Editing Value theory (section)

== History ==
The origin of value theory lies in the [[ancient period]], with early reflections on the good life and the ends worth pursuing.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|pp=636–637}} | {{harvnb|Li|2014|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Chang|2001|pp=68–69}} }}</ref> [[Socrates]] ({{circa|469–399 BCE}})<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=178}}</ref> identified the highest good as the right combination of [[knowledge]], [[pleasure]], and [[virtue]], holding that active inquiry is associated with pleasure while knowledge of the Good leads to virtuous action.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sharma|1991|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5tSOV8W1aCUC&pg=PA27 27–28]}} | {{harvnb|Devettere|2002|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sPwqJHoBD5EC&pg=PA33 33–34]}} | {{harvnb|Heinaman|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jEYlDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 123–124]}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|p=153}} }}</ref> [[Plato]] ({{circa|428–347 BCE|lk=no}})<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=156}}</ref> conceived [[the Good]] as a universal and changeless idea. It is the highest form in his [[theory of forms]], acting as the source of all other forms and the foundation of reality and knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Honderich|2005|p=349}} | {{harvnb|Bahm|1993|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jqSRrmtQ_WoC&pg=PA112 112]}} }}</ref> [[Aristotle]] (384–322 BCE)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=13}}</ref> saw [[eudaimonia]] as the highest good and ultimate goal of human life. He understood eudaimonia as a form of happiness or flourishing achieved through the exercise of virtues in accordance with [[reason]], leading to the full realization of human potential.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hiles|2008|pp=52–53}} | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|p=639}} | {{harvnb|Crisp|2005a|p=349}} }}</ref> [[Epicurus]] ({{circa|341–271 BCE|lk=no}}) proposed a nuanced [[egoistic]] hedonism, stating that personal pleasure is the greatest good while recommending moderation to avoid the negative effects of excessive desires and anxiety about the future.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|O'Keefe|loc=§ 5. Ethics}} | {{harvnb|Gaskin|2005|p=258}} | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|p=639}} }}</ref> According to the [[Stoicism|Stoics]], a virtuous life following nature and reason is the highest good. They thought that self-mastery and [[rationality]] lead to a pleasant [[Apatheia|equanimity]] independent of external circumstances.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Durand|Shogry|Baltzly|2023|loc=§ 4. Ethics}} | {{harvnb|Pigliucci|loc=§ 3. The Third Topos: Ethics, § 4. Apatheia and the Stoic Treatment of Emotions}} | {{harvnb|McDonald|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Z5JOEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA38 38]}} }}</ref> Influenced by Plato, [[Plotinus]] ({{circa|204/5–270 CE|lk=no}}) held that the Good is the ultimate principle of reality from which everything emanates. For him, [[evil]] is not a distinct opposing principle but merely a deficiency or absence of [[being]] resulting from a missing connection to the Good.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bahm|1993|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jqSRrmtQ_WoC&pg=PA103 103]}} | {{harvnb|Darr|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HgvYEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA108 108]}} | {{harvnb|Emilsson|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>

[[File:Half Portraits of the Great Sage and Virtuous Men of Old - Confucius.jpg|thumb|upright=.7|alt=Painting of a man with a long beard and mustache wearing traditional Chinese scholarly robes|[[Confucius]] viewed [[Ren (philosophy)|general benevolence towards humanity]] as the supreme virtue.<ref name="auto10">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ebrey|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vr81YoYK0c4C&pg=PA43 43]}} | {{harvnb|Sim|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=0WLABgAAQBAJ&pg=PA64 64, 74]}} | {{harvnb|Richey|loc=§ 6. Self-cultivation}} | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 1b. Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) of the Analects}} }}</ref>]]

In ancient [[Indian philosophy]], the idea that people are trapped in a [[Samsara|cycle of rebirths]] arose around 600 BCE.<ref>{{harvnb|Borgolte|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8cy8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA97 97]}}</ref> Many traditions adopted it, arguing that liberation from this cycle is the highest good.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sharma|1999|p=230}} | {{harvnb|Bartley|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=t28xEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA37 37–38, 136]}} }}</ref> [[Hindu philosophy]] distinguishes the [[Puruṣārtha|four fundamental values]] of [[dharma|duty]], [[artha|economic wealth]], [[kāma|sensory pleasure]], and [[mokṣa|liberation]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ranganathan|loc=§ 1a.iii. Puruṣārthas : dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa}} | {{harvnb|Sharma|1999|pp=223–225, 230}} | {{harvnb|Bailey|2011}} }}</ref> Many [[Āstika|Hindu schools of thought]] prioritize the value of liberation.<ref>{{harvnb|Sharma|1999|p=230}}</ref> A similar outlook is found in ancient [[Buddhist philosophy]], starting between the sixth and the fifth centuries BCE, where the cessation of [[Duḥkha|suffering]] through the attainment of [[Nirvana]] is considered the ultimate goal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wilson|2010}} | {{harvnb|Lougheed|2020|pp=243–244 }} | {{harvnb|Prasad|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6GPxDwAAQBAJ&pg=PR13 xiii–xiv, 21, 23]}}}}</ref> In [[ancient China]], [[Confucius]] ({{circa|551–479 BCE|lk=no}})<ref>{{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 1b. Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) of the Analects}}</ref> explored the role of [[self-cultivation]] in leading a virtuous life, viewing [[Ren (philosophy)|general benevolence towards humanity]] as the supreme virtue.<ref name="auto10"/> In comparing the highest virtue to water, [[Laozi]] (6th century BCE){{efn|This period is given in traditional sources. Some contemporary scholars have suggested later dates or questioned whether there was a single person by that name.<ref>{{harvnb|Chan|2018|loc=Lead section, § 2. Date and Authorship of the ''Laozi''}}</ref>}} emphasized the importance of living in harmony with the [[Tao|natural order of the universe]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Assandri|2021|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Ui5CEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA70 70–71]}} | {{harvnb|Slingerland|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=gSReaja3V3IC&pg=PA77 77]}} | {{harvnb|Chan|2018|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Lobel|2017|p=297}} }}</ref>

Religious teachings influenced value theory in the [[medieval period]]. Early [[Christian philosophy|Christian thinkers]], such as [[Augustine of Hippo]] (354–430 CE),<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=16}}</ref> adapted the theories of Plato and Plotinus into a religious framework. They identified God as the ultimate source of existence and goodness, seeing evil as a mere lack or privation of good.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bahm|1993|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jqSRrmtQ_WoC&pg=PA112 112]}} | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|p=639}} | {{harvnb|Darr|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HgvYEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA108 108]}} }}</ref> Drawing on [[Aristotelianism]], Christian philosopher [[Thomas Aquinas]] (1224–1274 CE)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=185}}</ref> said that communion with the divine, achieved through a [[beatific vision]] of God, is the [[Summum bonum|highest end]] of humans.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wieland|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=PtLyH02x60MC&pg=PA59 59]}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|2004a|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GbcuCf9TlDgC&pg=PA350 350]}} | {{harvnb|Peterson|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=C6u8kXWTjwwC&pg=PA235 235]}} }}</ref> In [[Islamic philosophy|Arabic–Persian philosophy]], [[Avicenna]] (980–1037 CE)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=19}}</ref> regarded the intellect as the highest human faculty. He thought that a contemplative life prepares humans for the greatest good, which is only attained in the afterlife when humans are free from bodily distractions.<ref>{{harvnb|McGinnis|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=M28EjkCdFecC&pg=PA209 209–210]}}</ref> In Chinese thought, the early [[neo-Confucian]] philosopher [[Han Yu]] (768–824 CE) identified the sage as an ideal role model who, through self-cultivation, achieves personal integrity expressed in harmony between theory and action in daily life.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Berthrong|loc=§ 3. The Emergence of Neo-Confucianism}} | {{harvnb|Hartman|1998}} }}</ref>

In the [[Early modern philosophy|early modern period]], [[Thomas Hobbes]] (1588–1679)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=88}}</ref> understood values as subjective phenomena that depend on a person's interests and examined mutual interests and benefits as a key principle of political decisions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hardin|2009|pp=6–7, 12, 16, 173, 177–179}} | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|loc=§ Hobbes}} | {{harvnb|Cowan|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA197 197, 210–211, 220]}} }}</ref> [[David Hume]] (1711–1776)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=91}}</ref> agreed with Hobbes's subjectivism, exploring [[Is–ought problem|how values differ from objective facts]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hardin|2009|pp=29, 51, 173, 177}} | {{harvnb|Li|2014|p=3}} }}</ref> [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=105}}</ref> asserted that the highest good is happiness in proportion to moral virtue. He emphasized the primacy of virtue by respecting the moral law and the inherent value of people, adding that moral virtue is ideally, but not always, accompanied by personal happiness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engstrom|1992|p=747}} | {{harvnb|Johnson|Cureton|2024|loc=§ 1. Aims and Methods of Moral Philosophy, § 2. Good Will, Moral Worth and Duty}} | {{harvnb|Direk|2014|pp=373–374}} }}</ref> [[Jeremy Bentham]] (1748–1832)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=25}}</ref> and [[John Stuart Mill]] (1806–1873)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=132}}</ref> formulated [[classical utilitarianism]], combining a [[hedonist]] theory about value with a [[consequentialist]] theory about right action.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|p=639}}  | {{harvnb|Sinnott-Armstrong|2023|loc=§ 1. Classic Utilitarianism}} | {{harvnb|Chenneville|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yn06DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA5 5]}} | {{harvnb|Hearn|1971|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=0z_z0RYmr38C&pg=PA2 2]}} }}</ref> [[Hermann Lotze]] (1817–1881)<ref>{{harvnb|Woodward|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=L4dsCQAAQBAJ&pg=PR1 i]}}</ref> developed a philosophy of values, holding that values make the world meaningful as an ordered whole centered around goodness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sullivan|2023|loc=§ 5.3 Value Theory}} | {{harvnb|Li|2014|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Sullivan|1998|loc=§ 4. Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Milkov|loc=§ 3a. Ethics}} | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|p=636}} }}</ref> Influenced by Lotze, the [[neo-Kantian]] philosopher [[Wilhelm Windelband]] (1848–1915)<ref>{{harvnb|Dafermos|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uC1bDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA20 20]}}</ref> understood philosophy as a theory of values, claiming that universal values determine the principles that all subjects should follow, including the norms of knowledge and action.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heis|2018|loc=§ 3.1 Conception of Philosophy: Philosophy as Theory of Value}} | {{harvnb|Kinzel|2024|loc=§ 2. From Kant to the Philosophy of Values}} | {{harvnb|Hiles|2008|p=52}} }}</ref> [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] (1844–1900)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=144}}</ref> held that values are human creations. He criticized traditional values in general and Christian values in particular, calling for a [[Transvaluation of values|revaluation of all values]] centered on life-affirmation, power, and excellence.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|pp=636, 639}} | {{harvnb|Li|2014|p=4}} | {{harvnb|Anderson|2024|loc=§ 3. Value Creation}} | {{harvnb|Hiles|2008|p=52}} | {{harvnb|Direk|2014|pp=374, 378}} }}</ref>

[[File:G-H-von-Wright-1961 (cropped).jpg|thumb|upright=.7|alt=Black-and-white photo of a man with combed hair wearing a knit sweater over a dark shirt|[[G. H. von Wright]] analyzed and compared diverse types of goodness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|pp=637–638}} | {{harvnb|Ylirisku|Arvola|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ed1ODwAAQBAJ&pg=PA53 53]}} }}</ref>]]

In the early 20th century, [[Pragmatism|Pragmatist]] philosopher [[John Dewey]] (1859–1952)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=52}}</ref> defended axiological [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]]. He distinguished values from value judgments, adding that the skill of correct value assessment must be learned through experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hart|1971|pp=36–38}} | {{harvnb|Marcum|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1arGI9NZcAkC&pg=PA192 192]}} }}</ref>{{efn|[[Clarence Irving Lewis]] (1883–1964) accepted and further elaborated many of Dewey's insights.<ref>{{harvnb|Hart|1971|pp=37–38}}</ref>}} [[G. E. Moore]] (1873–1958)<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=443}}</ref> developed and refined various axiological concepts, such as organic unity and the contrast between intrinsic and extrinsic value. He defended [[Ethical non-naturalism|non-naturalism]] about the nature of values and [[Ethical intuitionism|intuitionism]] about the knowledge of values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Findlay|1970|pp=2, 37–38, 41}} | {{harvnb|Dancy|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_78SDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 165]}} | {{harvnb|Hart|1971|p=33}} }}</ref> [[W. D. Ross]] (1877–1971)<ref>{{harvnb|Kunnan|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=IwgLEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA86 86]}}</ref> accepted and further elaborated on Moore's intuitionism, using it to formulate an axiological pluralism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism}} | {{harvnb|Simpson|loc=Lead section, § 6. Ross’s Ethical Theory: Main Components and Principles}} | {{harvnb|Findlay|1970|p=2}} }}</ref>{{efn|Ross is primarily known for his deontological pluralism about different types of [[prima facie duties|''prima facie'' duties]], which is related but not identical to his axiological pluralism about different types of values.<ref>{{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism}}</ref>}} [[R. B. Perry]] (1876–1957)<ref>{{harvnb|Anderson|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=SFVhEAAAQBAJ&pg=RA1-PA222 222]}}</ref> and [[David Prall|D. W. Prall]] (1886–1940)<ref>{{harvnb|Townsend|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GGgAAwAAQBAJ&pg=PR16 xvi]}}</ref> articulated systematic theories of value based on the idea that values originate in affective states such as interest and liking.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hart|1971|p=31}} | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|p=637}} }}</ref> [[Robert S. Hartman]] (1910–1973)<ref>{{harvnb|Edwards|Hartman|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=y8rAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA173 173]}}</ref> developed formal axiology, saying that values measure the level to which a thing embodies its ideal concept.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Edwards|2021|pp=3–4}} | {{harvnb|Hartman|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1UX7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA105 105–106]}} }}</ref> [[A. J. Ayer]] (1910–1989)<ref>{{harvnb|Tuboly|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=R-oEEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2]}}</ref> proposed anti-realism about values, arguing that [[Expressivism|value statements merely express]] the speaker's approval or disapproval.<ref>{{harvnb|Hart|1971|pp=34–35}}</ref> A different type of anti-realism, introduced by [[J. L. Mackie]] (1917–1981),<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=406}}</ref> suggests that [[Error theory|all value assertions are false]] since no values exist.<ref>{{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-msmrkE-67IC&pg=PA11 11–12]}}</ref> [[G. H. von Wright]] (1916–2003)<ref>{{harvnb|Rosenkrantz|Hoffman|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DQW9nyBCClMC&pg=PA332 332]}}</ref> provided a [[conceptual analysis]] of the term ''good'' by distinguishing different meanings or varieties of goodness, such as the technical goodness of a good driver and the hedonic goodness of a good meal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|pp=637–638}} | {{harvnb|Ylirisku|Arvola|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ed1ODwAAQBAJ&pg=PA53 53]}} }}</ref>

In [[continental philosophy]], [[Franz Brentano]] (1838–1917)<ref>{{harvnb|Kriegel|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3e9IDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2]}}</ref> formulated an early version of the fitting-attitude theory of value, saying that a thing is good if it is fitting to have a positive attitude towards it, such as love.<ref name="auto9">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2018|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3e9IDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10–11, 218, 221–222]}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4kUlDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA12 12]}} }}</ref> In the 1890s, his students [[Alexius Meinong]] (1853–1920)<ref name="auto">{{harvnb|Kuijper|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2-FZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA298 298]}}</ref> and [[Christian von Ehrenfels]] (1859–1932)<ref>{{harvnb|Zimmer|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=wkQrDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA135 135]}}</ref> conceived the idea of a general theory of values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|p=637}} | {{harvnb|Hart|1971|pp=30–31}} }}</ref> [[Edmund Husserl]] (1859–1938),<ref name="auto"/> another of Brentano's students, developed [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]] and applied this approach to the study of values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|p=637}} | {{harvnb|Direk|2014|pp=371–372}} }}</ref> Following Husserl's approach, [[Max Scheler]] (1874–1928) and [[Nicolai Hartmann]] (1882–1950) each proposed a comprehensive system of [[axiological ethics]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|p=637}} | {{harvnb|Findlay|1970|p=2}} | {{harvnb|Hart|1971|p=32}} | {{harvnb|Direk|2014|pp=371–372}} | {{harvnb|Løgstrup|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aurkDwAAQBAJ&pg=PR141 105]}} }}</ref> Asserting that values have objective reality, they explored how different value types form a hierarchy and examined the problems of value conflicts and right decisions from this hierarchical perspective.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frankena|2006|pp=637–639}} | {{harvnb|Findlay|1970|p=2}} | {{harvnb|Hart|1971|p=32}} }}</ref> [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=83}}</ref> criticized value theory, claiming that it rests on a mistaken [[metaphysical]] perspective by understanding values as aspects of things.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Direk|2014|pp=372–373, 384–386}} | {{harvnb|Findlay|1970|pp=2–3}} | {{harvnb|Sullivan|2023|loc=§ 5.3 Value Theory}} }}</ref> [[Existentialist]] philosopher [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] (1905–1980)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=168}}</ref> suggested that values do not exist by themselves but are actively created, emphasizing the role of human [[freedom]], responsibility, and [[Authenticity (philosophy)|authenticity]] in the process.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Abelson|Nielsen|2006|pp=426–428}} | {{harvnb|Direk|2014|pp=384–385}} }}</ref>