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==Media and accountability== Econometric research has found that [[v:Media and corruption#Better media means less corruption|countries with greater press freedom tend to have less corruption.]]<ref>{{citation | last1 = Brunetti | first1 = Aymo | last2 = Weder | first2 = Beatrice | author2-link = w:Beatrice Weder di Mauro | year = 2003 | title = A free press is bad news for corruption | journal = Journal of Public Economics | volume = 87 | issue = 7–8 | pages = 1801–1824 | doi=10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00186-4}}</ref> Greater political accountability and lower corruption were more likely where newspaper consumption was higher, according to data from roughly 100 countries and from different states in the US.<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{citation | last1 = Adserà | first1 = Alícia | last2 = Boix | first2 = Carles | author2-link = Carles Boix | last3 = Payne | first3 = Mark | year = 2000 | title = Are You Being Served?: Political Accountability and Quality of Government | work = Working Paper | issue = 438 | publisher = Inter-American Development Bank Research Department | url = http://www.princeton.edu/~cboix/JLEO-paper.pdf | access-date = 17 August 2014}} |2={{citation | last1 = Adserà | first1 = Alícia | last2 = Boix | first2 = Carles | author2-link = Carles Boix | last3 = Payne | first3 = Mark | year = 2003 | title = Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government | journal = Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization | volume = 19 | issue = 2 | pages = 445–490 | url = http://www.princeton.edu/~cboix/JLEO-paper.pdf | access-date = 31 August 2014 | doi=10.1093/jleo/19.2.445| hdl = 10419/87999 | hdl-access = free}} }}</ref> Congressmen{{Where|date=July 2023}} who receive less press coverage are less likely to produce a positive impact for their constituencies, are less likely to {{clarify|text=stand witness before|reason=Don't members of Congress usually preside over such hearings rather than appear as witnesses before them?|date=July 2023}} congressional hearings, and federal spending for their district is lower.<ref name="Snyder 2010 355–408">{{citation | last1 = Snyder | first1 = James M. | last2 = Strömberg | first2 = David | year = 2010 | title = Press Coverage and Political Accountability | journal = [[Journal of Political Economy]] | volume=118 |issue=2 |pages=355–408 |doi=10.1086/652903 | citeseerx = 10.1.1.210.8371 | s2cid = 154635874 }}</ref> One explanation for the positive impact of media on accountability stems from Besley and Burgess' work.<ref name="Besley 2001 629–640">{{citation | last1 = Besley | first1 = Timothy | last2 = Burgess | first2 = Robin | year = 2001 | title = Political agency, government responsiveness and the role of the media | journal = [[European Economic Review]] | volume=45 |issue = 4–6 |pages=629–640 |doi=10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00133-7 }}</ref> They argue that media resolves the information asymmetries between citizens and government and provides a way of overcoming obstacles preventing political action.<ref name="Besley 2001 629–640" /> When elected officials and the public gain information, the public is better equipped to hold politicians accountable and politicians are more responsive.<ref>{{citation | last1 = Barbera | first1 = Pablo| last2 = Casas | first2 = Andreu | last3 = Nagler | first3 = Jonathan | last4 = Egan | first4 = Patrick | last5 = Bonneau | first5 = Richard | last6 = Jost | first6 = John | last7 = Tucker | first7 = Joshua | year = 2019 | title = Who Leads? Who Follows? Measuring Issue Attention and Agenda Setting by Legislators and the Mass Public Using Social Media Data | journal = [[American Political Science Review]] | volume=113 |issue = 4 |pages=883–901 |doi=10.1017/S0003055419000352 | pmid = 33303996| pmc = 7672368| doi-access = free }}</ref><ref name="Snyder 2010 355–408" /> Ferraz & Finan demonstrate this in the Brazilian context. In their work, they find releasing audit reports prior to elections creates a more informed electorate which holds incumbent officials accountable.<ref name="Ferraz 2008 703–745">{{citation | last1 = Ferraz | first1 = Claudio | last2 = Finan | first2 = Frederico| year = 2008 | title = Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes | journal = [[Quarterly Journal of Economics]] | volume=123 |issue=2 |pages=703–745 |doi=10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703 | s2cid = 8148400 }}</ref> While evidence supports the positive impact of press freedom on political accountability, other work highlights the significance of factors such as media concentration and ownership as government tools for influencing or controlling news content.<ref>{{citation | last1 = Besley | first1 = Timothy | last2 = Prat | first2 = Andrea| year = 2006 | title = Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability | journal = [[American Economic Review]] | volume=96 |issue=3 |pages=720–736 |doi=10.1257/aer.96.3.720 | s2cid = 13849989 | url = http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3767/1/Handcuffs_for_the_Grabbing_Hand_Media_Capture_and_Government_Accountability.pdf }}</ref> Non-democratic regimes use media for a variety of purposes such as – (i) to enhance regime resilience, (ii) censor, or (iii) strategically distract the public.<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{citation | last1 = Munger | first1 = Kevin | last2 = Bonneau | first2 = Richard | last3 = Nagler | first3 = Jonathan | last4 = Tucker | first4 = Joshua | year = 2019 | title = Elites Tweet to Get Feet Off the Streets: Measuring Regime Social Media Strategies During Protest | journal = Political Science Research and Methods | volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=815–834 |doi=10.1017/psrm.2018.3 | doi-access = free }} |2={{citation | last1 = King | first1 = Gary | last2 = Pan | first2 = Jennifer | last3 = Roberts | first3 = Margaret | year = 2013 | title = How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression | journal = [[American Political Science Review]] | volume=107 |issue=2 |pages=326–343 |doi=10.1017/S0003055413000014 | s2cid = 53577293 | url = http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11878767| url-access = subscription }} |3={{citation | last1 = King | first1 = Gary | last2 = Pan | first2 = Jennifer | last3 = Roberts | first3 = Margaret | year = 2013 | title = How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument | journal = [[American Political Science Review]] | volume=111 |issue=3 |pages=484–501 |doi=10.1017/S0003055417000144 | doi-access = free}} }}</ref> Control of the media may also be especially beneficial to incumbents in new or developing democracies, who consider media control a spoil of office.<ref>{{citation | last1 = Boas | first1 = Taylor | last2 = Hidalgo | first2 = F. Daniel | year = 2011 | title = Controlling the Airwaves: Incumbency Advantage and Community Radio in Brazil | journal = [[American Journal of Political Science]] | volume=55 |issue=4 |pages=869–885 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00532.x}}</ref> An analysis of the evolution of mass media in the U.S. and Europe since World War II noted mixed results from the growth of the Internet: "The digital revolution has been good for freedom of expression [and] information [but] has had mixed effects on freedom of the press": It has disrupted traditional sources of funding, and new forms of Internet journalism have replaced only a tiny fraction of what's been lost.<ref name=Starr>{{citation | last = Starr| first = Paul | year = 2012 | title = An Unexpected Crisis: The News Media in Post-industrial Democracies | journal = International Journal of Press/Politics | volume = 17 | issue = 2 | pages = 234–242 | url = https://www.princeton.edu/~starr/articles/articles11/Starr_UnexpectedCrisis_2011.PDF | access-date = 31 August 2014 | quote = Since 2000, the newspaper industry alone has lost an estimated “$1.6 billion in annual reporting and editing capacity... or roughly 30 per cent", but the new non-profit money coming into journalism has made up less than one-tenth that amount.| doi = 10.1177/1940161211434422 | s2cid = 146729965 }}</ref> [[Electoral reform in the United States#Citizen funding of news|Various systems have been proposed for increasing the funds available for investigative journalism]] that allow individual citizens to direct small amounts of government funds to news outlets or investigative journalism projects of their choice.
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