Editing Conspiracy theory (section)

== Psychology ==
The widespread belief in conspiracy theories has become a topic of interest for sociologists, psychologists, and experts in folklore since at least the 1960s, when [[John F. Kennedy assassination conspiracy theories|a number of conspiracy theories]] arose regarding [[John F. Kennedy assassination|the assassination]] of U.S. President [[John F. Kennedy]]. [[Sociologist]] Türkay Salim Nefes underlines the political nature of conspiracy theories. He suggests that one of the most important characteristics of these accounts is their attempt to unveil the "real but hidden" power relations in social groups.<ref name="Turkay Nefes"/><ref name="Nefes"/> The term "conspiracism" was popularized by academic Frank P. Mintz in the 1980s. According to Mintz, conspiracism denotes "belief in the primacy of conspiracies in the unfolding of history":<ref name=Mintz1985>{{cite book|last=Mintz|first=Frank P.|title=The Liberty Lobby and the American Right: Race, Conspiracy, and Culture|publisher=Greenwood|location=Westport, CT|isbn=978-0-313-24393-6|year=1985}}</ref>{{rp|4}}

{{blockquote|Conspiracism serves the needs of diverse political and social groups in America and elsewhere. It identifies elites, blames them for economic and social catastrophes, and assumes that things will be better once popular action can remove them from positions of power. As such, conspiracy theories do not typify a particular epoch or ideology.<ref name=Mintz1985/>{{rp|199}}}}

Research suggests, on a psychological level, '''conspiracist ideation'''—belief in conspiracy theories—can be harmful or pathological,<ref name="Freeman 595–604"/><ref name="Barron 156–159"/> and is highly correlated with [[psychological projection]], as well as with [[paranoia]], which is predicted by the degree of a person's [[Machiavellianism (psychology)|Machiavellianism]].<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Douglas|first1=Karen M.|last2=Sutton|first2=Robbie M.|date=12 April 2011|title=Does it take one to know one? Endorsement of conspiracy theories is influenced by personal willingness to conspire|url=http://kar.kent.ac.uk/26187/1/Douglas%20%26%20Sutton%202011%20BJSP.pdf|journal=British Journal of Social Psychology|volume=10|issue=3|pages=544–552|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.2010.02018.x|pmid=21486312|s2cid=7318352|access-date=28 December 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181103180834/https://kar.kent.ac.uk/26187/1/Douglas%20%26%20Sutton%202011%20BJSP.pdf|archive-date=3 November 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> The propensity to believe in conspiracy theories is strongly associated with the mental health disorder of [[schizotypy]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Barron|first1=David|last2=Furnham|first2=Adrian|last3=Weis|first3=Laura|last4=Morgan|first4=Kevin D.|last5=Towell|first5=Tony|last6=Swami|first6=Viren|date=January 2018|title=The relationship between schizotypal facets and conspiracist beliefs via cognitive processes|journal=Psychiatry Research|volume=259|pages=15–20|doi=10.1016/j.psychres.2017.10.001|pmid=29024855|s2cid=43823184|url=http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/20297/1/1-s2.0-S0165178117312301-main-1.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Darwin|first1=Hannah|last2=Neave|first2=Nick|last3=Holmes|first3=Joni|date=1 June 2011|title=Belief in conspiracy theories. The role of paranormal belief, paranoid ideation and schizotypy|journal=Personality and Individual Differences|language=en|volume=50|issue=8|pages=1289–1293|doi=10.1016/j.paid.2011.02.027}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Barron|first1=David|last2=Morgan|first2=Kevin|last3=Towell|first3=Tony|last4=Altemeyer|first4=Boris|last5=Swami|first5=Viren|date=1 November 2014|title=Associations between schizotypy and belief in conspiracist ideation|journal=Personality and Individual Differences|language=en|volume=70|pages=156–159|doi=10.1016/j.paid.2014.06.040|url=http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/14570/1/1-s2.0-S0191886914003821-main.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|title=The Relationship Between Schizotypal Facets and Conspiracist Beliefs via Cognitive Processes|last1=D|first1=Barron|last2=A|first2=Furnham|date=January 2018|language=en|pmid=29024855|last3=L|first3=Weis|last4=Kd|first4=Morgan|last5=T|first5=Towell|last6=V|first6=Swami|journal=Psychiatry Research|volume=259|pages=15–20|doi=10.1016/j.psychres.2017.10.001|s2cid=43823184|url=http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/20297/1/1-s2.0-S0165178117312301-main-1.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Dagnall|first1=Neil|last2=Drinkwater|first2=Kenneth|last3=Parker|first3=Andrew|last4=Denovan|first4=Andrew|last5=Parton|first5=Megan|date=2015|title=Conspiracy theory and cognitive style: a worldview|journal=Frontiers in Psychology|volume=6|pages=206|doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00206|pmc=4340140|pmid=25762969|doi-access=free}}</ref> Conspiracy theories once limited to fringe audiences have become commonplace in [[mass media]], emerging as a [[cultural phenomenon]] of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.{{sfn|Barkun|2003|p=58}}<ref name="Camp 1997" /><ref name="Goldberg 2001" /><ref name="Fenster 2008" /> Exposure to conspiracy theories in news media and popular entertainment increases receptiveness to conspiratorial ideas, and has also increased the social acceptability of fringe beliefs.<ref name="DouglasUscinski2019"/><ref name="StojanovHalberstadt2020">{{cite journal|last1=Stojanov|first1=Ana|last2=Halberstadt|first2=Jamin|title=Does lack of control lead to conspiracy beliefs? A meta-analysis|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|volume=50|issue=5|year=2020|pages=955–968|doi=10.1002/ejsp.2690|s2cid=219744361}}</ref>

Conspiracy theories often use complicated and detailed arguments, including ones that appear analytical or scientific. However, belief in conspiracy theories is primarily driven by emotion.<ref name="van ProoijenDouglas2018"/> One of the most widely confirmed facts about conspiracy theories is that belief in a single conspiracy theory is often associated with belief in other conspiracy theories.<ref name="Thresher-Andrews2013"/><ref name="SuttonDouglas2020">{{cite journal|last1=Sutton|first1=Robbie M|last2=Douglas|first2=Karen M|title=Conspiracy theories and the conspiracy mindset: implications for political ideology|journal=Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences|volume=34|year=2020|pages=118–122|doi=10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.02.015|s2cid=214735855|doi-access=free}}</ref> This even applies when the conspiracy theories directly contradict each other—e.g., believing that [[Osama bin Laden]] was already dead before his compound in Pakistan was attacked makes the same person more likely to believe that he is still alive. One conclusion from this finding is that the content of a conspiracist belief is less important than the idea of a coverup by the authorities.<ref name="Thresher-Andrews2013"/><ref name="SciAm2013">{{Cite web|title=Why People Believe in Conspiracy Theories|last=Linden|first=Sander van der|work=Scientific American|date=30 April 2013|access-date=16 October 2020|url=https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-people-believe-conspiracy-theories/}}</ref><ref name="BilewiczCichocka2015">{{cite book|author1=Michal Bilewicz|author2=Aleksandra Cichocka|author3=Wiktor Soral|title=The Psychology of Conspiracy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WrJhCQAAQBAJ|date=15 May 2015|publisher=[[Routledge]]|isbn=978-1-317-59952-4}}</ref> [[Analytical thinking]] aids in reducing belief in conspiracy theories, in part because it emphasizes rational and critical cognition.<ref name="Douglas 538–542">{{Cite journal|last1=Douglas|first1=Karen M.|last2=Sutton|first2=Robbie M.|last3=Cichocka|first3=Aleksandra|date=1 December 2017|title=The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories|journal=Current Directions in Psychological Science|language=en|volume=26|issue=6|pages=538–542|doi=10.1177/0963721417718261|pmc=5724570|pmid=29276345}}</ref>

Some psychological scientists assert that explanations related to conspiracy theories can be, and often are, "internally consistent" with strong beliefs previously held prior to the event that sparked the belief in a conspiracy.<ref name="Douglas 538–542"/> People who believe in conspiracy theories tend to believe in other unsubstantiated claims, including [[pseudoscience]] and [[paranormal]] phenomena.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Bensley|first1=D. Alan|last2=Lilienfeld|first2=Scott O.|last3=Rowan|first3=Krystal A.|last4=Masciocchi|first4=Christopher M.|last5=Grain|first5=Florent|title=The generality of belief in unsubstantiated claims|journal=Applied Cognitive Psychology|date=2020|volume=34|issue=1|pages=16–28|doi=10.1002/acp.3581|hdl=11343/286891|s2cid=197707663|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/acp.3581|hdl-access=free}}</ref>

===Attractions===
Psychological motives for believing in conspiracy theories can be categorized as epistemic, existential, or social. These motives are particularly acute in vulnerable and disadvantaged populations. However, it does not appear that the beliefs help to address these motives; in fact, they may be self-defeating, acting to make the situation worse instead.<ref name="Douglas 538–542"/><ref name="SciAm2019"/> For example, while conspiratorial beliefs can result from a perceived sense of [[empowerment|powerlessness]], exposure to conspiracy theories immediately suppresses personal feelings of autonomy and control. Furthermore, they also make people less likely to take actions that could improve their circumstances.<ref name="Douglas 538–542"/><ref name="SciAm2019"/>

This is additionally supported by the fact that conspiracy theories have a number of disadvantageous attributes.<ref name="Douglas 538–542"/> For example, they promote a hostile and distrustful view of other people and groups allegedly acting based on antisocial and cynical motivations. This is expected to lead to increased [[social alienation]] and [[anomie]] and reduced [[social capital]]. Similarly, they depict the public as ignorant and powerless against the alleged conspirators, with important aspects of society determined by malevolent forces, a viewpoint that is likely to be disempowering.<ref name="Douglas 538–542"/>

Each person may endorse conspiracy theories for one of many different reasons.<ref name="GoreisVoracek2019"/> The most consistently demonstrated characteristics of people who find conspiracy theories appealing are a feeling of [[Social alienation|alienation]], unhappiness or dissatisfaction with their situation, an unconventional worldview, and a sense of [[disempowerment]].<ref name="GoreisVoracek2019"/> While various aspects of personality affect susceptibility to conspiracy theories, none of the [[Big Five personality traits]] are associated with conspiracy beliefs.<ref name="GoreisVoracek2019">{{cite journal|last1=Goreis|first1=Andreas|last2=Voracek|first2=Martin|title=A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Psychological Research on Conspiracy Beliefs: Field Characteristics, Measurement Instruments, and Associations With Personality Traits|journal=Frontiers in Psychology|volume=10|year=2019|page=205|doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00205|pmid=30853921|pmc=6396711|doi-access=free}}</ref>

The political scientist [[Michael Barkun]], discussing the usage of "conspiracy theory" in contemporary American culture, holds that this term is used for a belief that explains an event as the result of a secret plot by exceptionally powerful and cunning conspirators to achieve a malevolent end.{{sfn|Barkun|2003|p=3}}<ref name="New Internationalist 1 2004"/> According to Barkun, the appeal of conspiracism is threefold:

{{blockquote |
* First, conspiracy theories claim to explain what [[institutional analysis]] cannot. They appear to make sense out of a world that is otherwise confusing. 
* Second, they do so in an appealingly simple way, by dividing the world sharply between [[Manichaeism|the forces of light, and the forces of darkness]]. They trace all evil back to a single source, the conspirators and their agents. 
* Third, conspiracy theories are often presented as special, [[Western esotericism|secret knowledge]] unknown or unappreciated by others. For conspiracy theorists, the masses are a [[sheeple|brainwashed herd]], while the conspiracy theorists in the know can congratulate themselves on penetrating the plotters' deceptions.<ref name="New Internationalist 1 2004"/>}}

This third point is supported by the research of Roland Imhoff, professor of [[social psychology]] at the [[Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz]]. His research suggests that the smaller the minority believing in a specific theory, the more attractive it is to conspiracy theorists.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Imhoff|first1=Roland|title=Conspiracy Theorists Just Want to Feel Special|url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/conspiracy-theorists-just-want-to-feel-special/|website=motherboard.vice.com|access-date=6 July 2018|date=17 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190428135251/https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/9kg8j3/conspiracy-theorists-just-want-to-feel-special|archive-date=28 April 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Humanistic psychologists]] argue that even if a posited cabal behind an alleged conspiracy is almost always perceived as hostile, there often remains an element of reassurance for theorists. This is because it is a consolation to imagine that humans create difficulties in human affairs and remain within human control. If a cabal can be implicated, there may be a hope of breaking its power or of joining it. Belief in the power of a cabal is an implicit assertion of human dignity—an unconscious affirmation that man is responsible for his own destiny.<ref name="Baigent, Leigh & Lincoln 1987">{{cite book|author1=Baigent, Michael|author2=Leigh, Richard|author3=Lincoln, Henry|title=The Messianic Legacy|publisher=Henry Holt & Co|year=1987|isbn=978-0-8050-0568-4}}</ref>

People formulate conspiracy theories to explain, for example, power relations in social groups and the perceived existence of evil forces.{{efn|[[Michael Barkun|Barkun]] 2003: "The essence of conspiracy beliefs lies in attempts to delineate and explain evil. At their broadest, conspiracy theories 'view history as controlled by massive, demonic forces.'&nbsp;... For our purposes, a ''conspiracy belief'' is the belief that an organization made up of individuals or groups was or is acting covertly to achieve a malevolent end."{{sfn|Barkun|2003|p=3}}}}<ref name="New Internationalist 1 2004">{{cite web|author=Berlet, Chip|author-link=Chip Berlet|title=Interview: Michael Barkun|url=http://www.publiceye.org/antisemitism/nw_barkun.html|date=September 2004|quote=The issue of conspiracism versus rational criticism is a tough one, and some people (Jodi Dean, for example) argue that the former is simply a variety of the latter. I don't accept this, although I certainly acknowledge that there have been conspiracies. They simply don't have the attributes of almost superhuman power and cunning that conspiracists attribute to them.|access-date=1 October 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090402214330/http://www.publiceye.org/antisemitism/nw_barkun.html|archive-date=2 April 2009|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Turkay Nefes">{{cite journal|doi=10.1111/1467-954X.12016|volume=61|issue=2|title=Political parties' perceptions and uses of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in Turkey|year=2013|journal=The Sociological Review|pages=247–264|last1=Nefes|first1=Türkay S|s2cid=145632390}}</ref><ref name="Nefes">{{cite journal|doi=10.1111/j.1467-6443.2012.01434.x|volume=25|issue=3|title=The History of the Social Constructions of Dönmes (Converts)*|year=2012|journal=Journal of Historical Sociology|pages=413–439|last1=Nefes|first1=Türkay S.}}</ref> Proposed psychological origins of conspiracy theorising include projection; the personal need to explain "a significant event [with] a significant cause;" and the product of various kinds and stages of thought disorder, such as paranoid disposition, ranging in severity to diagnosable mental illnesses. Some people prefer socio-political explanations over the insecurity of encountering [[randomness|random]], unpredictable, or otherwise inexplicable events.<ref name="business.time.com">{{Cite magazine |date=2009-06-01 |title=Wall Streeters like conspiracy theories. Always have |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |last=Fox |first=Justin |url=https://business.time.com/2009/10/01/wall-streeters-like-conspiracy-theories-always-have/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120302114125/https://business.time.com/2009/10/01/wall-streeters-like-conspiracy-theories-always-have/ |archive-date=2012-03-02}}</ref><ref name="Goertzel 1994 733–744">{{cite journal|author=Goertzel|year=1994|title=Belief in Conspiracy Theories|doi=10.2307/3791630|url=http://www.crab.rutgers.edu/~goertzel/conspire.doc <!--|pages=733–44-->|pages=731–742|access-date=7 August 2006|jstor=3791630|journal=Political Psychology|volume=15|issue=4|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060831210103/http://crab.rutgers.edu/~goertzel/CONSPIRE.doc|archive-date=31 August 2006|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name="Douglas 2008 210–222">{{cite journal|first1=Karen|last1=Douglas|first2=Robbie|last2=Sutton|year=2008|title=The hidden impact of conspiracy theories: Perceived and actual influence of theories surrounding the death of Princess Diana|journal=Journal of Social Psychology|volume=148|issue=2|pages=210–22|doi=10.3200/SOCP.148.2.210-222|pmid=18512419|s2cid=8717161}}</ref><ref name="harpers=1964"/><ref name="Hodapp 2008">{{cite book|title=Conspiracy Theories & Secret Societies For Dummies|first=Christopher|last=Hodapp|author2=Alice Von Kannon|publisher=[[John Wiley & Sons]]|year=2008|isbn=978-0-470-18408-0|url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780470184080}}</ref><ref name="Cohen">{{cite news|last=Cohen|first=Roger|author-link=Roger Cohen|title=The Captive Arab Mind|newspaper=The New York Times|date=20 December 2010|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/opinion/21iht-edcohen21.html|access-date=18 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170625080138/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/opinion/21iht-edcohen21.html|archive-date=25 June 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> According to Berlet and Lyons, "Conspiracism is a particular narrative form of scapegoating that frames demonized enemies as part of a vast insidious plot against the common good, while it valorizes the scapegoater as a hero for sounding the alarm".<ref>{{cite book|last=Berlet|first=Chip|author-link=Chip Berlet|author2=Lyons, Matthew N.|title=Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort|url=https://archive.org/details/rightwingpopulis00berlrich|url-access=registration|publisher=Guilford Press|location=New York|year=2000|isbn=978-1-57230-562-5|access-date=9 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191216201705/https://archive.org/details/rightwingpopulis00berlrich|archive-date=16 December 2019|url-status=live}}{{page needed|date=September 2011}}</ref>

===Causes===
{{Anchor|Origins}}

Some psychologists believe that a search for meaning is common in conspiracism. Once cognized, [[confirmation bias]] and avoidance of [[cognitive dissonance]] may reinforce the belief. When a conspiracy theory has become embedded within a social group, [[communal reinforcement]] may also play a part.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Swami|first1=Viren|last2=Coles|first2=Rebecca|last3=Stieger|first3=Stefan|last4=Pietschnig|first4=Jakob|last5=Furnham|first5=Adrian|last6=Rehim|first6=Sherry|last7=Voracek|first7=Martin|date=2011|title=Conspiracist ideation in Britain and Austria: Evidence of a monological belief system and associations between individual psychological differences and real-world and fictitious conspiracy theories|journal=British Journal of Psychology|volume=102|issue=3|pages=443–463|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8295.2010.02004.x|pmid=21751999}}</ref>

Inquiry into possible motives behind the accepting of irrational conspiracy theories has linked<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=van Prooijen|first1=Jan-Willem|last2=Jostmann|first2=Nils B.|date=17 December 2012|title=Belief in conspiracy theories: The influence of uncertainty and perceived morality|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|volume=43|issue=1|pages=109–115|doi=10.1002/ejsp.1922}}</ref> these beliefs to distress resulting from an event that occurred, such as the [[September 11 attacks|events of 9/11.]] Additional research suggests that "delusional ideation" is the trait most likely to indicate a stronger belief in conspiracy theories.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Dagnall|first1=Neil|last2=Drinkwater|first2=Kenneth|last3=Parker|first3=Andrew|last4=Denovan|first4=Andrew|last5=Parton|first5=Megan|date=2015|title=Conspiracy theory and cognitive style: a worldview|journal=Frontiers in Psychology|language=en|volume=6|page=206|doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00206|pmid=25762969|pmc=4340140|doi-access=free}}</ref> Research also shows an increased attachment to these irrational beliefs leads to a decreased desire for civic engagement.<ref name="BrothertonFrench2014"/> Belief in conspiracy theories is correlated with low intelligence, lower analytical thinking, [[anxiety disorder]]s, [[paranoia]], and [[authoritarian]] beliefs.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Bullock|first1=John G.|last2=Lenz|first2=Gabriel|date=2019-05-11|title=Partisan Bias in Surveys|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=22|issue=1|pages=325–342|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-050904|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Scientists find a link between low intelligence and acceptance of 'pseudo-profound bulls***'|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/scientists-find-link-between-low-intelligence-and-acceptance-pseudo-profound-bulls-a6757731.html|newspaper=The Independent|last=Bolton|first=Doug|date=2 December 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|title=The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories|volume=26|issue=6|doi=10.1177/0963721417718261|last1=Douglas|first1=Karen M.|last2=Sutton|first2=Robbie M.|last3=Cichocka|first3=Aleksandra|journal=Current Directions in Psychological Science|date=7 December 2017|pages=538–542|pmid=29276345|pmc=5724570}}</ref>

Professor [[Quassim Cassam]] argues that conspiracy theorists hold their beliefs due to flaws in their thinking and, more precisely, their intellectual character. He cites philosopher [[Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski]] and her book ''Virtues of the Mind'' in outlining intellectual virtues (such as humility, caution, and carefulness) and intellectual vices (such as gullibility, carelessness, and closed-mindedness). Whereas intellectual virtues help reach sound examination, intellectual vices "impede effective and responsible inquiry", meaning that those prone to believing in conspiracy theories possess certain vices while lacking necessary virtues.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Cassam|first1=Quassim|title=Bad Thinkers|url=https://aeon.co/essays/the-intellectual-character-of-conspiracy-theorists|publisher=Aeon|date=13 March 2015}}</ref>

Some researchers have suggested that conspiracy theories could be partially caused by the human brain's mechanisms for detecting dangerous coalitions. Such a mechanism could have been helpful in the small-scale environment humanity evolved in but is mismatched in a modern, complex society and thus "misfire", perceiving conspiracies where none exist.<ref>van Prooijen, Jan-Willem, and Van Vugt, Mark (2018) "Conspiracy theories: Evolved functions and psychological mechanisms" ''[[Perspectives on Psychological Science]]'' v.13, n.6, pp.770–788</ref>

====Projection====
Some historians have argued that [[psychological projection]] is prevalent amongst conspiracy theorists. According to the argument, this projection is manifested in the form of attributing undesirable characteristics of the self to the conspirators. Historian Richard Hofstadter stated that:

{{blockquote|This enemy seems on many counts a projection of the self; both the ideal and the unacceptable aspects of the self are attributed to him. A fundamental paradox of the paranoid style is the imitation of the enemy. The enemy, for example, may be the cosmopolitan intellectual, but the paranoid will outdo him in the apparatus of scholarship, even of pedantry.&nbsp;...&nbsp;The Ku Klux Klan imitated Catholicism to the point of donning priestly vestments, developing an elaborate ritual and an equally elaborate hierarchy. The [[John Birch Society]] emulates Communist cells and quasi-secret operation through "front" groups, and preaches a ruthless prosecution of the ideological war along lines very similar to those it finds in the Communist enemy. Spokesmen of the various fundamentalist anti-Communist "crusades" openly express their admiration for the dedication, discipline, and strategic ingenuity the Communist cause calls forth.<ref name="harpers=1964"/>}}

Hofstadter also noted that "sexual freedom" is a vice frequently attributed to the conspiracist's target group, noting that "very often the fantasies of true believers reveal strong sadomasochistic outlets, vividly expressed, for example, in the delight of anti-Masons with the cruelty of Masonic punishments".<ref name="harpers=1964">{{cite book|author=Hofstadter, Richard|author-link=Richard Hofstadter|year=1965|title=The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays|location=New York|publisher=Alfred A. Knopf|isbn=978-0-674-65461-7|pages=32–33|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XcLSoljnmBcC&q=0674654617|access-date=27 October 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190418133817/https://books.google.com/books?id=XcLSoljnmBcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=0674654617#v=onepage&q=This%20enemy%20seems%20to%20be%20on%20many%20counts%20a%20projection|archive-date=18 April 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Physiology====
[[Marcel Danesi]] suggests that people who believe conspiracy theories have difficulty rethinking situations. Exposure to those theories has caused neural pathways to be more rigid and less subject to change. Initial susceptibility to believing these theories' lies, dehumanizing language, and metaphors leads to the acceptance of larger and more extensive theories because the hardened neural pathways are already present. Repetition of the "facts" of conspiracy theories and their connected lies simply reinforces the rigidity of those pathways. Thus, conspiracy theories and dehumanizing lies are not mere hyperbole; they can actually change the way people think:

{{blockquote|Unfortunately, research into this brain wiring also shows that once people begin to believe lies, they are unlikely to change their minds even when confronted with evidence that contradicts their beliefs. It is a form of brainwashing. Once the brain has carved out a well-worn path of believing deceit, it is even harder to step out of that path – which is how fanatics are born. Instead, these people will seek out information that confirms their beliefs, avoid anything that is in conflict with them, or even turn the contrasting information on its head, so as to make it fit their beliefs.{{pb}}People with strong convictions will have a hard time changing their minds, given how embedded a lie becomes in the mind. In fact, there are scientists and scholars still studying the best tools and tricks to combat lies with some combination of brain training and linguistic awareness.<ref>Danesi, Marcel (30 July 2023) [https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/07/30/the-connection-between-political-lies-and-conspiracy-theories-00108378 "What Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orbán Understand About Your Brain"] ''[[Politico]]''</ref>}}