Editing Consequentialism (section)

==Criticisms==
[[G. E. M. Anscombe]] objects to the consequentialism of Sidgwick on the grounds that the moral worth of an action is premised on the predictive capabilities of the individual, relieving them of the responsibility for the "badness" of an act should they "make out a case for not having foreseen" negative consequences.<ref name="Anscombe"/>

[[Immanuel Kant]] makes a similar argument against consequentialism in the case of the inquiring murder. The example asks whether or not it would be right to give false statement to an inquiring murderer in order to misdirect the individual away from the intended victim. He argues, in [[On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives]], that lying from "benevolent motives," here the motive to maximize the good consequences by protecting the intended victim, should then make the liar responsible for the consequences of the act. For example, it could be that by misdirecting the inquiring murder away from where one thought the intended victim was actually directed the murder to the intended victim.<ref>Kant, I.: 1898, ‘On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives’, In: T.K. Abbott (trans.), Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics. London: Longmans, Green and Co.</ref> That such an act is immoral mirrors Anscombe's objection to Sidgwick that his consequentialism would problematically absolve the consequentalist of moral responsibility when the consequentalist fails to foresee the true consequences of an act.

The [[Chaos theory|future amplification of the effects of small decisions]]<ref>Gregersen, Hal B., and Lee Sailer. 1993. "Chaos theory and its implications for social science research." ''[[Human Relations (journal)|Human Relations]]'' 46(7):777–802. {{doi|10.1177/001872679304600701}}. [https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1993-43681-001 Abstract].</ref> is an important factor that makes it more difficult to predict the ethical value of consequences,<ref>[[James Lenman|Lenman, James]]. 2000. "[https://www.jstor.org/stable/2672830?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents Consequentialism and Cluelessness]." ''[[Philosophy & Public Affairs]]'' 29(4):342–70.</ref> even though most would agree that only predictable consequences are charged with a [[moral responsibility]].<ref name=":2">[[Mohr Siebeck|Siebeck, Mohr]]. 2018. "Revisiting Max Weber's Ethic of Responsibility." ''Perspektiven Der Ethik'' 12. p. 67.</ref>

<!-- Image with inadequate rationale removed: [[File:BernardWilliams.jpg|thumb|left|[[Bernard Williams]]]] -->
[[Bernard Williams]] has argued that consequentialism is alienating because it requires moral agents to put too much distance between themselves and their own projects and commitments. Williams argues that consequentialism requires moral agents to take a strictly impersonal view of all actions, since it is only the consequences, and not who produces them, that are said to matter. Williams argues that this demands too much of moral agents—since (he claims) consequentialism demands that they be willing to sacrifice any and all personal projects and commitments in any given circumstance in order to pursue the most beneficent course of action possible. He argues further that consequentialism fails to make sense of intuitions that it can matter whether or not someone is personally the author of a particular consequence. For example, that participating in a crime can matter, even if the crime would have been committed anyway, or would even have been worse, without the agent's participation.<!-- This really needs a quick discussion of William's firing-squad example. Maybe I'll add this later; but I wouldn't mind if someone beat me to it, either. --><ref name="Williams1973">[[J. J. C. Smart|Smart, J. J. C.]], and [[Bernard Williams]]. 1973. ''Utilitarianism: For and Against''. [[Cambridge University Press]]. pp. 98 ff.</ref>

Some consequentialists—most notably [[Peter Railton]]—have attempted to develop a form of consequentialism that acknowledges and avoids the objections raised by Williams. Railton argues that Williams's criticisms can be avoided by adopting a form of consequentialism in which moral decisions are to be determined by the sort of life that they express. On his account, the agent should choose the sort of life that will, on the whole, produce the best overall effects.<ref name="Scheffler"/>