh]] in [[Vietnam]], in order to de-escalate the tension.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22" /> On September 16, however, [[Victor Louis (journalist)|Victor Louis]], a Soviet journalist with a [[KGB]] background, again claimed in ''[[The Evening News (London newspaper)|The Evening News]]'' that the Soviet Union might launch a nuclear airstrike against China.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":9" /><ref name=":10">{{Cite web |last1=Lewis |first1=John Wilson |author-link1=John Wilson Lewis |last2=Xue |first2=Litai |date=2010-10-26 |title=1969年中国安危系于千钧一发——苏联核袭击计划胎死腹中 |trans-title=In 1969, China's security was at a critical moment——Soviet nuclear attack plan aborted |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK10/cr604.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241202202634/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK10/cr604.gb.html |archive-date=2024-12-02 |access-date= |website=China News Digest |publisher=领导者 |language=zh}}</ref><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22" /> [[Chiang Kai-shek]], then [[President of the Republic of China]], also recorded numerous outreaches from Victor Louis in 1968 and 1969 on potential cooperation to attack the Communist PRC and re-gain control of [[mainland China]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tai |first=Paul H. |date=July 2, 2010 |title=The Russia Option |url=https://www.hoover.org/research/russia-option |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220823202656/https://www.hoover.org/research/russia-option |archive-date=2022-08-23 |access-date=2025-01-13 |website=[[Hoover Institution]] |language=en}}</ref> In the late September, both the USSR and the PRC went on to conduct nuclear tests, with China successfully conducting its first [[underground nuclear test]] on September 22.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2011 |title=67. Editorial Note |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d67 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241103111455/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d67 |archive-date=2024-11-03 |access-date= |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref> The PRC leadership initially anticipated a Soviet attack on October 1, the [[National Day of China|National Day of PRC]], but when the attack did not come, they soon received new classified intelligence and formed another anticipation of October 20, the scheduled starting day of border negotiations with the Soviets.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22">{{Cite journal |last=Lüthi |first=Lorenz M. |date=2012 |title=Restoring Chaos to History: Sino-Soviet-American Relations, 1969 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23510691 |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=210 |issue=210 |pages=378–397 |doi=10.1017/S030574101200046X |jstor=23510691 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref> 

[[File:Tiananmen palace 1967.jpg|thumb|From left to right: [[Zhou Enlai]], Mao Zedong and [[Lin Biao]] (1967). Zhou and Lin were holding the ''[[Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung|Little Red Book]]'' on [[Tiananmen]], at the height of the [[Cultural Revolution]]. ]]

On October 14, 1969, the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] released an urgent notification of evacuation to the [[Party and state leaders]] in Beijing, requiring all leaders to leave Beijing by October 20 (they eventually returned to Beijing in 1971 after the [[Lin Biao incident|Lin Biao Incident]]), with Mao travelling to [[Wuhan]] (returned to Beijing in April 1970) and [[Lin Biao]] travelling to [[Suzhou, Jiangsu|Suzhou]].<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":13">{{Cite web |title=中国共产党大事记·1969年 |trans-title=Major events of the Chinese Communist Party (1969) |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64164/4416087.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240806101132/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64164/4416087.html |archive-date=2024-08-06 |access-date= |website=[[People's Daily|People's Net]] |language=zh}}</ref> All central government and military agencies were moved to underground nuclear-proof castles in [[Western Hills]] of Beijing, with Zhou Enlai remaining in charge.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":28" /><ref name=":8" /> On October 17, Lin Biao issued an emergency order to put all [[People's Liberation Army]] personnel on combat alert, and on October 18, Lin's followers released the order as "[[Order Number One (Lin Biao)|Order Number One]]".<ref name=":21" /><ref name=":13" /><ref name=":02">{{Citation |last=Xu |first=Jinzhou |title=9 Analysis of 1969's "Order Number One" |date=2015-01-01 |work=Selected Essays on the History of Contemporary China |pages=168–193 |url=https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004292673/B9789004292673_010.xml |access-date=2025-01-03 |publisher=Brill |language=en |isbn=978-90-04-29267-3}}</ref> Over 940,000 soldiers, together with more than four thousand planes and over six hundred ships received the evacuation order, while important documents and archives were relocated from Beijing to southwestern China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":28" /><ref name=":8" /> 

According to a number of sources, U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]] decided to intervene in the end, and on October 15, the Soviet side was informed that the United States would launch a nuclear attack on approximately 130 cities in the Soviet Union if the latter attacked China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":11" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8" /> The U.S. government confirmed that "the U.S. military, including its nuclear forces, secretly went on alert" in October 1969, known as the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test]], and that Nixon indeed once considered using nuclear weapons.<ref name=":9" /> Kissinger recalled in his memoirs that the United States "raised our profile somewhat to make clear that we were not indifferent to these Soviet threats."<ref name=":9" /> Eventually, the Soviet Union abandoned its planned attack on China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":11" /> Researchers and scholars have also speculated that the U.S. authorities might have ordered a nuclear alert in October 1969 in order to deter a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack on China, and such speculation, according to [[Scott Sagan]] and [[Jeremi Suri]], "appears logically to be the most likely one".<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":26">{{Cite journal |last1=Sagan |first1=Scott D. |last2=Suri |first2=Jeremi |date=2003 |title=The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137607 |journal=International Security |volume=27 |issue=4 |pages=156–158 |doi=10.1162/016228803321951126 |jstor=4137607 |issn=0162-2889|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name=":62">{{Cite web |last=Aftergood |first=Steven |date=2011-10-25 |title=Purpose of 1969 Nuclear Alert Remains a Mystery |url=https://fas.org/publication/1969_nuclear_alert/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240912163147/https://fas.org/web/20240912163147/https://fas.org/publication/1969_nuclear_alert/ |archive-date=2024-09-12 |access-date=2025-01-14 |website=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |language=en-US}}</ref> However, there were also evidence and arguments that the nuclear alert was Nixon's effort to influence [[Vietnam War|events in North Vietnam]].<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":26" /><ref name=":62" /> 

In the early 1970, the Chinese military eventually lowered their alert level.<ref name=":10" /> Since the late 1960s, the Soviet Union had replaced the US as the primary focus of Chinese nuclear developments.<ref name=":12" /><ref name=":14">{{Cite web |last=Tan |first=Lu |date=2010-02-05 |title=北京地下城往事：毛主席九字方针"深挖洞"(图) |trans-title=Stories of the underground city in Beijing: Chairman Mao's nine-word guideline |url=https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/news/2010/02-05/2111098.shtml |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240613053610/https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/news/2010/02-05/2111098.shtml |archive-date=2024-06-13 |access-date= |website=[[China News Service]] |publisher=[[Beijing Youth Daily]] |language=zh}}</ref> Throughout the 1970s, aware of the Soviet nuclear threat, the PRC built large-scale underground bomb shelters, such as the [[Underground City (Beijing)|Underground City]] in Beijing, and the military bomb shelters of [[Underground Project 131]], a command center in [[Hubei]], and the [[816 Nuclear Military Plant]], in the [[Fuling District]] of [[Chongqing]].<ref name=":14" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Zhiyong |date=April 15, 2005 |title=Beijing's Underground City |url=http://www.china.org.cn/english/travel/125961.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241211095658/http://www.china.org.cn/english/travel/125961.htm |archive-date=2024-12-11 |access-date=2024-12-30 |website=[[China Internet Information Center]]}}</ref>