Editing Great Leap Forward (section)

==Other impacts==
===Failures of the food supply===
In agrarian policy, the failures of the food supply during the Great Leap were met by a gradual de-[[collectivization]] over the course of the 1960s that foreshadowed the further measures taken under Deng Xiaoping. Political scientist [[Meredith Jung-En Woo]] argues: "Unquestionably the regime failed to respond in time to save the lives of millions of peasants, but when it did respond, it ultimately transformed the livelihoods of several hundred million peasants (modestly in the early 1960s, but permanently after Deng Xiaoping's reforms subsequent to 1978)."<ref>[http://www.lsa.umich.edu/orgstudies/people_detail.asp?id=422 Woo-Cummings, Meredith] {{webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20131129094106/http://www.lsa.umich.edu/orgstudies/people_detail.asp?id=422 |date=29 November 2013 }} (2002). {{Cite web |date=22 January 2015 |title=''The Political Ecology of Famine: The North Korean Catastrophe and Its Lessons'' |url=http://www.adbi.org/files/2002.01.rp31.ecology.famine.northkorea.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060318194644/http://www.adbi.org/files/2002.01.rp31.ecology.famine.northkorea.pdf |archive-date=18 March 2006 |access-date=13 March 2006}}, ADB Institute Research Paper 31, January 2002. Retrieved 3 July 2006.</ref>

Despite the risks to their careers, some CCP members openly laid blame for the disaster at the feet of the Party leadership and took it as proof that China must rely more on education, acquiring technical expertise and applying [[bourgeoisie|bourgeois]] methods in developing the [[economic science|economy]]. [[Liu Shaoqi]] made a speech at the [[Seven Thousand Cadres Conference]] in 1962, stating that "[the] economic disaster was 30% fault of nature, 70% [[human error]]."<ref>''Twentieth Century China: Third Volume''. Beijing, 1994. p.&nbsp;430.</ref>

A 2017 paper by economists found "strong evidence that the unrealistic yield targets led to excessive death tolls from 1959 to 1961, and further analysis shows that yield targets induced the inflation of grain output figures and excessive procurement. We also find that Mao's radical policy caused serious deterioration in human [[capital accumulation]] and slower economic development in the policy-affected regions decades after the death of Mao."<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Liu |first1=Chang |last2=Zhou |first2=Li-An |title=Radical Target Setting and China's Great Famine |journal=The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization |date=23 December 2021 |volume=38 |issue=1 |pages=120–160 |doi=10.1093/jleo/ewab025 |ssrn=3075015 }}</ref>{{long quote|date=December 2023}}

A dramatic decline in grain output continued for several years, involving in 1960–61 a drop in output of more than 25 percent. Causes of this drop are found in both natural disaster and government policy.<ref name="Ashton1984" />

===Industrialization===
Overall, the Great Leap Forward failed to rapidly industrialize China as intended;{{sfnp|Harrell|2023|p=84}} however, there was significant capital construction (especially in iron, steel, mining and textile enterprises) that ultimately contributed greatly to [[Chinese industrialization|China's later industrialization]].<ref name="Joseph1986">{{Cite journal |last=Joseph |first=William A. |year=1986 |title=A Tragedy of Good Intentions: Post-Mao Views of the Great Leap Forward |journal=Modern China |volume=12 |issue=4 |pages=419–457 |doi=10.1177/009770048601200401 |jstor=189257 }}</ref> The Great Leap Forward period also marked the initiation of China's rapid growth in tractor and fertilizer production.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lippit |first=Victor D. |year=1975 |title=The Great Leap Forward Reconsidered |journal=[[Modern China (journal)|Modern China]] |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=92–115 |doi=10.1177/009770047500100104 |jstor=188886 }}</ref>

The successful construction of the [[Daqing Oil Field|Daqing oil field]] despite harsh weather conditions and supply limitations became a model held up by the Party as an example during subsequent industrialization campaigns. During its 1960 construction, Oil Minister [[Yu Qiuli]] mobilized workers through ideological motivation instead of material incentives, focusing enthusiasm, energy, and resources to complete a rapid industrialization project. The project also delivered critical economic benefits because without the production of the Daqing oil field, crude oil would have been severely limited after the Soviet Union cut off supplies as a result of the Sino-Soviet split.{{sfnp|Meyskens|2020|pp=52–54}}

Large-scale irrigation projects begun during the late 1950s as part of the Great Leap Forward continued to grow rapidly until the late 1970s.{{sfnp|Hou|2021|p=206}}

During the Great Leap Forward, control of [[State-owned enterprises of China|state-owned enterprises]] was largely decentralized, with control being transferred to local governments from the central government.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Hirata |first=Koji |title=Making Mao's Steelworks: Industrial Manchuria and the Transnational Origins of Chinese Socialism |date=2024 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-009-38227-4 |series=Cambridge Studies in the History of the People's Republic of China series |location=New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=231}} This process of decentralization also significantly increased the power of local Party organizations.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=238}}

===Women's labor advancement===
The Great Leap Forward's focus on total workforce mobilization resulted in opportunities for women's labor advancement.{{sfnp|Karl|2010|pp=104–105}} Increasing collectivization of labor brought more opportunities for women to "leave the home", thereby increasing their economic and personal independence.{{sfnp|Cai|Karl|Zhong|2016|pp=297–298}} The number of women in state institutions and [[State-owned enterprises of China|state-owned enterprises]] more than tripled during the period 1957 to 1960.{{sfnp|Hou|2021|p=215}}

As women became increasingly needed to work in agriculture and industry, and encouraged by policy to do so, the phenomenon of [[Iron Girls|Iron Women]] arose. Women did traditionally male work in both fields and factories, including major movements of women into management positions. Women competed for high productivity, and those who distinguished themselves came to be called Iron Women.{{sfnp|Karl|2010|pp=104–105}} Slogans such as "There is no difference between men and women in this new age," and "We can do anything, and anything we do, we can do it well," became popular.{{sfnp|Hou|2021|p=215}}

Neighborhood production teams established during this period offered women labor that allowed them to leave the home without leaving the neighborhood community. This mode of labor provided urban women with the right to work while still preserving existing forms of household social life.{{sfnp|Cai|Karl|Zhong|2016|p=302}}

=== Education ===
During the Great Leap Forward, the number of universities in China increased to 1,289 by 1960 and nationwide enrollment more than doubled to 962,000 in 1960.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Minami |first=Kazushi |title=People's Diplomacy: How Americans and Chinese Transformed US-China Relations during the Cold War |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781501774157 |location=Ithaca, NY |page=92}}</ref> This was a wave of "great leap forward" in [[higher education]].<ref name="Zhang2009">{{Cite web |last=Zhang |first=Ming |date=13 August 2009 |script-title=zh:高等教育大跃进:到处是大学遍地是教授 |trans-title=Great Leap Forward of higher education: professors and universities were everywhere |url=https://culture.ifeng.com/3/detail_2009_08/13/308516_0.shtml |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240212015631/https://culture.ifeng.com/3/detail_2009_08/13/308516_0.shtml |archive-date=12 February 2024 |website=[[Phoenix New Media]] |publisher=Shaanxi People's Publishing House |language=zh}}</ref><ref name="Kwong1979">{{Cite journal |last=Kwong |first=Julia |year=1979 |title=The Educational Experiment of the Great Leap Forward, 1958-1959: Its Inherent Contradictions |journal=Comparative Education Review |volume=23 |issue=3 |pages=443–455 |doi=10.1086/446072 |jstor=1187608 }}</ref> Many of the newly established universities, however, were affiliated with [[people's commune]]s and were directly transformed from local middle schools.<ref name="Zhang2009" /> For example, in [[Xushui County]], Hebei, every commune built one university of its own and local middle school teachers were promoted to professors; for another example, in [[Suiping County]], Henan, a new university was established with 10 departments and 529 students, where some "professors" were actually teachers from local elementary school.<ref name="Zhang2009" /> According to official sources:<ref name="Kwong1979" />

<blockquote>Some comrades expressed the fear that the movement would be a mockery of school education ....With regard to the development of higher education, some comrades, hearing that peasants have set up their own universities in the countryside, would ridicule the idea, believing that a university without a staff of qualified professors and students who have graduated from senior middle schools cannot be called a university.</blockquote>

Educational reforms during the Great Leap Forward sought to increase student and staff participation in the administration process, to favor students from worker, peasant, or soldier backgrounds in admissions, and to increase the role of the CCP and of politics in schools. Beginning in 1961, universities rolled back these policy initiatives, and increase meritocratic university policies instead of egalitarian ones.{{sfnp|Thornton|2019|p=59}}

===Resistance===
There were various forms of resistance to the consequences of the Great Leap Forward. Several provinces saw armed rebellion,{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|pp=226–228}}{{sfnp|Rummel|1991|pp=247–251}} though these rebellions never posed a serious threat to the Central Government.{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|pp=226–228}} Rebellions are documented to have occurred in [[Henan]], [[Shandong]], [[Qinghai]], [[Gansu]], [[Sichuan]], [[Fujian]], [[Yunnan]], and [[Tibet Autonomous Region|Tibet]].{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|pp=226–228|loc=(Qinghai, Tibet, Yunnan)}}{{sfnp|Rummel|1991|pp=247–251. (Honan, Shantung, Qinghai [Chinghai], Gansu [Kansu], Szechuan [Schechuan], Fujian), p.&nbsp;240 (TAR)}} In Henan, Shandong, Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan, these rebellions lasted more than a year,{{sfnp|Rummel|1991|pp=247–251. (Honan, Shantung, Qinghai [Chinghai], Gansu [Kansu], Szechuan [Schechuan], Fujian), p.&nbsp;240 (TAR)}} with the [[Spirit Soldier rebellion (1959)|Spirit Soldier rebellion of 1959]] being one of the few larger-scale uprisings.{{sfnp|Smith|2015|p=346}} There was also occasional violence against cadre members.{{sfnp|Rummel|1991|pp=247–251}}{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|pp=224–226}} Raids on granaries,{{sfnp|Rummel|1991|pp=247–251}}{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|pp=224–226}} arson and other vandalism, train robberies, and raids on neighboring villages and counties were common.{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|pp=224–226}}

According to Ralph Thaxton, professor of politics at [[Brandeis University]], villagers turned against the CCP during and after the Great Leap, seeing it as autocratic, brutal, corrupt, and mean-spirited.<ref name="Mirsky2009" /> According to Thaxton, the CCP's policies included plunder, forced labor, and starvation, which led villagers "to think about their relationship with the Communist Party in ways that do not bode well for the continuity of socialist rule."<ref name="Mirsky2009" />

Often, villagers composed [[doggerel]] to show their defiance to the regime, and "perhaps, to remain sane". During the Great Leap, one jingle ran: "Flatter shamelessly—eat delicacies.... Don't flatter—starve to death for sure."<ref name="Mirsky2006" />

===Impact on the government===
{{See also|Seven Thousand Cadres Conference}}
Officials were prosecuted for exaggerating production figures, although punishments varied. In one case, a provincial party secretary was dismissed and prohibited from holding higher office. A number of county-level officials were publicly tried and executed.<ref>Friedman, Edward; Pickowicz, Paul G.; Selden, Mark; and Johnson, Kay Ann (1993). ''Chinese Village, Socialist State''. Yale University Press. p.&nbsp;243. {{ISBN|0300054289}} / As seen in [https://books.google.com/books?id=GN2cXHxg_6oC&pg=PA243 Google Book Search].</ref>

Mao stepped down as State Chairman of the PRC on 27 April 1959, but remained CCP Chairman. Liu Shaoqi (the new PRC Chairman) and reformist [[Deng Xiaoping]] (CCP General Secretary) were left in charge to change policy to bring economic recovery. Mao's Great Leap Forward policy was openly criticized at the [[Lushan Conference|Lushan party conference]] by one person. Criticism from Minister of National Defense [[Peng Dehuai]], who, discovered that people from his home province starved to death caused him to write a letter to Mao to ask for the policies to be adapted.<ref name="Guardian2012" /> After the Lushan showdown, Mao replaced Peng with [[Lin Biao]] and Peng was sent off into obscurity.<ref name="Guardian2012" />

However, by 1962, it was clear that the party had changed away from the extremist ideology that led to the Great Leap. During 1962, the party held a number of conferences and rehabilitated most of the deposed comrades who had criticized Mao in the aftermath of the Great Leap. The event was again discussed, with much [[self-criticism]], and the contemporary government called it a "serious [loss] to our country and people" and blamed the [[cult of personality]] of Mao.{{citation needed|date=July 2024}}

At the Lushan conference of 1959, Peng Dehuai, one of the great marshals of the Chinese civil war against the nationalists, was a strong supporter of the Leap. But the discovery that people from his own home area were starving to death prompted him to write to Mao to ask for the policies to be adapted. Mao was furious, reading the letter out in public and demanding that his colleagues in the leadership line up either behind him or Peng. Almost to a man, they supported Mao, with his security chief Kang Sheng declaring of the letter: "I make bold to suggest that this cannot be handled with lenience."{{citation needed|date=July 2024}}

In particular, at the ''[[Seven Thousand Cadres Conference]]'' in January–February 1962, Mao made a [[self-criticism]] and re-affirmed his commitment to [[democratic centralism]]. In the years that followed, Mao mostly abstained from the operations of government, making policy largely the domain of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Maoist ideology took a back seat in the CCP, until Mao launched the [[Cultural Revolution]] in 1966 which marked his political comeback.{{citation needed|date=July 2024}}

Following the failures of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese leadership slowed the pace of industrialization, focusing more on the development of China's already more developed coastal areas and the production of consumer goods.{{sfnp|Meyskens|2020|p=3}} Thus, during the preliminary formulation of the Third Five Year Plan (which had been delayed due to the economic turmoil),<ref>{{Cite journal |last=W. K. |date=Jan–Mar 1966 |title=China's Third Five-Year Plan |journal=The China Quarterly |issue=25 |pages=171–175 |jstor=3082101}}</ref> Liu stated:{{sfnp|Meyskens|2020|p=51}}

{{Blockquote|text=In the past, the infrastructure battlefront was too long. There were too many projects. Demands were too high and rushed. Designs were done badly, and projects were hurriedly begun ... We only paid attention to increasing output and ignored quality. We set targets too highly. We must always remember these painful learning experiences.}}

During the discussion of the Third Five Year Plan, Mao made similar statements about the Great Leap Forward having "extended the infrastructure battlefront too long", acknowledging that it was "best to do less and well".{{sfnp|Meyskens|2020|p=56}}

The failures of the Great Leap Forward also informed the government's approach to the [[Third Front (China)|Third Front]] construction campaign which followed a few years later and which built basic industry and national defense industry in China's interior.{{sfnp|Meyskens|2020|p=9}} Rather than adopting the Great Leap Forward's approach of locally developed projects, the mass mobilizations of the Third Front were centrally planned.{{sfnp|Meyskens|2020|pp=10–12}}

In addition, according to historian Philipp Brigham, the failures of the Great Leap Forward significantly contributed to the Cultural Revolution, which is another pivotal event in modern Chinese politics that happened later in Chairman Mao's regime. Specifically, he posits that one of the main objectives of the Cultural Revolution was to extricate Chairman Mao and the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] from the responsibility for the Great Leap Forward.<ref name="Bridgham1967">{{Cite journal |last=Bridgham |first=Philip |year=1967 |title=Mao's "Cultural Revolution": Origin and Development |journal=The China Quarterly |issue=29 |pages=5 |jstor=651587}}</ref> According to Brigham's explanation, Chairman Mao and the central committee tried to incite through the Cultural Revolution that the Great Leap Forward had failed despite the right direction from above due to inadequate leadership of the local cadres.<ref name="Bridgham1967" />

=== Ecological impact ===
The Great Leap Forward resulted in ecological impacts through [[deforestation]] that resulted, as well as the expansion of agriculture into areas ill-suited for it.{{sfnp|Harrell|2023|pp=83–84}}

=== Health impacts ===
There is evidence that survivors of the famine suffered sustained negative effects to their long-term health and economic outcomes. Those in early childhood during the famine were impacted the most, and it has been estimated that the 1959 birth cohort would have otherwise grown three centimeters taller in adulthood.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Chen |first=Yuyu |date=1 July 2007 |title=The long-term health and economic consequences of the 1959–1961 famine in China |journal=Journal of Health Economics |volume=26 |issue=4 |pages=659–681 |doi=10.1016/j.jhealeco.2006.12.006 |pmid=17289187 }}</ref>

Cohorts born during the famine showed higher infant and early life mortality, but exhibit a "mortality crossover" pattern, with mortality rates leveling off or even dropping relative to non-famine cohorts beyond a certain point. This could be explained by the combined effects of initial debilitation, in which malnutrition and hardship increase early deaths, and selection for robustness among famine survivors resulting in fewer later deaths.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Song |first=Shige |year=2010 |title=Mortality consequences of the 1959–1961 Great Leap Forward famine in China: Debilitation, selection, and mortality crossovers |journal=Social Science & Medicine |volume=71 |issue=3 |pages=551–558 |doi=10.1016/j.socscimed.2010.04.034 |pmid=20542611 }}</ref>

=== Cultural impact ===
Consistent with the Great Leap Forward in agriculture and industry, authorities promoted the New Folksong Movement and the Peasant Painting Movement, from which hundreds of thousands of new artists emerged. Through the New Folksong Movement, millions of new folk songs and poems were written and collected. As part of the Peasant Painting Movement, peasant artists decorated village walls with Great Leap Forward-themed murals.{{sfnp|Qian|2024|p=167}}

The Great Leap Forward also prompted a wave of the New ''[[Guohua]]'' Campaign in which the state commissioned landscape artists to paint new production projects; select paintings of the campaign were taught in schools, published widely as propaganda posters, exhibited in museums, and used as the backdrops of state events.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Laikwan |first=Pang |title=One and All: The Logic of Chinese Sovereignty |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781503638815 |pages=138 |doi=10.1515/9781503638822}}</ref>

On 9 March 1958, the [[Ministry of Culture (China)|Ministry of Culture]] held a meeting to introduce a Great Leap Forward in [[Cinema of China|cinema]]. During the Great Leap Forward, the film industry rapidly expanded, with documentary films being the genre that experienced the greatest growth. The total number of film-screening venues, including both urban cinemas and mobile projection units which traveled through rural China, radically increased.{{sfnp|Qian|2024|pp=149–150}}