Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

===Type-C Materialism===

Type-C materialists acknowledge a distinction between knowledge and experience<ref name="ChalmersGreen-aia"/> without asserting a more complete explanation for the experiential phenomenon. One taking this view would admit that there is an [[explanatory gap]] for which no answer to date may be satisfactory, but trust that inevitably the gap will be closed.<ref name="Chalmers-caipin"/> This is described by analogy to progression in other areas of science, such as [[mass-energy equivalence]] which would have been unfathomable in ancient times,<ref name="Chalmers-caipin"/> [[abiogenesis]] which was once considered paradoxical from an evolutionary framework,<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.allaboutscience.org/abiogenesis.htm | title=Abiogenesis }}</ref><ref name="ChalmersGreen-aia">{{cite web | url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hru5d_wsu7g | title=Is the hard problem of consciousness really that hard? &#124; Brian Greene and Pat Churchland lock horns | website=[[YouTube]] | date=9 July 2022 }}</ref> or a suspected future [[theory of everything]] combining relativity and quantum mechanics. Similarly, type-C materialism posits that the problem of consciousness is a consequence of our ignorance<ref name="Dennett1991"/><ref>''Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness.'' Daniel Stoljar. Oxford University Press.</ref> but just as resolvable as any other question in [[neuroscience]].

Because the explanatory question of consciousness is evaded, type-C materialism does not presuppose<ref name="RomainBrette">{{cite web | url=http://romainbrette.fr/notes-on-consciousness-x-why-i-am-not-a-panpsychist-reading-notes-on-philip-goffs-galileos-error/ | title=Notes on consciousness. (X) Why I am not a panpsychist - Reading notes on Philip Goff's "Galileo's error" | date=25 January 2022 }}</ref> the descriptive question, for instance that there is any self-consciousness, wakefulness, or even sentience<ref>Jan 14, 2014. "Consciousness". Sections 2.1 and 3. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/</ref> in a rock. Principally, the basis for the argument arises from the apparently high correlation of consciousness with living brain tissue,<ref>May 13, 2022. "Panpsychism". Section 4.4.2. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/</ref> thereby rejecting [[panpsychism]]<ref name="RomainBrette"/> without explicitly formulating physical causation. More specifically this position denies the existence of [[philosophical zombies]]<ref name=CarruthersSchier2012/> for which there is an absence of data and no proposed method of testing.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://selfawarepatterns.com/2016/10/03/the-problems-with-philosophical-zombies/ | title=The problems with philosophical zombies | date=3 October 2016 }}</ref><ref>''Thinking about Consciousness.'' Chapter 3. "The Impossibility of Zombies". David Papineau. Oxford Academic.</ref> Whether via the inconceivability or actual nonexistence of zombies, a contradiction is exposed nullifying the premise of the consciousness problem's "hardness".

Type-C materialism is compatible with several cases and could collapse into one of these other metaphysical views<ref name="Chalmers-caipin"/> depending on scientific discovery and its interpretation. With evidence of [[emergence]], it resolves to strong reductionism under type A. With a different, possibly cultural paradigm for understanding consciousness, it resolves to type-B materialism.<ref name=":2"/> If consciousness is explained by the [[quantum mind]], then it resolves to property dualism under type D.<ref name="Quantum Approaches to Consciousness">{{cite web|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-consciousness/|title=Quantum Approaches to Consciousness|publisher=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|orig-year=First published Tue Nov 30, 2004 |date=May 19, 2011}}</ref> With characterisation of intrinsic properties in physics extending beyond structure and dynamics, it could resolve to type-F monism.<ref name="Chalmers-caipin"/>

Richard Brown has defended an unorthodox form of type-C materialism which states that the hard problem cannot be decided ''a priori'' and the two major positions (physicalism and dualism) can only be vindicated empirically, i.e. through scientific advances. His version of type-C materialism is unorthodox because he claims that it does not collapse into the other positions. He uses "reverse zombie" and "reverse knowledge" thought experiments (anti-dualist versions of the standard anti-physicalist arguments) to show that ''a priori'' arguments beg the question and are only useful for revealing one's own intuitions, whether physicalist or dualist. The only reason why such thought experiments, both anti-physicalist and anti-dualist, seem intuitive is because they are ''prima facie'' conceivable but not ideally conceivable, where ideal conceivability involves knowledge of the completed science and thus the ability to deduce ''a priori'' the discovered identities, in the same way that "water is H₂O" was discovered empirically but the identity is deducible ''a priori''.<ref name="Brown2010">{{cite journal|last1=Brown|first1=Richard|title=Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments Against Physicalism|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|date=2010|volume=17|issue=3–4|pages=47–69|url=http://philpapers.org/archive/BRODTA.pdf |via=PhilPapers |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240126233332/https://philpapers.org/archive/BRODTA.pdf |archive-date= Jan 26, 2024}}</ref>