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Evolutionary game theory
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===Effects of having information=== In evolutionary game theory as in conventional [[game theory]] the effect of Signalling (the acquisition of information) is of critical importance, as in Indirect Reciprocity in Prisoners Dilemma (where contests between the SAME paired individuals are NOT repetitive). This models the reality of most normal social interactions which are non-kin related. Unless a probability measure of reputation is available in Prisoners Dilemma only direct reciprocity can be achieved.<ref name="Nowak & Sigmund" /> With this information indirect reciprocity is also supported. Alternatively, agents might have access to an arbitrary signal initially uncorrelated to strategy but becomes correlated due to evolutionary dynamics. This is the [[green-beard effect]] (see side-blotched lizards, above) or evolution of ethnocentrism in humans.<ref>{{Cite journal | url=http://egtheory.wordpress.com/2012/06/13/evolution-of-ethnocentrism/ | doi=10.1177/0022002706293470| title=The Evolution of Ethnocentrism| journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution| volume=50| issue=6| pages=926–936| year=2006| last1=Hammond| first1=Ross A.| last2=Axelrod| first2=Robert| s2cid=9613947}}</ref> Depending on the game, it can allow the evolution of either cooperation or irrational hostility.<ref>Kaznatcheev, A. (2010, March). [http://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~akazna/kaznatcheev20100910.pdf Robustness of ethnocentrism to changes in inter-personal interactions]. In ''Complex Adaptive Systems–AAAI Fall Symposium''.</ref> From molecular to multicellular level, a [[signaling game]] model with information asymmetry between sender and receiver might be appropriate, such as in mate attraction<ref name="Grafen 1990 517–546"/> or evolution of translation machinery from RNA strings.<ref>{{cite journal |author1=Jee, J. |author2=Sundstrom, A. |author3=Massey, S.E. |author4=Mishra, B. | year=2013 | title= What can information-asymmetric games tell us about the context of Crick's 'Frozen Accident'? | journal=Journal of the Royal Society Interface | volume=10 | issue=88 | page=20130614 | doi=10.1098/rsif.2013.0614 | pmid=23985735 | pmc=3785830}}</ref>
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