Editing Unification of Germany (section)

== Founding a unified state ==
{{Blockquote|''There is, in political geography, no Germany proper to speak of. There are Kingdoms and Grand Duchies, and Duchies and Principalities, inhabited by Germans, and each [is] separately ruled by an independent sovereign with all the machinery of State. Yet there is a natural undercurrent tending to a national feeling and toward a union of the Germans into one great nation, ruled by one common head as a national unit.''|author= article from ''[[The New York Times]]'' published on July 1, 1866<ref>''[https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1866/07/01/79809602.pdf The Situation of Germany.]'' ([[Portable Document Format|PDF]])&nbsp;– ''[[The New York Times]]'', July 1, 1866.</ref>}}

=== Peace of Prague and the North German Confederation ===
The [[Peace of Prague (1866)|Peace of Prague]] sealed the dissolution of the [[German Confederation]]. Its former leading state, the Austrian Empire, was along with the majority of its allies excluded from the ensuing [[North German Confederation Treaty]] sponsored by Prussia which directly annexed [[Kingdom of Hanover|Hanover]], [[Electorate of Hesse|Hesse-Kassel]], [[Duke of Nassau|Nassau]], and the [[Free City of Frankfurt|city of Frankfurt]], while [[Grand Duchy of Hesse|Hesse Darmstadt]] lost some territory but kept its statehood. At the same time, the original East Prussian cradle of the Prussian statehood as well as the Prussian-held Polish- or Kashubian-speaking territories of [[Province of Posen]] and [[West Prussia]] were formally annexed into the [[North German Confederation]], thus Germany. Following adoption of the [[North German Constitution]], the new state obtained its own constitution, flag, and governmental and administrative structures.{{Citation needed|date=December 2024}}

Through military victory, Prussia under Bismarck's influence had overcome Austria's active resistance to the idea of a unified Germany. The states south of the [[Main (river)|Main]] River (Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria) signed separate treaties requiring them to pay indemnities and to form alliances bringing them into Prussia's sphere of influence.{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|p=910}} Austria's influence over the German states may have been broken, but the war also splintered the spirit of pan-German unity, as many German states resented Prussian power politics.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|1998|loc=Chapter V: ''From Reaction to Unification''|pp=225–269}}

=== Unified Italy and Austro-Hungarian Compromise ===
{{further|Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867}}
The [[Peace of Prague (1866)|Peace of Prague]] offered lenient terms to Austria but its relationship with the new nation-state of Italy underwent major restructuring. Although the Austrians were far more successful in the military field against Italian troops, the monarchy lost the important province of [[Kingdom of Lombardy–Venetia|Venetia]]. The Habsburgs ceded Venetia to France, which then formally transferred control to Italy.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Schjerve |first=Rosita Rindler |title=Diglossia and Power: Language Policies and Practice in the Nineteenth Century Habsburg Empire |date=2003 |publisher=De Gruyter |isbn=978-3-1101-7654-4 |location=Berlin |pages=199–200 |ol=9017475M}}</ref>

The end of Austrian dominance of the German states shifted Austria's attention to the Balkans. The reality of defeat for Austria also caused a reevaluation of internal divisions, local autonomy, and liberalism.<ref>{{Harvnb|Sheehan|1989|pp=909–910}}; {{Harvnb|Wawro|1996|loc=Chapter 11}}.</ref> In 1867, the Austrian emperor [[Franz Joseph I of Austria|Franz Joseph]] accepted a settlement (the [[Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867]]) in which he gave his Hungarian holdings equal status with his Austrian domains, creating the Dual Monarchy of [[Austria-Hungary]].{{Sfn|Sheehan|1989|pp=905–910}}

=== War with France ===

The French public resented the Prussian victory and demanded ''Revanche pour Sadová'' ("Revenge for Sadova"), illustrating anti-Prussian sentiment in France—a problem that would accelerate in the months leading up to the [[Franco-Prussian War]].<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Bridge |first1=Roy |title=The Great Powers and the European States System 1814–1914 |last2=Bullen |first2=Roger |date=2004 |publisher=Longman |isbn=978-0-5827-8458-1 |edition=2nd |ol=7882098M}}{{page needed|date=May 2025}}</ref> The Austro-Prussian War also damaged relations with the French government. At a meeting in [[Biarritz]] in September 1865 with [[Napoleon III]], Bismarck had let it be understood (or Napoleon had thought he understood) that France might annex parts of Belgium and [[Luxembourg]] in exchange for its neutrality in the war. These annexations did not happen, resulting in animosity from Napoleon towards Bismarck.{{Citation needed|date=December 2024}}

====Background====
{{Main|Causes of the Franco-Prussian War}} 
By 1870 three of the important lessons of the Austro-Prussian war had become apparent. The first lesson was that, through force of arms, a powerful state could challenge the old alliances and spheres of influence established in 1815. Second, through diplomatic maneuvering, a skilful leader could create an environment in which a rival state would declare war first, thus forcing states allied with the "victim" of external aggression to come to the leader's aid. Finally, as Prussian military capacity far exceeded that of Austria, Prussia was clearly the only state within the Confederation (or among the German states generally) capable of protecting all of them from potential interference or aggression. In 1866, most mid-sized German states had opposed Prussia, but by 1870 these states had been coerced and coaxed into mutually protective alliances with Prussia. If a European state declared war on one of their members, then they all would come to the defense of the attacked state. With skilful manipulation of European politics, Bismarck created a situation in which France would play the role of aggressor in German affairs, while Prussia would play that of the protector of German rights and liberties.{{Sfn|Howard|1968|pp=4–60}}

At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Metternich and his conservative allies had reestablished the Spanish monarchy under [[Ferdinand VII of Spain|King Ferdinand VII]]. Over the following forty years, the great powers supported the Spanish monarchy, but events in 1868 would further test the old system, finally providing the external trigger needed by Bismarck.{{Citation needed|date=December 2024}}

==== Spanish prelude ====
A revolution in Spain overthrew [[Isabella II of Spain|Queen Isabella II]], and the throne remained empty while Isabella lived in sumptuous exile in Paris. The Spanish, looking for a suitable Catholic successor, had offered the post to three European princes, each of whom was rejected by [[Napoleon III]], who served as regional power-broker. Finally, in 1870 the Regency offered the crown to [[Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern|Leopold]] of [[Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen]], a prince of the Catholic cadet Hohenzollern line. The ensuing furor has been dubbed by historians as the Hohenzollern candidature.{{Sfn|Howard|1968|pp=50–57}} Over the next few weeks, the Spanish offer turned into the talk of Europe. Bismarck encouraged Leopold to accept the offer.{{Sfn|Howard|1968|pp=55–56}} A successful installment of a Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen king in Spain would mean that two countries on either side of France would both have German kings of Hohenzollern descent. This may have been a pleasing prospect for Bismarck, but it was unacceptable to either Napoleon III or to [[Agenor, duc de Gramont]], his minister of foreign affairs. Gramont wrote a sharply formulated ultimatum to Wilhelm, as head of the Hohenzollern family, stating that if any Hohenzollern prince should accept the crown of Spain, the French government would respond—although he left ambiguous the nature of such response. The prince withdrew as a candidate, thus defusing the crisis, but the French ambassador to Berlin would not let the issue lie.{{Sfn|Howard|1968|pp=56–57}} He approached the Prussian king directly while Wilhelm was vacationing in [[Bad Ems|Ems Spa]], demanding that the King release a statement saying he would never support the installation of a Hohenzollern on the throne of Spain. Wilhelm refused to give such an encompassing statement, and he sent Bismarck a dispatch by telegram describing the French demands. Bismarck used the king's telegram, called the [[Ems Dispatch]], as a template for a short statement to the press. With its wording shortened and sharpened by Bismarck—and further alterations made in the course of its translation by the French agency [[Havas]]—the Ems Dispatch raised an angry furor in France. The French public, still aggravated over the defeat at Sadová, demanded war.{{Sfn|Howard|1968|pp=55–59}}

==== Open hostilities and the disastrous end of the Second French Empire ====
[[File:BismarckundNapoleonIII.jpg|thumb|alt=a tired sick old man in French military uniform, sitting beside an erect senior officer in Prussian uniform, spiked helmet, and sword|Emperor Napoleon III (left) at Sedan, on 2 September 1870, seated next to Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, holding Napoleon's surrendered sword. The defeat of the French army destabilized Napoleon's regime; a revolution in Paris established the [[French Third Republic|Third French Republic]], and the war continued.]]

Napoleon III had tried to secure territorial concessions from both sides before and after the Austro-Prussian War, but despite his role as mediator during the peace negotiations, he ended up with nothing. He then hoped that Austria would join in a war of revenge and that its former allies—particularly the southern German states of Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria—would join in the cause. This hope would prove futile since the 1866 treaty came into effect and united all German states militarily—if not happily—to fight against France. Instead of a war of revenge against Prussia, supported by various German allies, France engaged in a war against all of the German states without any allies of its own.{{Sfn|Howard|1968|pp=64–68}}

The reorganization of the military by [[Albrecht von Roon|von Roon]] and the operational strategy of [[Helmuth von Moltke the Elder|Moltke]] combined against France to great effect. The speed of Prussian mobilization astonished the French, and the Prussian ability to concentrate power at specific points—reminiscent of Napoleon I's strategies seventy years earlier—overwhelmed French mobilization. Utilizing their efficiently laid rail grid, Prussian troops were delivered to battle areas rested and prepared to fight, whereas French troops had to march for considerable distances to reach combat zones. After a number of battles, notably [[Battle of Spicheren|Spicheren]], [[Battle of Wörth (1870)|Wörth]], [[Battle of Mars-la-Tour|Mars la Tour]], and [[Battle of Gravelotte|Gravelotte]], the Prussians defeated the main French armies and advanced on the primary city of [[Metz]] and the French capital of Paris. They captured Napoleon III and took an entire army as prisoners at [[Battle of Sedan|Sedan]] on 1 September 1870.{{Sfn|Howard|1968|pp=218–222}}

==== Proclamation of the German Empire ====
[[File:Wernerprokla.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=painting of well dressed and portly princes and dukes cheering a king on a dais|January 18, 1871: The proclamation of the [[German Empire]] in the [[Hall of Mirrors]] at the [[Palace of Versailles]]. [[Otto von Bismarck|Bismarck]] appears in white. The Grand Duke of Baden stands beside Wilhelm, leading the cheers. Crown Prince Friedrich, later [[Frederick III, German Emperor|Friedrich III]], stands on his father's right. Painting by [[Anton von Werner]]]]
{{main|Proclamation of the German Empire}}
The humiliating capture of the French emperor and the loss of the French army itself, which marched into captivity at a makeshift camp in the Saarland ("Camp Misery"), threw the French government into turmoil; Napoleon's energetic opponents overthrew his government and proclaimed the [[French Third Republic|Third Republic]].{{Sfn|Howard|1968|pp=222–230}} "In the days after Sedan, Prussian envoys met with the French and demanded a large cash indemnity as well as the cession of Alsace and Lorraine. All parties in France rejected the terms, insisting that any armistice be forged "on the basis of territorial integrity." France, in other words, would pay reparations for starting the war, but would, in Jules Favre's famous phrase, "cede neither a clod of our earth nor a stone of our fortresses".{{Sfn|Wawro|2003|p=235}} The German High Command expected an overture of peace from the French, but the new republic refused to surrender. The Prussian army [[Investment (military)|invested]] Paris and [[Siege of Paris (1870–1871)|held it under siege until mid-January]], with the city being "ineffectually bombarded".{{Sfn|Taylor|1988|p=126}} Nevertheless, in January, the Germans fired some 12,000 shells, 300–400 grenades daily into the city.{{Sfn|Howard|1968|pp=357–370}} On January 18, 1871, the German princes and senior military commanders [[William I of Germany#Emperor|proclaimed Wilhelm "German Emperor"]] in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles.<ref>[http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/kaiserreich/innenpolitik/reichsgruendung/index.html Die Reichsgründung 1871] (The Foundation of the Empire, 1871), Lebendiges virtuelles Museum Online, accessed 2008-12-22. German text translated: [...] on the wishes of Wilhelm I, on the 170th anniversary of the elevation of the House of Brandenburg to princely status on January 18, 1701, the assembled German princes and high military officials proclaimed Wilhelm I as German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at the Versailles Palace.</ref> Under the subsequent [[Treaty of Frankfurt (1871)|Treaty of Frankfurt]], France relinquished most of its traditionally German regions ([[Alsace]] and the German-speaking part of [[Lorraine (province)|Lorraine]]); paid an indemnity, calculated (on the basis of population) as the precise equivalent of the indemnity that Napoleon Bonaparte imposed on Prussia in 1807;{{Sfn|Taylor|1988|p=133}} and accepted German administration of Paris and most of northern France, with "German troops to be withdrawn stage by stage with each installment of the indemnity payment".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Crankshaw |first=Edward |title=Bismarck |date=1981 |publisher=The Viking Press |isbn=0-3333-4038-8 |location=New York |page=299 |ol=28022489M}}</ref>

==== War as ″the capstone of the unification process″ ====
Victory in the Franco-Prussian War proved the capstone of the unification process. In the first half of the 1860s, Austria and Prussia both contended to speak for the German states; both maintained they could support German interests abroad and protect German interests at home. In responding to the Schleswig-Holstein Question, they both proved equally diligent in doing so. After the victory over Austria in 1866, Prussia began internally asserting its authority to speak for the German states and defend German interests, while Austria began directing more and more of its attention to possessions in the Balkans. The victory over France in 1871 expanded Prussian hegemony in the German states (aside from Austria) to the international level. With the proclamation of Wilhelm as ''Kaiser'', Prussia assumed the leadership of the new empire. The southern states became officially incorporated into a unified Germany at the [[Treaty of Versailles of 1871]] (signed 26 February 1871; later ratified in the [[Treaty of Frankfurt (1871)|Treaty of Frankfurt]] of 10 May 1871), which formally ended the war.{{Sfn|Howard|1968|pp=432–456|loc=Chapter XI: the Peace}} Although Bismarck had led the transformation of Germany from a loose confederation into a federal [[nation state]], he had not done it alone. Unification was achieved by building on a tradition of legal collaboration under the Holy Roman Empire and economic collaboration through the ''Zollverein.'' The difficulties of the ''Vormärz'', the impact of the 1848 liberals, the importance of von Roon's military reorganization, and von Moltke's strategic brilliance all played a part in political unification.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|1998|pp=255–257}} "Einheit – unity – was achieved at the expense of Freiheit – freedom. The German Empire became," in Karl Marx's words, "a military despotism cloaked in parliamentary forms with a feudal ingredient, influenced by the bourgeoisie, festooned with bureaucrats and guarded by police." Indeed, many historians would see Germany's "escape into war" in 1914 as a flight from all of the internal-political contradictions forged by Bismarck at Versailles in the fall of 1870.{{Sfn|Wawro|2003|p=302}}

=== Internal political and administrative unification ===

The new [[German Empire]] included 26 political entities: twenty-five constituent states (or ''Bundesstaaten'') and one Imperial Territory (or ''Reichsland''). It realized the ''[[Kleindeutsche Lösung]]'' ("Lesser German Solution", with the exclusion of Austria) as opposed to a ''[[German question|Großdeutsche Lösung]]'' or "Greater German Solution", which would have included Austria. Unifying various states into one nation required more than some military victories, however much these might have boosted morale. It also required a rethinking of political, social, and cultural behaviors and the construction of new metaphors about "us" and "them". Who were the new members of this new nation? What did they stand for? How were they to be organized?{{Sfn|Confino|1997}}

==== Constituent states of the Empire ====
Though often characterized as a federation of monarchs, the German Empire, strictly speaking, federated a group of 26 constituent entities with different forms of government, ranging from the main four constitutional monarchies to the three republican [[Hanseatic League|Hanseatic]] cities.{{Sfn|Evans|2005|p=1}}

{{German Empire States|width=700|include_list=y}}
{{Clear}}

==== Political structure of the Empire ====

The 1866 [[North German Constitution]] became (with some semantic adjustments) the 1871 [[Constitution of the German Empire]]. With this constitution, the new Germany acquired some democratic features: notably the [[Reichstag (German Empire)|Imperial Diet]], which—in contrast to the parliament of Prussia—gave citizens representation on the basis of elections by direct and equal [[Universal suffrage|suffrage]] of all males who had reached the age of 25. Furthermore, elections were generally free of chicanery, engendering pride in the national parliament.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|1998|p=267}} However, legislation required the consent of the ''Bundesrat'', the federal council of deputies from the states, in and over which Prussia had a powerful influence; Prussia could appoint 17 of 58 delegates with only 14 votes needed for a veto. Prussia thus exercised influence in both bodies, with executive power vested in the Prussian King as ''Kaiser'', who appointed the federal chancellor. The chancellor was accountable solely to, and served entirely at the discretion of, the Emperor. Officially, the chancellor functioned as a one-man cabinet and was responsible for the conduct of all state affairs; in practice, the [[State Secretary|State Secretaries]] (bureaucratic top officials in charge of such fields as finance, war, foreign affairs, etc.) acted as unofficial portfolio ministers. With the exception of the years 1872–1873 and 1892–1894, the imperial chancellor was always simultaneously the prime minister of the imperial dynasty's hegemonic home-kingdom, Prussia. The Imperial Diet had the power to pass, amend, or reject bills, but it could not initiate legislation. (The power of initiating legislation rested with the chancellor.) The other states retained their own governments, but the military forces of the smaller states came under Prussian control. The militaries of the larger states (such as the Kingdoms of [[Kingdom of Bavaria|Bavaria]] and [[Kingdom of Saxony|Saxony]]) retained some autonomy, but they underwent major reforms to coordinate with Prussian military principles and came under federal government control in wartime.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|1998|pp=225–301}}

==== Historical arguments and the Empire's social anatomy ====
[[File:Niederwald memorial 1.JPG|thumb|alt=Statue of the allegorical figure Germania|''Germania'', also called the [[Niederwalddenkmal|Niederwald Monument]], was erected in 1877–83 at [[Rüdesheim am Rhein|Rüdesheim]].]]

The ''Sonderweg'' hypothesis attributed Germany's difficult 20th century to the weak political, legal, and economic basis of the new empire. The Prussian [[landed elite]]s, the ''[[Prussian Junkers|Junkers]]'', retained a substantial share of political power in the unified state. The ''Sonderweg'' hypothesis attributed their power to the absence of a revolutionary breakthrough by the middle classes, or by peasants in combination with the urban workers, in 1848 and again in 1871. Recent research into the role of the Grand Bourgeoisie—which included bankers, merchants, industrialists, and entrepreneurs—in the construction of the new state has largely refuted the claim of political and economic dominance of the ''Junkers'' as a social group. This newer scholarship has demonstrated the importance of the merchant classes of the [[Hanseatic League|Hanseatic cities]] and the industrial leadership (the latter particularly important in the Rhineland) in the ongoing development of the Second Empire.<ref>{{Harvnb|Blackbourn|Eley|1984}}; {{Harvnb|Blickle|2004}}; {{Harvnb|Scribner|Ogilvie|1996}}.{{page needed|date=May 2025}}</ref>

Additional studies of different groups in Wilhelmine Germany have all contributed to a new view of the period. Although the ''Junkers'' did, indeed, continue to control the officer corps, they did not dominate social, political, and economic matters as much as the ''Sonderweg'' theorists had hypothesized. Eastern ''Junker'' power had a counterweight in the western provinces in the form of the Grand Bourgeoisie and in the growing professional class of bureaucrats, teachers, professors, doctors, lawyers, scientists, etc.<ref>See, e.g.: {{Cite book |last=Eley |first=Geoff |title=Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change After Bismarck |date=1980 |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=0-3000-2386-3 |location=New Haven |oclc=5353122 |ol=4416729M |author-link=Geoff Eley}}; {{Harvnb|Evans|2005}}; {{Cite book |author-link=Richard J. Evans |first= Richard J. |last=Evans |title=Society and politics in Wilhelmine Germany |location=London and New York |publisher=Barnes & Noble |date=1978 |ol=21299242M |isbn=0-06-492036-4 |oclc=3934998}}; {{Harvnb|Nipperdey|1996}}; {{Harvnb|Sperber|1984}}.{{page needed|date=May 2025}}</ref>