Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Submarine communications cable
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
==== Technical vulnerabilities ==== The remoteness of these cables in international waters, poses significant challenges for continuous monitoring and increases their attractiveness as targets of physical tampering, [[data theft]], and service disruptions.<ref name=":4" /> The cables' vulnerability is further compounded by technological advancements, such as the development of [[unmanned underwater vehicle]]s (UUVs), which enable covert cable damage while avoiding detection.<ref name=":16">Wrathall, L. R. (2010). The vulnerability of subsea infrastructure to underwater attack: Legal shortcomings and the way forward. ''San Diego International Law Journal'', ''12''(1), 223–262. <nowiki>https://digital.sandiego.edu/ilj/vol12/iss1/8</nowiki></ref> However, even [[Low technology|low-tech]] attacks can impact the cable's security significantly, as demonstrated in 2013, when three divers were arrested for severing the main cable linking [[Egypt]] with Europe, drastically lowering Egypt's [[Bandwidth (computing)|internet speed]].<ref name=":11" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=2013-03-27 |title=Egypt catches divers cutting Internet cable amid disruptions |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/egypt-catches-divers-cutting-internet-cable-amid-disruptions-idUSBRE92Q1AQ/ |website=Reuters}}</ref> Even in shallow waters, cables remain exposed to risks, as illustrated in the context of the [[Korea Strait]].<ref name=":14">O’Malley, S. (2019). Assessing threats to South Korea's undersea communications cable infrastructure. ''The Korean Journal of International Studies'', ''17''(3), 385–414. https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.385</ref> Such sea passages are often marked as ‘maritime choke points’ where several nations have conflicting interests, increasing the risk of harm from shipping activities and disputes.<ref name=":5" /> Further, most cable locations are publicly available,<ref name=":5" /> making them an easy target for criminal acts such as disrupting services or stealing cable materials, which potentially lead to substantial [[Communications blackout|communication blackouts]].<ref name=":14" /><ref name=":17">Raha, U. K., & D., R. K. (2021). ''Submarine cables protection and regulations: A comparative analysis and model framework'' (pp. 1–177). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3436-9_1</ref> The stealing of submarine cable has been reported in [[Vietnam]], where more than 11 km of cables went missing in 2007 and were later presumed to be found on fishing boats, attributed to their incentives to sell them, according to media reports.<ref>Bdnews24.com. (2007, June 1). ''Vietnam's submarine cable lost and found''. Vietnam's submarine cable lost and found. https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/vietnam-s-submarine-cable-lost-and-fou nd</ref><ref>Khan, A. S. (2007, June 2). ''Vietnam's submarine cable 'lost' and 'found' — LIRNEasia''. LIRNEasia. https://lirneasia.net/2007/06/vietnams-submarine-cable-lost-and-found/</ref>
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)