Editing Operation Compass (section)

===Analysis===
{|class="wikitable" align=right style="margin:0 0 1em 1em"
|+Approximate numbers of [[PoW]] and equipment captured,<br>Western Desert and Cyrenaica<br>(9 December 1940&nbsp;– 8 February 1941){{sfn|Harding|1941}}
|-
! Place
! PoW
! Tanks
! Guns
|-
|Sidi<br />Barrani||align="right"|38,289||align="right"|73||align="right"|297
|-
|Sidi Omar||align="right"|900||align="right"|0||align="right"|8
|-
|Bardia||align="right"|42,000||align="right"|130||align="right"|275
|-
|Tobruk||align="right"|25,000||align="right"|87||align="right"|208
|-
|Mechili||align="right"|100||align="right"|13||align="right"|0
|-
|Derna<br>Benghazi||align="right"|2,000||align="right"|10||align="right"|24
|-
|Benghazi<br>Agedabia||align="right"|25,000||align="right"|107||align="right"|93
|-
|'''Total'''||align="right"|'''133,298'''||align="right"|'''420'''||align="right"|'''845'''
|}
The success of the 7th Armoured Division encouraged a belief in the [[Royal Tank Regiment]] that manoeuvre could win battles; the engagement with the [[Babini Group]] on 24 January, led to a conclusion that armoured divisions needed more artillery. No integration of tanks with infantry or the use of anti-tank guns offensively was considered necessary. The lack of cover in the desert encouraged dispersion to avoid air attack but this reduced firepower at the decisive point. Due to the lack of supplies and the shortage of transport, conservation during lulls also encouraged the use of "[[jock column]]s" (a small mobile force formed of a motorised infantry company, a field-gun battery and several armoured cars). The success of such columns against the Italians led to exaggerated expectations, which were confounded when German aircraft and better-equipped and -armed troops arrived in Libya. The 7th Armoured Division concluded that the defensive mentality of the Italians had justified the British taking of exceptional risks, which would be unjustified against German troops.{{sfn|French|2001|pp=215–216}}