Editing Deterrence theory (section)

==Cyber deterrence==
{{Main|Cyberwarfare|Cyberweapon}}

Since the early 2000s, there has been an increased focus on cyber deterrence. Cyber deterrence has two meanings:<ref name="Det Cyber">{{Citation|last=Schneider|first=Jacquelyn G.|title=Deterrence in and through Cyberspace|date=2019|url=https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190908645.001.0001/oso-9780190908645-chapter-5|work=Cross-Domain Deterrence|pages=95–120|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/oso/9780190908645.003.0005|isbn=978-0-19-090864-5|access-date=2021-11-06|archive-date=2021-11-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211106235413/https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190908645.001.0001/oso-9780190908645-chapter-5|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

# The use of cyber actions to deter other states
# The deterrence of an adversary's cyber operations

Scholars have debated how cyber capabilities alter traditional understandings of deterrence, given that it may be harder to attribute responsibility for cyber attacks, the barriers to entry may be lower, the risks and costs may be lower for actors who conduct cyber attacks, it may be harder to signal and interpret intentions, the advantage of offense over defense, and weak actors and non-state actors can develop considerable cyber capabilities.<ref name="Det Cyber" /><ref name="Diss">{{Cite journal|last=Nye|first=Joseph S.|date=2017|title=Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace|url=http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00266|journal=International Security|volume=41|issue=3|pages=44–71|doi=10.1162/isec_a_00266|s2cid=29361290|issn=0162-2889|access-date=2021-11-06|archive-date=2021-01-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126074153/https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00266|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name="Coercion">{{Cite journal|last1=Borghard|first1=Erica D.|last2=Lonergan|first2=Shawn W.|date=2017|title=The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396|journal=Security Studies|volume=26|issue=3|pages=452–481|doi=10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396|s2cid=46356854|issn=0963-6412|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name="den Cyber">{{Cite journal|last1=Borghard|first1=Erica D.|last2=Lonergan|first2=Shawn W.|date=2021-08-03|title=Deterrence by denial in cyberspace|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2021.1944856|journal=Journal of Strategic Studies|volume=46|issue=3|language=en|pages=534–569|doi=10.1080/01402390.2021.1944856|s2cid=238842794|issn=0140-2390|access-date=2021-11-06|archive-date=2021-11-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211106235410/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2021.1944856|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Scholars have also debated the feasibility of launching highly damaging cyber attacks and engaging in destructive cyber warfare, with most scholars expressing skepticism that cyber capabilities have enhanced the ability of states to launch highly destructive attacks.<ref name="Stuxnet">{{Cite journal|last=Lindsay|first=Jon R.|date=2013|title=Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.816122|journal=Security Studies|volume=22|issue=3|pages=365–404|doi=10.1080/09636412.2013.816122|s2cid=154019562|issn=0963-6412|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name="Tangle">{{Cite journal|last1=Gartzke|first1=Erik|last2=Lindsay|first2=Jon R.|date=2015|title=Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2015.1038188|journal=Security Studies|volume=24|issue=2|pages=316–348|doi=10.1080/09636412.2015.1038188|s2cid=4830861|issn=0963-6412|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name="Cyberwar">{{Cite journal|last1=Farrell|first1=Henry|last2=Glaser|first2=Charles L.|date=2017|title=The role of effects, saliencies and norms in US Cyberwar doctrine|journal=Journal of Cybersecurity|doi=10.1093/cybsec/tyw015|issn=2057-2085|doi-access=free}}</ref> The most prominent cyber attack to date is the [[Stuxnet]] attack on Iran's nuclear program.<ref name="Stuxnet" /><ref name="Tangle" /> By 2019, the only publicly acknowledged case of a cyber attack causing a power outage was the [[2015 Ukraine power grid hack]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kostyuk|first1=Nadiya|last2=Zhukov|first2=Yuri M.|date=2019-02-01|title=Invisible Digital Front: Can Cyber Attacks Shape Battlefield Events?|url=https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717737138|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|language=en|volume=63|issue=2|pages=317–347|doi=10.1177/0022002717737138|s2cid=44364372|issn=0022-0027|access-date=2021-11-15|archive-date=2022-02-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220225152312/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002717737138|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

There are various ways to engage in cyber deterrence:<ref name="Det Cyber" /><ref name="Diss" /><ref name="Coercion" />

* Denial: preventing adversaries from achieving military objectives by defending against them<ref name="den Cyber" />
* Punishment: the imposition of costs on the adversary
* Norms: the establishment and maintenance of norms that establish appropriate standards of behavior<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Finnemore|first1=Martha|last2=Hollis|first2=Duncan B.|date=2016|title=Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5305/amerjintelaw.110.3.0425|journal=The American Journal of International Law|volume=110|issue=3|pages=425–479|doi=10.1017/S0002930000016894|jstor=10.5305/amerjintelaw.110.3.0425|s2cid=151870657|issn=0002-9300|access-date=2021-11-06|archive-date=2021-11-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211107000904/https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5305/amerjintelaw.110.3.0425|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Finnemore|first1=Martha|last2=Hollis|first2=Duncan B.|date=2016|title=Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/constructing-norms-for-global-cybersecurity/373A149D995A12E824E2FD1E0B5E5675|journal=American Journal of International Law|language=en|volume=110|issue=3|pages=425–479|doi=10.1017/S0002930000016894|s2cid=151870657|issn=0002-9300|access-date=2021-11-06|archive-date=2021-11-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211107000913/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/constructing-norms-for-global-cybersecurity/373A149D995A12E824E2FD1E0B5E5675|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref>
* Escalation: raising the probability that costs will be imposed on the adversary<ref name="SNS">{{Cite journal|last1=Brown|first1=Joseph M.|last2=Fazal|first2=Tanisha M.|date=2021|title=#SorryNotSorry: Why states neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operations|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/sorrynotsorry-why-states-neither-confirm-nor-deny-responsibility-for-cyber-operations/85A08DAB9C058D3C2DF1DBD962BC01C5|journal=European Journal of International Security|language=en|volume=6|issue=4|pages=401–417|doi=10.1017/eis.2021.18|s2cid=238358851|issn=2057-5637|access-date=2021-11-06|archive-date=2021-11-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211106235403/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/sorrynotsorry-why-states-neither-confirm-nor-deny-responsibility-for-cyber-operations/85A08DAB9C058D3C2DF1DBD962BC01C5|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref>
* Entanglement and interdependence: interdependence between actors can have a deterrent effect<ref name="Diss" /><ref name="Cyberwar" />

There is a risk of unintended escalation in cyberspace due to difficulties in discerning the intent of attackers,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lin|first=Herbert|date=2012|title=Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26267261|journal=Strategic Studies Quarterly|volume=6|issue=3|pages=46–70|jstor=26267261|issn=1936-1815|access-date=2021-11-06|archive-date=2021-11-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211106235402/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26267261|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Borghard|first1=Erica D.|last2=Lonergan|first2=Shawn W.|date=2017|title=The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396|journal=Security Studies|volume=26|issue=3|pages=452–481|doi=10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396|s2cid=46356854|issn=0963-6412|url-access=subscription}}</ref> and complexities in state-hacker relationships.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Maurer|first=Tim|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cyber-mercenaries/B685B7555E1C52FBE5DFE6F6594A1C00|title=Cyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and Power|date=2018|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-107-12760-9|location=Cambridge|doi=10.1017/9781316422724|access-date=2021-11-07|archive-date=2021-11-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211107184006/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cyber-mercenaries/B685B7555E1C52FBE5DFE6F6594A1C00|url-status=live}}</ref> According to political scientists Joseph Brown and [[Tanisha Fazal]], states frequently neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operations so that they can avoid the escalatory risks (that come with public credit) while also signaling that they have cyber capabilities and resolve (which can be achieved if intelligence agencies and governments believe they were responsible).<ref name="SNS" />

According to Lennart Maschmeyer, cyber weapons have limited coercive effectiveness due to a trilemma "whereby speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated. These constraints pose a trilemma for actors because a gain in one variable tends to produce losses across the other two variables."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Maschmeyer|first=Lennart|date=2021|title=The Subversive Trilemma: Why Cyber Operations Fall Short of Expectations|journal=International Security|volume=46|issue=2|pages=51–90|doi=10.1162/isec_a_00418|s2cid=239770382|issn=0162-2889|doi-access=free}}</ref>