Editing Tegetthoff-class battleship (section)

==== 1914–1915 ====
{{main|Adriatic Campaign of World War I}}
[[File:SMS Szent Istvan 1915.png|thumb|left|300px|''Szent István'' in Pola on 15 December 1915|alt=A large battleship steams through a harbor. Large clouds of smoke can be seen coming from the ship's funnels while a smaller vessel is sailing in the foreground. Hills and the coastline can be seen in the background.]]

Following France and Britain's declarations of war on Austria-Hungary on 11 and 12 August respectively, the French Admiral [[Augustin Boué de Lapeyrère]] was issued orders to close off Austro-Hungarian shipping at the entrance to the Adriatic Sea and to engage any Austro-Hungarian ships his Anglo-French fleet came across. Lapeyrère chose to attack the Austro-Hungarian ships blockading Montenegro. The ensuing [[Battle of Antivari]] ended Austria-Hungary's blockade, and effectively placed the entrance of the Adriatic Sea firmly in the hands of Britain and France.{{sfn|Koburger|2001|pp=33, 35}}{{sfn|Sondhaus|1994|p=251}}

After the breakout of ''Goeben'' and ''Breslau'', the ships of the ''Tegetthoff'' class saw very little action, spending much of their time in their base at Pola. The navy's general inactivity was partly caused by a fear of mines in the Adriatic.{{sfn|Halpern|1995|p=144}} Other factors contributed to the lack of naval activity among the ships of the ''Tegetthoff'' class in the first year of the war. Haus was fearful that direct confrontation with the French Navy, even if it should be successful, would weaken the Austro-Hungarian Navy to the point that Italy would have a free hand in the Adriatic.{{sfn|Sondhaus|1994|p=260}} This concern was so great to Haus that he wrote in September 1914, "So long as the possibility exists that Italy will declare war against us, I consider it my first duty to keep our fleet intact."{{sfn|Halpern|1987|p=30}} Haus' decision to use the Austro-Hungarian Navy as a [[fleet in being]] earned sharp criticism from the [[Austro-Hungarian Army]], the German Navy, and the Austro-Hungarian [[Foreign Ministry of Austria-Hungary|Foreign Ministry]],{{sfn|Sondhaus|1994|p=261}} but it also led to a far greater number of Entente naval forces being devoted to the Mediterranean and the Strait of Otranto. These could have been used elsewhere, such as against the Ottoman Empire during the [[Gallipoli Campaign]].{{sfn|Sondhaus|1994|pp=380–381}}

The most important factor contributing to the ''Tegetthoff''s spending most of their time at port may have been the lack of coal. Prior to the war, the United Kingdom had served as Austria-Hungary's primary source for coal. In the years before the war an increasing percentage of coal had come from mines in Germany, [[Virginia]] in the United States, and from domestic sources, but 75% of the coal purchased for the Austro-Hungarian Navy came from Britain. The outbreak of war meant that these sources, as well as those from Virginia, would no longer be available. Significant quantities of coal had been stockpiled before the war however, ensuring the navy was capable of sailing out of port if need be. Even so, the necessity of ensuring the navy's most important ships such as the ''Tegetthoff''s had the coal they needed in the event of an Italian or French attack or a major offensive operation resulted in the dreadnoughts remaining at port unless circumstances necessitated their deployment at sea.{{sfn|Sondhaus|1994|p=261}}{{sfn|Halpern|1995|p=144}}

In early 1915 Germany suggested that the Austro-Hungarian Navy conduct an attack on the Otranto Barrage in order to relieve pressure on the Ottoman Empire at the height of the Gallipoli Campaign. Haus rejected the proposal, countering that the French had pulled back their blockade to the southernmost end of the Adriatic Sea, and that none of the Anglo-French ships assigned to blockading the strait had been diverted to the Dardanelles.{{sfn|Sondhaus|1994|pp=266–267}}

Haus also advocated strongly in favor of keeping his battleships, in particular the ships of the ''Tegetthoff'' class, in reserve in the event of Italy's entry into the war on the side of the Entente. Haus believed that Italy would inevitably break her alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and that by keeping Austria-Hungary's battleships safe, they could rapidly be employed against Italy. This strategy enabled Austria-Hungary's battleships to engage the Italians shortly after Italy's declaration of war in May 1915.{{sfn|Sondhaus|1994|pp=269–270}}