Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

===Type-D Dualism===
{{main|Dualism (philosophy of mind)|Interactionism (philosophy of mind)|Epiphenomenalism}}
[[Dualism (philosophy of mind)|Dualism]] views consciousness as either a non-physical [[Substance theory|substance]] separate from the brain or a non-physical [[Property (philosophy)|property]] of the physical brain.<ref name="iep-dualism">{{cite encyclopedia|last=Calef|first=Scott|encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|title=Dualism and Mind|year=2014|url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/dualism/#H3|access-date=8 February 2019}}</ref> Dualism is the view that the mind is irreducible to the physical body.<ref name="iep-dualism"/> There are multiple dualist accounts of the causal relationship between the mental and the physical, of which interactionism and epiphenomenalism are the most common today. Interactionism posits that the mental and physical causally impact one another, and is associated with the thought of [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650).<ref name="Chalmers-caipin"/> Epiphenomenalism holds the mental is causally dependent on the physical, but does not in turn causally impact it.<ref name="Chalmers-caipin"/>

In contemporary philosophy, interactionism has been defended by philosophers including [[Martine Nida-Rümelin]],<ref name="mnr-dualism">{{cite encyclopedia|last1=Nida-Rümelin|first1=Martine|editor1-last=McLaughlin|editor1-first=Brian|editor2-last=Cohen|editor2-first=Jonathan|encyclopedia=Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind|edition=1st|title=Dualist Emergentism|date=2006|publisher=Wiley-Blackwell|location=Malden, MA|isbn=978-1-405-11761-6|url=https://www.newdualism.org/papers/M.Nida-Rumelin/Nida-Rumelin-Dualist%20Emergentism%20-%2018%203%2006.pdf|access-date=1 February 2019}}</ref> while epiphenomenalism has been defended by philosophers including [[Frank Cameron Jackson|Frank Jackson]]<ref name="jackson-1">{{cite journal|last1=Jackson|first1=Frank|title=Epiphenomenal Qualia|journal=The Philosophical Quarterly|date=1982|volume=32|issue=127|pages=127–136|doi=10.2307/2960077|jstor=2960077|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name="jackson-2">{{cite journal|last1=Jackson|first1=Frank|title=What Mary Didn't Know|journal=The Journal of Philosophy|date=1986|volume=83|issue=5|pages=291–295|doi=10.2307/2026143|jstor=2026143|s2cid=19000667}}</ref> (although Jackson later changed his stance to physicalism).<ref name="jackson-3">{{cite journal|last1=Jackson|first1=Frank|title=Mind and Illusion|journal=Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements|date=2003|volume=53|pages=251–271|doi=10.1017/S1358246100008365|s2cid=170304272|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231993032|access-date=6 February 2019}}</ref> Chalmers has also defended versions of both positions as plausible.<ref name="Chalmers-caipin"/> Traditional dualists such as Descartes believed the mental and the physical to be two separate [[Substance theory|substances]], or fundamental types of entities (hence "[[substance dualism]]"); some more recent dualists, however, accept only one substance, the physical, but state it has both mental and physical [[Property (philosophy)|properties]] (hence "[[property dualism]]").<ref name="iep-dualism"/>