Editing Taiwan (section)

====Public opinion====
{{See also|Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity}}
[[File:National Chengchi University identity survey.svg|thumb|right|upright=1.5|Results from an identity survey conducted each year from 1992 to 2020 by the Election Study Center, [[National Chengchi University]].<ref name="nccu"/> Responses are Taiwanese (green), Chinese (red) or Both Taiwanese and Chinese (hatched). No response is shown as gray.]]

Taiwanese identification has increased substantially since the early 1990s, while Chinese identification has fallen to a low level, and identification as both has also seen a reduction. In 1992, 17.6 percent of respondents identified as Taiwanese, 25.5 percent as Chinese, 46.4 percent as both, and 10.5 percent non-response. In June 2021, 63.3 percent identified as Taiwanese, 2.6 percent as Chinese, 31.4 percent as both, and 2.7 percent non-response.<ref name="nccu">{{cite web |title=Taiwanese / Chinese Identity(1992/06~2021/06) |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961 |website=Election Study Center |publisher=[[National Chengchi University]] |access-date=27 October 2021 |archive-date=6 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210306094327/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961 |url-status=live }}</ref> A survey conducted in Taiwan by Global Views Survey Research Center in July 2009 showed that 82.8 percent of respondents consider the ROC and the PRC two separate countries with each developing on its own but 80.2 percent think they are members of the Chinese.<ref>{{cite web|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110429190528/http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/200907_GVSRC_others_E.pdf|url=http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/200907_GVSRC_others_E.pdf|archive-date=29 April 2011|title=Survey on President Ma's Approval Rating and Cross-Strait Relations After First Year of Direct Flights|date=24 July 2009|publisher=Global Views Survey Research Center|access-date=3 December 2014}}</ref>

Domestic public opinion has preferred maintaining the status quo, though pro-independence sentiment has steadily risen since 1994. In June 2021, an annual poll found that 28.2 percent supported the status quo and postponing a decision, 27.5 percent supported maintaining the status quo indefinitely, 25.8 percent supported the status quo with a move toward independence, 5.9 percent supported the status quo with a move toward unification, 5.7 percent gave no response, 5.6 percent supported independence as soon as possible, and 1.5 percent supported unification as soon as possible.<ref name="chengchiIndepUnif">{{cite web |title=Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 |publisher=Election Study Center, [[National Chengchi University]] |access-date=27 October 2021 |archive-date=26 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211026231952/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 |url-status=live }}</ref> A [[2018 Taiwanese referendum|referendum question in 2018]] asked if Taiwan's athletes should compete under "Taiwan" in the [[2020 Summer Olympics]] but did not pass; the ''New York Times'' attributed the failure to a campaign cautioning that a name change might lead to Taiwan being banned "under Chinese pressure".<ref name="HortonNYT2018">{{Cite news|last=Horton|first=Chris|date=26 November 2018|title=Taiwan Asked Voters 10 Questions. It Got Some Unexpected Answers. (Published 2018)|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/26/world/asia/taiwan-election.html}}</ref>