Editing Conspiracy theory (section)

===Attractions===
Psychological motives for believing in conspiracy theories can be categorized as epistemic, existential, or social. These motives are particularly acute in vulnerable and disadvantaged populations. However, it does not appear that the beliefs help to address these motives; in fact, they may be self-defeating, acting to make the situation worse instead.<ref name="Douglas 538–542"/><ref name="SciAm2019"/> For example, while conspiratorial beliefs can result from a perceived sense of [[empowerment|powerlessness]], exposure to conspiracy theories immediately suppresses personal feelings of autonomy and control. Furthermore, they also make people less likely to take actions that could improve their circumstances.<ref name="Douglas 538–542"/><ref name="SciAm2019"/>

This is additionally supported by the fact that conspiracy theories have a number of disadvantageous attributes.<ref name="Douglas 538–542"/> For example, they promote a hostile and distrustful view of other people and groups allegedly acting based on antisocial and cynical motivations. This is expected to lead to increased [[social alienation]] and [[anomie]] and reduced [[social capital]]. Similarly, they depict the public as ignorant and powerless against the alleged conspirators, with important aspects of society determined by malevolent forces, a viewpoint that is likely to be disempowering.<ref name="Douglas 538–542"/>

Each person may endorse conspiracy theories for one of many different reasons.<ref name="GoreisVoracek2019"/> The most consistently demonstrated characteristics of people who find conspiracy theories appealing are a feeling of [[Social alienation|alienation]], unhappiness or dissatisfaction with their situation, an unconventional worldview, and a sense of [[disempowerment]].<ref name="GoreisVoracek2019"/> While various aspects of personality affect susceptibility to conspiracy theories, none of the [[Big Five personality traits]] are associated with conspiracy beliefs.<ref name="GoreisVoracek2019">{{cite journal|last1=Goreis|first1=Andreas|last2=Voracek|first2=Martin|title=A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Psychological Research on Conspiracy Beliefs: Field Characteristics, Measurement Instruments, and Associations With Personality Traits|journal=Frontiers in Psychology|volume=10|year=2019|page=205|doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00205|pmid=30853921|pmc=6396711|doi-access=free}}</ref>

The political scientist [[Michael Barkun]], discussing the usage of "conspiracy theory" in contemporary American culture, holds that this term is used for a belief that explains an event as the result of a secret plot by exceptionally powerful and cunning conspirators to achieve a malevolent end.{{sfn|Barkun|2003|p=3}}<ref name="New Internationalist 1 2004"/> According to Barkun, the appeal of conspiracism is threefold:

{{blockquote |
* First, conspiracy theories claim to explain what [[institutional analysis]] cannot. They appear to make sense out of a world that is otherwise confusing. 
* Second, they do so in an appealingly simple way, by dividing the world sharply between [[Manichaeism|the forces of light, and the forces of darkness]]. They trace all evil back to a single source, the conspirators and their agents. 
* Third, conspiracy theories are often presented as special, [[Western esotericism|secret knowledge]] unknown or unappreciated by others. For conspiracy theorists, the masses are a [[sheeple|brainwashed herd]], while the conspiracy theorists in the know can congratulate themselves on penetrating the plotters' deceptions.<ref name="New Internationalist 1 2004"/>}}

This third point is supported by the research of Roland Imhoff, professor of [[social psychology]] at the [[Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz]]. His research suggests that the smaller the minority believing in a specific theory, the more attractive it is to conspiracy theorists.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Imhoff|first1=Roland|title=Conspiracy Theorists Just Want to Feel Special|url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/conspiracy-theorists-just-want-to-feel-special/|website=motherboard.vice.com|access-date=6 July 2018|date=17 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190428135251/https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/9kg8j3/conspiracy-theorists-just-want-to-feel-special|archive-date=28 April 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Humanistic psychologists]] argue that even if a posited cabal behind an alleged conspiracy is almost always perceived as hostile, there often remains an element of reassurance for theorists. This is because it is a consolation to imagine that humans create difficulties in human affairs and remain within human control. If a cabal can be implicated, there may be a hope of breaking its power or of joining it. Belief in the power of a cabal is an implicit assertion of human dignity—an unconscious affirmation that man is responsible for his own destiny.<ref name="Baigent, Leigh & Lincoln 1987">{{cite book|author1=Baigent, Michael|author2=Leigh, Richard|author3=Lincoln, Henry|title=The Messianic Legacy|publisher=Henry Holt & Co|year=1987|isbn=978-0-8050-0568-4}}</ref>

People formulate conspiracy theories to explain, for example, power relations in social groups and the perceived existence of evil forces.{{efn|[[Michael Barkun|Barkun]] 2003: "The essence of conspiracy beliefs lies in attempts to delineate and explain evil. At their broadest, conspiracy theories 'view history as controlled by massive, demonic forces.'&nbsp;... For our purposes, a ''conspiracy belief'' is the belief that an organization made up of individuals or groups was or is acting covertly to achieve a malevolent end."{{sfn|Barkun|2003|p=3}}}}<ref name="New Internationalist 1 2004">{{cite web|author=Berlet, Chip|author-link=Chip Berlet|title=Interview: Michael Barkun|url=http://www.publiceye.org/antisemitism/nw_barkun.html|date=September 2004|quote=The issue of conspiracism versus rational criticism is a tough one, and some people (Jodi Dean, for example) argue that the former is simply a variety of the latter. I don't accept this, although I certainly acknowledge that there have been conspiracies. They simply don't have the attributes of almost superhuman power and cunning that conspiracists attribute to them.|access-date=1 October 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090402214330/http://www.publiceye.org/antisemitism/nw_barkun.html|archive-date=2 April 2009|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Turkay Nefes">{{cite journal|doi=10.1111/1467-954X.12016|volume=61|issue=2|title=Political parties' perceptions and uses of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in Turkey|year=2013|journal=The Sociological Review|pages=247–264|last1=Nefes|first1=Türkay S|s2cid=145632390}}</ref><ref name="Nefes">{{cite journal|doi=10.1111/j.1467-6443.2012.01434.x|volume=25|issue=3|title=The History of the Social Constructions of Dönmes (Converts)*|year=2012|journal=Journal of Historical Sociology|pages=413–439|last1=Nefes|first1=Türkay S.}}</ref> Proposed psychological origins of conspiracy theorising include projection; the personal need to explain "a significant event [with] a significant cause;" and the product of various kinds and stages of thought disorder, such as paranoid disposition, ranging in severity to diagnosable mental illnesses. Some people prefer socio-political explanations over the insecurity of encountering [[randomness|random]], unpredictable, or otherwise inexplicable events.<ref name="business.time.com">{{Cite magazine |date=2009-06-01 |title=Wall Streeters like conspiracy theories. Always have |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |last=Fox |first=Justin |url=https://business.time.com/2009/10/01/wall-streeters-like-conspiracy-theories-always-have/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120302114125/https://business.time.com/2009/10/01/wall-streeters-like-conspiracy-theories-always-have/ |archive-date=2012-03-02}}</ref><ref name="Goertzel 1994 733–744">{{cite journal|author=Goertzel|year=1994|title=Belief in Conspiracy Theories|doi=10.2307/3791630|url=http://www.crab.rutgers.edu/~goertzel/conspire.doc <!--|pages=733–44-->|pages=731–742|access-date=7 August 2006|jstor=3791630|journal=Political Psychology|volume=15|issue=4|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060831210103/http://crab.rutgers.edu/~goertzel/CONSPIRE.doc|archive-date=31 August 2006|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name="Douglas 2008 210–222">{{cite journal|first1=Karen|last1=Douglas|first2=Robbie|last2=Sutton|year=2008|title=The hidden impact of conspiracy theories: Perceived and actual influence of theories surrounding the death of Princess Diana|journal=Journal of Social Psychology|volume=148|issue=2|pages=210–22|doi=10.3200/SOCP.148.2.210-222|pmid=18512419|s2cid=8717161}}</ref><ref name="harpers=1964"/><ref name="Hodapp 2008">{{cite book|title=Conspiracy Theories & Secret Societies For Dummies|first=Christopher|last=Hodapp|author2=Alice Von Kannon|publisher=[[John Wiley & Sons]]|year=2008|isbn=978-0-470-18408-0|url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780470184080}}</ref><ref name="Cohen">{{cite news|last=Cohen|first=Roger|author-link=Roger Cohen|title=The Captive Arab Mind|newspaper=The New York Times|date=20 December 2010|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/opinion/21iht-edcohen21.html|access-date=18 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170625080138/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/opinion/21iht-edcohen21.html|archive-date=25 June 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> According to Berlet and Lyons, "Conspiracism is a particular narrative form of scapegoating that frames demonized enemies as part of a vast insidious plot against the common good, while it valorizes the scapegoater as a hero for sounding the alarm".<ref>{{cite book|last=Berlet|first=Chip|author-link=Chip Berlet|author2=Lyons, Matthew N.|title=Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort|url=https://archive.org/details/rightwingpopulis00berlrich|url-access=registration|publisher=Guilford Press|location=New York|year=2000|isbn=978-1-57230-562-5|access-date=9 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191216201705/https://archive.org/details/rightwingpopulis00berlrich|archive-date=16 December 2019|url-status=live}}{{page needed|date=September 2011}}</ref>