Editing Apollo 1 (section)

== Program recovery ==
{{quote box|width=22em|quote=
From this day forward, Flight Control will be known by two words: ''Tough'' and ''Competent''. ''Tough'' means we are forever accountable for what we do or what we fail to do. We will never again compromise our responsibilities{{nbsp}}... ''Competent'' means we will never take anything for granted{{nbsp}}... Mission Control will be perfect. When you leave this meeting today you will go to your office and the first thing you will do there is to write ''Tough'' and ''Competent'' on your blackboards. It will never be erased. Each day when you enter the room, these words will remind you of the price paid by Grissom, White, and Chaffee. These words are the price of admission to the ranks of Mission Control.|source=
[[Gene Kranz]], speech given to Mission Control after the accident.<ref name="Keefe" /><ref name="Kranz Failure" />{{Reference page|page=204}}}}
[[Gene Kranz]] called a meeting of his staff in Mission Control three days after the accident, delivering a speech which has subsequently become one of NASA's principles.<ref name="Keefe">{{Cite web |date=August 26, 2003 |title=Full Transcript: NASA Update on the Space Shuttle Columbia Sean O'Keefe and Scott Hubbard August 26, 2003 (part 2) |url=https://spaceref.com/status-report/full-transcript-nasa-update-on-the-space-shuttle-columbia-sean-okeefe-and-scott-hubbard-august-26-2003-part-2/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20240124211806/https://spaceref.com/status-report/full-transcript-nasa-update-on-the-space-shuttle-columbia-sean-okeefe-and-scott-hubbard-august-26-2003-part-2/ |archive-date=January 24, 2024 |access-date=July 13, 2013 |website=SpaceRef |page=Part 2 of 4 |no-pp=y |location=Reston, VA}} PDF of update available from NASA here [http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/49587main_nasa_update_26082003.pdf].</ref> Speaking of the errors and overall attitude surrounding the [[Apollo program]] before the accident, he said: "We were too '[[gung-ho]]' about the schedule and we blocked out all of the problems we saw each day in our work. Every element of the program was in trouble and so were we."<ref name="Kranz Failure">{{Cite book |last=Kranz |first=Eugene |title=Failure is Not an Option: Mission Control from Mercury to Apollo 13 and Beyond |publisher=[[Berkley Books]] |year=2000 |isbn=978-0-425-17987-1 |ref=Kranz}}</ref>{{Reference page|page=204}} He reminded the team of the perils and mercilessness of their endeavor, and stated the new requirement that every member of every team in mission control be "tough and competent", requiring nothing less than perfection throughout NASA's programs.<ref name="Kranz Failure" />{{Reference page|page=204}} In 2003, following the [[Space Shuttle Columbia disaster|Space Shuttle ''Columbia'' disaster]], NASA administrator [[Sean O'Keefe]] quoted Kranz's speech, applying it to the ''Columbia'' crew.<ref name="Keefe" />

=== Command module redesign ===
After the fire, the Apollo program was grounded for review and redesign. The command module was found to be extremely hazardous and, in some instances, carelessly assembled (for example, a misplaced wrench socket was found in the cabin).<ref name="aibreport" />{{Reference page|page=5–10}}

It was decided that the remaining Block I spacecraft would be used only for uncrewed Saturn V test flights. All crewed missions would use the [[Apollo command and service module#Major differences between Block I and Block II|Block II spacecraft]], to which many command module design changes were made:
* The cabin atmosphere at launch was adjusted to 60% oxygen and 40% nitrogen at sea-level pressure: {{convert|14.7|psi|kPa|abbr=on}}. During ascent the cabin rapidly vented down to {{convert|5|psi|kPa|abbr=on}}, releasing approximately 2/3 of the gas originally present at launch. The vent then closed and the environmental control system maintained a nominal cabin pressure of {{convert|5|psi|kPa|abbr=on}} as the spacecraft continued into vacuum. The cabin was then very slowly purged (vented to space and simultaneously replaced with 100% oxygen), so the nitrogen concentration gradually fell off to zero over the next day. Although the new cabin launch atmosphere was significantly safer than 100% oxygen, it still contained almost three times the amount of oxygen present in ordinary sea-level air (20.9% oxygen). This was necessary to ensure a sufficient [[partial pressure]] of oxygen when the astronauts removed their helmets after reaching orbit. (60% of five psi is three psi, compared to 60% of {{convert|14.7|psi|kPa|abbr=on}} which is {{convert|8.8|psi|kPa|abbr=on}} at launch, and 20.9% of {{convert|14.7|psi|kPa|abbr=on}} which is {{convert|3.07|psi|kPa|abbr=on}} in sea-level air.)<ref name="chariot" />
* The environment within the astronauts' pressure suits was not changed. Because of the rapid drop in cabin (and suit) pressures during ascent, [[decompression sickness]] was likely unless the nitrogen had been purged from the astronauts' tissues before launch. They would still breathe pure oxygen, starting several hours before launch, until they removed their helmets on orbit. Avoiding the "bends" was considered worth the residual risk of an oxygen-accelerated fire within a suit.<ref name="chariot" />
* Nylon used in the [[Gemini space suit|Block I suits]] was replaced in the [[Apollo/Skylab A7L|Block II suits]] with [[Beta cloth]], a non-flammable, highly melt-resistant fabric woven from [[Glass (fiber)|fiberglass]] and coated with Teflon.<ref name="chariot">{{Cite web |last1=Brooks |first1=Courtney |last2=Grimwood |first2=James |last3=Swenson |first3=Loyd |date=1979 |title=The Slow Recovery |url=http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4205/ch9-4.html |access-date=May 14, 2016 |publisher=NASA}}</ref>
* Block II had already been planned to use a completely redesigned hatch which opened outward, and could be opened in less than five seconds.<ref name="chariot" /> Concerns of accidental opening were addressed by using a cartridge of pressurized nitrogen to drive the release mechanism in an emergency, instead of the [[explosive bolt]]s used on Project Mercury.
* Flammable materials in the cabin were replaced with self-extinguishing versions.
* Plumbing and wiring were covered with protective [[thermal insulation|insulation]]. Aluminum tubing was replaced with stainless steel tubing that used brazed joints when possible.<ref name="chariot" />

Thorough protocols were implemented for documenting spacecraft construction and maintenance.

=== New mission naming scheme ===
The astronauts' widows asked that ''Apollo 1'' be reserved for the flight their husbands never made, and on April 24, 1967, Mueller, as Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, announced this change officially: AS-204 would be recorded as Apollo{{nbsp}}1, "first manned Apollo Saturn flight – failed on ground test".<ref name="MarAprChron">{{Cite book |last1=Ertel |first1=Ivan D. |url=http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4009/contents.htm#Volume%20IV |title=The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology |last2=Newkirk |first2=Roland W. |last3=Brooks |first3=Courtney G. |publisher=[[NASA]] |year=1969–1978 |volume=IV |location=Washington, D.C. |chapter=Part 1 (H): Preparation for Flight, the Accident, and Investigation: March 25 – April 24, 1967 |lccn=69060008 |oclc=23818 |id=NASA SP-4009 |display-authors=2 |access-date=March 3, 2011 |chapter-url=http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4009/v4p1h.htm |archive-date=February 5, 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080205020128/http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4009/contents.htm#Volume%20IV |url-status=dead }}</ref> Even though three uncrewed Apollo missions ([[AS-201]], [[AS-202]], and [[AS-203]]) had previously occurred, only AS-201 and AS-202 carried spacecraft. Therefore, the next mission, the first uncrewed Saturn V test flight (AS-501) would be designated [[Apollo 4|Apollo{{nbsp}}4]], with all subsequent flights numbered sequentially in the order flown. The first three flights would not be renumbered, and the names ''Apollo{{nbsp}}2'' and ''Apollo{{nbsp}}3'' would officially go unused.<ref>{{Cite web |year=1999 |title=Apollo 11 30th Anniversary: Manned Apollo Missions |url=https://history.nasa.gov/ap11ann/missions.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110220232013/https://history.nasa.gov/ap11ann/missions.htm |archive-date=February 20, 2011 |access-date=March 3, 2011 |publisher=NASA History Office}}</ref> Mueller considered AS-201 and AS-202, the first and second flights of the Apollo Block I CSM, as Apollo{{nbsp}}2 and{{nbsp}}3 respectively.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Slotkin |first=Arthur W. |title=Doing the Impossible, George E Mueller and the Management of NASA's Human Spaceflight Program |date=2012 |publisher=Springer-Praxis |location=New York |chapter=8 All-up testing |bibcode=2012doim.book.....S}}</ref>

The crewed flight hiatus allowed work to catch up on the Saturn V and lunar module, which were encountering their own delays. Apollo{{nbsp}}4 flew in November 1967. Apollo{{nbsp}}1's (AS-204) Saturn IB rocket was taken down from Launch Complex 34, later reassembled at [[Cape Canaveral Space Launch Complex 37|Launch complex 37B]] and used to launch [[Apollo 5|Apollo{{nbsp}}5]], an uncrewed Earth orbital test flight of the first lunar module, LM-1, in January 1968.<ref>{{Cite web |year=2001 |title=Apollo Program |url=http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/arch/findaids/bellcomm/bci_sec_21.html |access-date=January 26, 2013 |website=[[National Air and Space Museum]] |series=Bellcomm, Inc Technical Library Collection |publisher=[[Smithsonian Institution]] |location=Washington, D.C. |page=Subseries III.D.3 |no-pp=y |id=Accession No. XXXX-0093 |archive-date=April 29, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120429235023/http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/arch/findaids/bellcomm/bci_sec_21.html }}</ref> A second uncrewed Saturn V AS-502 flew as [[Apollo 6|Apollo{{nbsp}}6]] in April 1968, and Grissom's backup crew of [[Wally Schirra]], [[Donn F. Eisele|Don Eisele]], and [[Walter Cunningham]], finally flew the orbital test mission as [[Apollo 7|Apollo{{nbsp}}7]] (AS-205), in a Block II CSM in October 1968.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Orloff |first=Richard W. |url=https://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/Apollo_07a_Summary.htm |title=Apollo By the Numbers: A Statistical Reference |date=September 2004 |publisher=NASA |location=Washington D.C. |chapter=Apollo 7: The First Mission |access-date=June 1, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071014211102/https://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/Apollo_07a_Summary.htm |archive-date=October 14, 2007 |url-status=live }}</ref>